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English summary 
The effect of corporate governance and managers on the value of companies has 
received great attention in the recent public debate. In the academic research, this 
increased attention has been associated with an effort to develop finer conceptual 
frameworks and analytical techniques to assess how governance and financial 
characteristics influence corporate policies and profitability. 
 While theoretical models represent a successful approach under specific 
hypotheses, the econometric analysis of corporate governance and managerial 
characteristics has proven to be extremely challenging. Because governance and 
managerial characteristics are equilibrium outcomes largely determined by the firm 
itself, it is methodologically difficult to separate out their determinants from their 
consequences to infer causal effects. Since its infancy the empirical corporate 
governance and corporate finance research has faced this problem, which is often 
responsible for mixed empirical results. 
In my dissertation, I adopt a common methodological framework developed in 
the “program evaluation” literature to shed new light on the effects of governance and 
managerial characteristics on a variety of corporate policies and, ultimately, firm 
performance. In particular, I estimate a class of difference-in-differences models 
deriving the empirical identifications from policy changes that generate “quasi-natural 
experiments”. 
The first chapter of my dissertation analyzes the corporate value of political 
connections between managers and the political sector. Connections with politicians 
are commonly seen as a valuable asset for companies in corrupt institutional 
environments. I contribute to this stream of research by analyzing politically connected 
firms in Denmark, which is typically considered as one of the most transparent 
countries in the world. Moreover, I offer a new empirical identification based on a 
difference-in-differences model which exploits the passage of an administrative reform 
to generate exogenous variations in the decisional power of local politicians connected 
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with firms through family ties. My findings indicate that political networking is a 
powerful business strategy even in a non-corrupt environment: firms family-connected 
with politicians that became more powerful following the administrative reform 
systematically outperform firms connected with politicians that did not experience any 
change. Furthermore, I show that the mechanism that generates this corporate 
performance is partly related to doing more business with the public sector. 
The second chapter of my dissertation examines how corporate governance 
shapes the competitive ability of firms. When competition acts as a disciplining 
mechanism, as argued by a large strand of governance research, we should expect that, 
in equilibrium, competition mitigates the negative effects of worse corporate 
governance. Yet, if worse governance entails managerial slack then, at least in the 
short term, worse-governed firms may suffer from the inability to timely respond to a 
sudden increase in competition. My empirical analysis provides strong support for this 
notion: U.S. firms that are exogenously endowed with worse governance are more 
vulnerable to a subsequent increase in competitive pressures, as induced by the 
passage of the U.S. – Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989. Furthermore, 
I show that one of the channels driving the effect is the increase in financial constraints 
for worse-governed firms, which may endanger firms’ ability to adapt to the new 
environment and expose them to predatory actions by the competitors. 
Although financial constraints influence a broad array of corporate outcomes, 
innovation expenses have long been considered as one of the investment policies most 
susceptible to changes in the availability of financial resources. The third chapter of 
my dissertation contributes to this literature by examining the effect of a wider access 
to external finance on firms’ innovative performance. My empirical approach exploits 
the passage of banking deregulations in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s, which 
increased the supply of credit for bank-dependent firms, improved the quality of 
financial intermediation, and provided banks with an opportunity to geographically 
diversify credit risk. My main result shows that U.S. firms exposed to the deregulation 
of banking activities across states increased significantly the quantity and quality of 
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their innovation activities, as measured by patent-based metrics. In exploring the 
channels behind this effect, I provide evidence that the effect is partly driven by a 
better diversification of deregulated banks. Moreover, I show that the effect is driven 
by an increase in innovation inputs associated with a relaxation of financial 
constraints. Finally, I find that the positive effect of banking deregulations on 
innovation is not influenced by simultaneous policies that affected the quality of 
corporate governance. 
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Dansk resumé 
Effekten af virksomhedsledelse og -ledere i forhold til virksomheders værdi er blevet 
genstand for stor bevågenhed i nyere offentlig debat. Inden for akademisk forskning 
har denne bevågenhed været knyttet til bestræbelserne på at udvikle et mere udbygget 
begrebsapparat og analytiske metoder til at vurdere, hvordan ledelse og finansielle 
karakteristika influerer virksomhedspolitik og -rentabilitet.   
 Mens teoretiske modeller udgør en udbytterig metode i forhold til specifikke 
hypoteser, har den økonometriske analyse af virksomhedsledelse og 
ledelseskarakteristika vist sig at være yderst udfordrende. Idet ledelse og 
ledelseskarakteristika er resultat af ligevægt, som hovedsageligt er bestemt af firmaet 
selv, er det metodisk vanskeligt at afgrænse deres determinanter fra deres 
konsekvenser for at kunne udlede kausale virkninger. Siden dets fremkost har den 
empiriske forskning i virksomhedsledelse og virksomhedsfinansiering stået over for 
dette problem, som ofte har været årsag til sammenblandede empiriske resultater.  
 I min afhandling anvender jeg et alment metodologisk apparat, der er udviklet 
inden for programevaluering, for at kaste nyt lys over effekterne af styreformer og 
ledelsesegenskaber i forskellige virksomhedspolitikker og i sidste instans 
virksomheders præstation. Især estimerer jeg en type ”difference-in-differences” 
modeller, som udleder de empiriske kendetegn for policyændringer, der generer 
”quasi-naturlige eksperimenter”.  
 Det første kapitel af min afhandling analyserer virksomhedernes værdi af 
politiske forbindelser mellem ledere og den politiske sektor. Forbindelser med 
politikere er ofte set som et værdifuldt aktiv for virksomheder i korrupte institutionelle 
omgivelser. Jeg bidrager til denne forskningsgren ved at analysere politisk forbundne 
erhvervsvirksomheder i Danmark, der typisk anses som et af de mest åbne lande i 
verden. Ydermere fremsætter jeg en ny empirisk identifikation baseret på en 
’difference-in-differences’-model, som benytter vedtagelsen af en administrativ 
reform, der sigter mod at generere eksogen variation i beslutningskraften hos lokale 
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politikere, der er forbundne til firmaer gennem familie. Mine fund indikerer, at politisk 
networking er en slagkraftig virksomhedsstrategi selv i et ikke-korrupt miljø; firmaer, 
der er forbundet gennem familie med politikere, der fik mere magt som følge af den 
administrative reform, klarer sig systematisk bedre end firmaer, som er forbundet med 
politikere, der ikke oplevede nogen ændring. Derudover viser jeg, at den mekanisme, 
der generer denne virksomhedspræstation, delvist er forbundet med at gøre flere 
forretninger med den offentlige sektor.    
 Andet kapitel af min afhandling undersøger, hvordan virksomhedsledelse former 
virksomheders konkurrenceevne. Når konkurrence fungerer som mekanisme for 
disciplin, som en lang streng af ledelsesforskning argumenterer for, bør vi forvente, at 
konkurrence i ligevægtssituationen mindsker negative effekter af dårligere 
virksomhedsledelse. Men hvis dårligere styring fører til træg styring, i det mindste på 
den korte bane, vil dårligt ledede virksomheder lide under en manglende evne til 
rettidigt at handle på en pludselig konkurrenceøgning. Min empiriske analyse 
underbygger denne opfattelse: Amerikanske firmaer, der er eksogent udstyret med 
dårligere styring er mere sårbare over for efterfølgende forøgelse af konkurrencepres, 
foranlediget af vedtagelsen af ”the U.S. – Canada Free Trade Agreement” (CUSTFA) i 
1989. Derudover viser jeg, at en af de faktorer, der styrer effekten, er forøgelse af 
dårligt ledede virksomheders økonomiske begrænsninger, hvilket kan true 
virksomheders evne til at tilpasse de nye forudsætninger samt eksponere dem for 
destruktive adfærd fra deres konkurrenters side.  
 Selvom finansielle begrænsninger har indflydelse på en lang række af 
virksomhedens resultater, har udgifter til innovation længe været anset som en af de 
investeringspolitikker, der er mest sårbare i forhold til ændringer i tilgængeligheden af 
økonomiske ressourcer. Det tredje kapitel i min afhandling bidrager til denne 
forskning ved at undersøge effekterne af en bredere adgang til ekstern finansiering af 
virksomheders innovative performance. Min empiriske tilgang benytter vedtagelsen af 
bankderegulering i USA gennem 1970erne og 1980erne, der øgede udbuddet af kredit 
for bankafhængige virksomheder, forbedrede kvaliteten af finansiel formidling samt 
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udstyrede banker med en mulighed for at sprede kreditrisici geografisk. Mit 
hovedresultat viser, at amerikanske virksomheder, der er udsat for deregulering af 
bankaktiviteter på tværs af delstater, øgede kvaliteten og kvantiteten af deres 
aktiviteter inden for innovation signifikant målt ved patentbaserede metrik. I 
udforskningen af de bagvedliggende kanaler til denne effekt, beviser jeg, at effekten 
delvist er drevet af en bedre spredning af deregulerede banker. Ydermere viser jeg, at 
effekten er drevet af en øgning i innovationstilførsel i forbindelse med en lempelse af 
finansielle begrænsninger. Endelig finder jeg, at den positive effekt af 
bankdereguleringer vedrørende innovation ikke bliver influeret af samtidige politikker, 
der påvirker kvaliteten af virksomhedsledelse. 
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Introduction
The effect of managers and corporate governance mechanisms on the value of 
companies has received great attention in the recent public debate. In the academic 
research, this increased attention has been associated with an effort to develop finer 
conceptual frameworks and analytical techniques apt to assess how governance and 
financial characteristics influence corporate policies and, ultimately, the performance 
of firms. 
While theoretical models represent a successful approach under specific 
hypotheses, the econometric analysis of governance and managerial characteristics has 
proven to be extremely challenging. The problem arises because governance and 
managerial characteristics are equilibrium outcomes largely determined by the firm 
itself, and that makes methodologically difficult to separate out their determinants 
from their consequences in order to infer causal relationships. A positive association, 
for instance, between observed measures of profitability and corporate governance 
could indicate that good governance improves firm performance. However, scholars 
have acknowledged that such inference is typically plagued by two problems. First, 
companies may adopt effective governance mechanisms in response to good 
performance, in which case, corporate governance is not the determinant but rather the 
consequence of firm performance. Second, the quality of corporate governance may be 
correlated with factors (e.g. CEO’s preferences) that are not observed by the researcher 
but that directly affect firm policies; in this case, one would wrongly attribute the 
effect of such omitted factors to corporate governance. These two problems represent 
the most common cases of endogeneity, either in the form of reverse causality or in the 
form of omitted factor bias. 
Since its infancy, the empirical corporate governance and corporate finance 
research has faced these methodological problems, which are often responsible for 
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mixed empirical results.1 Roberts and Whited recently considered endogeneity as: “the 
most important and pervasive issue confronting studies in empirical corporate 
finance”.2 Yet, the importance of establishing causal effect in corporate governance 
goes beyond the academic research agenda and entails a practical relevance for e.g. 
investors interested in identifying firm characteristics that yield high returns, and 
policy-makers that need to assess and compare the effectiveness of different policy 
interventions. 
In my dissertation, I adopt a common methodological framework developed in 
the “program evaluation” literature to shed new light on the effects of governance and 
managerial characteristics on a variety of corporate policies and, ultimately, on firm 
performance. In particular, I estimate a class of difference-in-differences models 
deriving the empirical identifications from policy changes that generate “quasi-natural 
experiments”. This approach has recently emerged as an effective way to handle the 
problems plaguing the empirical research in corporate governance and corporate 
finance. For example, Adams et al. (2010) write that “empirical work will need to 
continue to devise ways of dealing with the joint endogeneity issue”, and explicitly 
refers to natural experiments generated by legislative changes as an approach that can 
help in solving this issue.3 The main advantage of this approach is that, under a 
relatively small set of assumptions, it permits to control for major confounding effects 
such as common trends and omitted factors, thereby helping to identify causal 
relationships. 
The first chapter of my dissertation analyzes the corporate value of political 
connections between managers and the political sector. Connections with politicians 
are commonly seen as a valuable asset for companies. However, existing research has 
estimated the value of political connections primarily in corrupt institutional 
environments, such as Indonesia and Thailand, where these benefits are expected to be 

1 See e.g. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) on the 
relationship between ownership structures and corporate performance. 
2Roberts and Whited (2011, pg.1)
3 Adams et al. (2010, pg. 98) 
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the largest.4 By contrast, I concentrate the analysis on Denmark, which the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) ranks as one of the most transparent countries in the world.5 
My empirical analysis is based on a difference-in-differences model which exploits the 
passage of an administrative reform in Denmark to generate exogenous variations in 
the decisional power of local politicians that are connected with firms through family 
ties. My findings indicate that political networking is a powerful business strategy 
even in a non-corrupt environment: firms family-connected with politicians that 
became more powerful following the administrative reform systematically outperform 
firms connected with politicians that did not experience any change. Furthermore, I 
show that the increase in corporate performance partly arises from doing more 
business with the public sector, whereas the relaxation of connected firms’ financial 
constraints, documented by previous works in emerging economies (e.g. Claessens et 
al. 2008), does not play a significant role. 
The second chapter of my dissertation examines how corporate governance 
shapes the competitive ability of firms. When competition acts as a disciplining 
mechanism, as argued by a large strand of research, we should expect that in 
equilibrium competition mitigates the negative effects of worse corporate governance. 
Yet, if worse governance entails managerial slack then, at least in the short term, 
worse-governed firms may suffer from the inability to timely respond to a sudden 
increase in competition. My analysis provides strong support for this notion: U.S. 
firms that are exogenously endowed with worse governance are more vulnerable to a 
subsequent increase in competitive pressures, as induced by the passage of the U.S. – 
Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989. Furthermore, my analysis shows 
that one of the channels driving the effect is the increase in financial constraints for 
worse-governed firms, which may endanger firms’ ability to adapt to the new 
environment and expose them to predatory actions by the competitors. 

4 See, in particular, Fisman (2001) and Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009). 
5 The CPI is a ranking of perceived corruption assembled published by Transparency International, a 
non-governmental organization. Denmark ranked second in 2009, first in 2010, and second in 2011 
(source: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi). 
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Although financial constraints influence a broad array of corporate outcomes, 
innovation expenses have long been considered as one of the investments most 
susceptible to changes in the availability of financial resources. Starting from this 
notion, a recent literature has focused on the relationship between finance and 
innovation (e.g. Atanassov et al. 2007; Bernstein 2011; Brown et al. 2009; Benfratello 
et al. 2008). In the third chapter of my dissertation, I contribute to this literature by 
examining the effect of a wider access to external finance on firms’ innovative 
performance. My empirical approach exploits the passage of banking deregulations in 
the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s, which increased the supply of credit for bank-
dependent firms, improved the quality of financial intermediation, and provided banks 
with better opportunities to geographically diversify their credit risk. My main result 
shows that U.S. firms exposed to the deregulation of banking activities across states 
increased significantly the quantity and quality of their innovation activities, as 
measured by patent-based metrics. In exploring the channels behind this effect, I 
provide evidence suggesting that the effect is partly driven by a better diversification 
of deregulated banks, which encouraged lending to riskier companies. Moreover, I 
show that the effect is driven by an increase in innovation inputs associated with a 
relaxation of financial constraints. Finally, I find that the positive effect of banking 
deregulations on innovation is not influenced by simultaneous policies that affected the 
quality of corporate governance. 
To conclude, the overall contribution of my dissertation is threefold. First, it 
links three governance and financial characteristics to firms’ success, measured using 
indicators of accounting profitability, market value, and innovative performance. 
Second, it provides a thorough methodological assessment of the causality 
relationships using quasi-natural experiments derived from policy changes. Third, it 
explores the specific mechanisms that generate the performance effects; in particular, 
the provision of services to the public sector (first chapter) and the changes in financial 
constraints (second and third chapters). 
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Abstract
Applying difference-in-differences, matching, discontinuity, and selection models, we 
use exogenous variations from an administrative reform to identify a positive causal 
effect of political power on the operating performance of firms that have blood-related 
ties to local politicians. An increase in power boosts blood-related firm revenues and 
proves especially valuable in service sectors and when local outsourcing increases, 
suggesting that the performance increase is related to doing more business with local 
governments. Focusing on connections between firms and local politicians in the 
world’s least corrupt country, we conclude that political networking is a valuable 
business strategy even in settings where connections are expected to be least relevant. 
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1. Introduction 
We use an administrative reform that exogenously increased the size of a majority of 
municipalities in Denmark to identify the causal effect of political power on the 
performance of firms that have blood ties to local politicians. We find that, compared 
to a control group of firms connected with unchanged municipalities, blood-related 
firms prosper when the average power of local politicians increases. Furthermore, we 
provide supporting evidence that this effect is driven by an increase in business 
activities with the public sector. 
A number of studies indicate that political connections have a large positive 
effect on firm performance in countries with weak institutions (Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang 2009; Cingano and Pinotti 2011; Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 
2003; Li et al. 2008). By contrast, evidence from developed countries is ambiguous. In 
the U.S., for example, Goldman et al. (2009a) and Jayachandran (2006) find that 
political connections have a positive and economically relevant value. However, 
Fisman et al. (2006) show that the effect of being connected with former Vice 
President Dick Cheney was zero. Acemoglu et al. (2010) argue that political 
connections may be beneficial but mainly in times of economic distress. 
We use a natural experiment to estimate the effect of being connected with local 
politicians in Denmark, which the well-respected Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
classifies as the least corrupt country over the last four years.6 In other words, we 
investigate the value of political ties in an institutional environment where our prior 
assumption is that such ties are least valuable. Contrary to this expectation, our results 
support the notion that political networks are of great importance in all countries 
around the world and at all political levels. 
We contribute to the literature in both providing new economic insight and 
introducing a novel identification strategy. First, we show how exogenous increases in 
political power affect connected firms. We provide evidence for a positive relationship 

6 The CPI, formulated by Transparency International, ranked Denmark 2nd in 2009, 1st in 2010, and 2nd 
in 2011.
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between district size and connected firms’ performance: our unconditional correlations 
show that doubling a district’s population/expenditure/outsourcing improves connected 
firms’ performance by 105/77/80 percent. This picture is consistent with the notion 
that centralization leads to more rent-seeking (Fisman and Gatti 2002) and lower 
internal political efficacy (Dreyer Lassen and Serritzlew 2011). Thus, we build a 
bridge between research on the corporate value of political connections and the vast 
literature that investigates how the design of political institutions shapes politicians’ 
rent-seeking behavior.7 Our analysis also complements a larger discussion of how 
government spending affects firm activities (Cohen et al. 2011). 
 Second, we propose a novel identification strategy to estimate the causal impact 
of political connection on firms’ operating returns.8 While event studies have been 
used to assess the stock price impact of political connections (e.g. Fisman 2001; Faccio 
and Parsley 2009), identifying the effect on accounting measures of performance has 
proven to be extremely difficult due to the challenge in choosing appropriate 
counterfactuals. Our identification exploits exogenous variations in the size of local 
governments for given connections between firms and politicians. These variations 
come from the implementation of an administrative reform that took place in Denmark 
in 2006, whereby 238 municipalities merged into 65 new ones and 33 municipalities 
were left unchanged. Using a difference-in-differences model, we test how the 
enlargement of local governments affected the profitability of firms connected with 
local politicians before and after the reform, using as counterfactuals firms connected 
before and after the reform in municipalities that did not change size.  
Our identification builds on the notion that an increase in the size of local 
governments creates a ‘positive shock’ to politicians’ power and thus to the amount of 

7 See, for example, Fisman and Gatti (2002) on decentralization; Persson et al. (2003), Persson and 
Tabellini (2000), and Gagliarducci et al. (2011) on electoral rules; Ferraz and Finan (2011) on re-
election incentives; Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2003) on the openness of political systems. 
8 Previous studies have relied on cross-sectional comparisons of connected and non-connected firms 
(Johnson and Mitton 2003; Li et al. 2008; Niessen and Ruenzi 2010), and panel data focusing on 
politicians or parties losing offices (Cingano and Pinotti 2010; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang 
2009; Goldman et al. 2009b). 
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rent that politically connected firms may potentially receive. We validate this notion 
by documenting that the ratios of population, governmental budget, and outsourced 
expenses to elected politicians increased significantly more in merging municipalities 
than in non-merging municipalities. Moreover, the reform in itself was backed up with 
DKK 1.2 billion to cover transitory expenses in merging municipalities only.9 Overall, 
these figures indicate that politicians in treatment districts were endowed with more 
decisional power and financial resources. 
Our approach presents two empirical advantages. First, we can keep fixed the 
connections between firms and politicians over time and identify the value of 
connections through a positive shock that exogenously increased the power of some 
politicians but not others. Second, we can focus solely on connections with winning 
candidates in both the treatment and control group. Thus, we avoid potential 
endogeneity problems in the formation and disruption of connections. Similarly, we do 
not employ non-connected firms or firms connected with non-elected candidates, 
which represent poor counterfactuals because the electoral results of connected 
politicians are potentially affected by corporate outcomes. 
Our estimates indicate that connections with local politicians in larger 
municipalities lead to an economically and statistically relevant increase in firm 
performance. On average, our benchmark specification reveals that the operating 
return on assets (OROA) nearly doubles. This effect is particularly pronounced for 
small firms, firms connected with more powerful politicians, and firms with low prior 
profitability. 
Further validation of a causal relation is derived, as we do not find any significant 
effect for either non-connected firms or firms connected with politicians who ran for 
local offices but were not elected. Neither do we find any significant impact for a 
placebo increase in district size on firm performance prior to the reform year. A 
challenge to our identification is that the reform may have affected the selection of 
politicians elected in treatment municipalities in a way that is correlated with the 

9 The average DKK-USD exchange rate in 2006 was 0.1681 (source: www.statbank.dk).  
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transfer of rent to the connected firms. For example, if tougher electoral competition in 
the merging municipalities improves the quality of re-elected politicians, and high-
quality politicians are less willing to provide rent to connected firms, then focusing on 
connections with politicians who were re-elected may undermine our results. To 
mitigate this concern, we adopt a selection model based on two different exclusion 
restrictions: the aggregate party vote, computed excluding the district where a given 
politician runs for re-election; and the share of politicians older than 65 years in the old 
municipalities that formed a given new municipality. The resulting estimates indicate 
that selection concerns did not significantly affect our findings. 
We confirm our findings by employing alternative specifications. First, we use a 
matching strategy to address the possibility that the impact of the reform is 
heterogeneous with respect to observable corporate and political characteristics 
unbalanced across treatment and control municipalities. Second, we exploit a sharp 
discontinuity that was adopted to select which municipalities to merge. By comparing 
firms connected with municipalities barely above and below the qualifying threshold, 
we mitigate the concern that the merging group is characterized by declining economic 
or demographic performance and, thus, that firms connected with those municipalities 
are not fully comparable with firms connected with large unchanged municipalities. 
We proceed to identify a channel through which companies benefit from 
connections. First, we show a larger increase in profitability for firms connected with 
municipalities that outsource a higher proportion of public services to private 
contractors. Second, we find that the effect is larger in industries that are more 
dependent on public demand. Third, some indication exists that firms connected with 
treatment municipalities increase their revenues relative to the industry level. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that political ties secure firms a larger share of 
outsourced local service provisions. 
In Section 2, we describe our data and the institutional features of the Danish 
administrative reform. In Section 3, we provide summary statistics and discuss our 
11
identification strategy. In Section 4, we present empirical results. In Section 5, we 
discuss our findings and conclude. 
 
2. Institutional background and data 
2.1. Local governments and the 2005 administrative reform 
Municipalities in Denmark are governed by local councils headed by a mayor, who is 
elected during the first meeting of the council by a simple majority. The mayor has the 
overall responsibility for the provision of public services in various sectors (in 
particular, primary and secondary education; elderly care; healthcare; employment; 
social services; special education; business services; collective transport and roads; 
environment and planning; and, often, provision of electricity, water, and heating). 
These services account for approximately 48% of total public expenditure.10  
Local councils have between 9 and 31 members, with the exception of 
Copenhagen, which has 55 seats. Municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants had 
a minimum of 19 seats before 2005, and a minimum of 25 seats after 2005, as an effect 
of the administrative reform. All councils have an odd number of seats. The election 
period is 4 years, and the elections take place the 3rd Tuesday in November. Every new 
local government starts working on January 1st. The electoral system is proportional, 
and in most municipalities the parties that run for election are the same as those that 
run for the national election; however, cases may exist of local parties that run only in 
specific municipalities. The last local elections took place in 2001, 2005, and 2009. 
The main input to our identification derives from a change in the geographic 
borders of Danish municipalities due to the administrative reform implemented with 
the 2005 elections.11 Figure 1 maps the municipalities before and after the 

10 Source: “The Local Government Reform – In Brief,” Ministry of the Interior and Health, Department 
of Economics, 2005.
11 Counselors in the new municipalities were elected through the local elections in November 2005, but 
to ensure continued operation in the merging municipalities, the tenure of the previous councils was 
prolonged by one year, until the end of 2006. In this transitory period, old municipalities transferred 
administrative entities to the new municipalities and were fully dissolved on January 1, 2007. The newly 
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administrative reform; and Table 1, Panel A, describes how the reform reduced the 
number of municipalities. 
Since the previous electoral reform in 1974, 271 municipalities had ranged from 
less than 5,000 to more than 400,000 inhabitants (the old municipalities are 
represented on the left side of Figure 1). Given the economic and administrative 
inefficiencies of having 205 municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, the 
2005 reform aimed to create larger and more efficient entities. Table 1, Panel A, and 
the right side of Figure 1 show the outcome of the reform: 238 municipalities were 
merged into 65 new and larger municipalities, while 33 mostly large municipalities 
were left unchanged. As a result of the reform, the size of the average (median) 
municipality increased from approximately 159km2 to 440km2 and, in terms of 
inhabitants, from approximately 20,000 (10,000) to 56,000 (49,000). Table 1, Panel B, 
shows the impact of the reform on the number of municipalities by population size. 
As documented in Dreyer Lassen and Serritzlew (2010), the selection of merging 
municipalities was strictly based on population size, which is arguably exogenous to 
current firm outcomes. An additional constraint was that the merging municipalities 
had to be neighbors. Less obvious requirements were applied in few cases12, whereas 
14 municipalities were split into two parts, with each merging into separate larger 
municipalities.
2.2. Election, corporate, and management data 
We received from the Danish Ministry of the Interior electoral data containing the 
personal identification number (CPR number) of all candidates in the 2001 and 2005 

elected councils in municipalities not involved in a merger started their activities on January 2006. Five 
municipalities on the island of Bornholm merged into an island-wide municipality when the debate over 
the reform started, at the end of 2002; in the empirical analysis, we exclude the few firms connected 
with these municipalities. 
12 Two municipalities were allowed to stay independent because the ruling coalitions in the neighboring 
municipalities were of different political orientation, and a few poor municipalities had a hard time 
finding neighbors willing to merge.
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local elections. For each candidate, the data contain information about party affiliation, 
number of votes received, and whether or not he or she was elected. 
To construct our dataset of firms connected with local politicians, we combined 
a number of other data sources. Accounting data come from Experian, a private firm 
that collects the annual reports that all limited liability firms are required to submit to 
the Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs. We consider companies with 
non-negative and non-missing book value of assets that are present in the sample for 
the period from 2002 to 2008. Unfortunately, the Danish law requires private firms to 
disclose only a limited number of items such as total assets, selected measures of 
profitability including operating and net income, and a few variables related to capital 
structure. Other items such as sales or employment are not required to be disclosed, 
albeit around one third of firms disclose these measures voluntarily. By law, all 
balance sheets must be approved by external and independent accountants. 
The Danish Ministry of Economics and Business Affairs also provided the 
personal identification number of all managers and board members in the Danish firms 
from 1994 to 2007, including the dates of entering and exiting managerial positions 
which firms are obliged to submit to the Ministry within two weeks of any changes. 
For each personal identification number in our sample, the official Danish Civil 
Registration System at the Ministry of Interior provided us with the personal 
identification number of all close family members. These administrative records 
contain individual characteristics such as gender, birth and death dates, and marital 
history (number and dates of marriages, divorces, and widowhoods). By using this 
information, we create the family tree behind each top manager and director. 
2.3. Politically connected firms 
By merging the families behind the top management and directors with the election 
data, we can identify firms that are blood-related to politicians. By ‘blood-related’ (i.e. 
our definition of connection) we mean a politician that either is a CEO and/or a board 
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director, or is family-connected to a CEO and/or a director of a firm. The family 
relations we consider are parent, child, sibling, and current or former spouse(s).  
Because we have election data for both the 2001 and 2005 local elections, we 
can classify firms into different groups depending on the connection status through the 
two election periods. Firms can be connected in both electoral periods—denoted as re-
connected—or they can be connected in 2005 but not in 2001—denoted as newly 
connected. The other two groups are formed by firms not connected in either of the 
two periods, and by firms that were connected in 2001 but not in 2005. 
 
3. Empirical strategy and summary statistics 
Our main goal is to measure how exogenous variations in the size of political districts 
affect the corporate value of political connections. For this purpose, we classify 
municipalities into ‘treatment’ municipalities—those that increased in size—and 
‘control’ municipalities—those that did not. We focus only on re-connected firms, i.e., 
firms that were connected both after the 2001 elections and after the 2005 elections. 
We exploit the longitudinal nature of our data to estimate a difference-in-differences 
model (DD hereafter), measuring how the increase in political rent arising from a 
larger political office affects the profitability of connected firms, using as a control 
group firms that were connected with politicians in non-merging municipalities. This 
methodology allows us to absorb any general impact of political connections, national 
elections, and changes in the business environment (e.g., macroeconomic shocks) on 
corporate outcomes. 
The validity of our identification relies on two premises. First, the selection of 
merging municipalities is not driven by corporate outcomes. We have discussed above 
that the criteria used to merge municipalities were almost entirely determined by 
population size and geographic conditions, which were mostly historical in origin and 
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independent of current firm performance.13 Second, the increase in district size caused 
an increase in political rent. We provide evidence that this effect was created by a 
combination of fewer politicians, more tasks, and larger budgets. Table 1, Panel C, 
reports three measures of power attributes around the reform in both treatment and 
control municipalities. The number of inhabitants per elected politician more than 
doubled in treatment municipalities, whereas it remained unchanged in control 
municipalities. Expenditures per elected politician increased by a factor of three in 
treatment districts, whereas control districts only experienced marginal increases. 
Finally, we find an increase in outsourcing per elected politician that is nearly three 
times larger in treatment municipalities. In addition to these figures, the 
implementation of the reform required merging municipalities to accomplish some 
transitory tasks (e.g., integration of IT systems or public transportation networks). 
Expenses for these tasks amounted to almost DKK 1.2 billion, including 
approximately DKK 750 million for IT adjustments and DKK 175 million for 
relocations14, and were to a large extent outsourced to private companies. Overall, 
these arguments provide strong evidence that the reform induced a greater increase in 
political power and potential for rent-seeking for the average politician in the treated 
municipalities than in the control municipalities.15 While we cannot conclude that 
every politician in the treatment municipalities became more powerful, in our 
empirical analysis we allow for the possibility that this effect is only present among 
leading politicians or politicians belonging to the ruling coalition. 

13We admit that corporate performance can affect migration across municipalities, but for almost all 
municipalities this concern is of a second order to the geographic and historical determinants and has 
not been, we claim, a decisive factor in any of the mergers between municipalities in Denmark.
14 Source: “The Local Government Reform—In Brief,” Ministry of the Interior and Health, Department 
of Economics, 2005.
15 Research on political accountability has yielded some additional support for the argument that larger 
district size is associated with more potential for rent-seeking. Studies of electoral rules and fiscal 
federalism suggest that centralization and the creation of larger electoral municipalities might imply 
lower electoral accountability (Fisman and Gatti 2002). In the context of Denmark, Dreyer Lassen and 
Serritzlew (2010) document that larger districts had a sizeable detrimental effect on citizens’ internal 
political efficacy, which in turn may have reduced their ability to hold politicians accountable. 
16
Our identification assumes that the enlargement of local municipalities does not 
affect firm performance through channels other than the political connections. 
Although we cannot a priori rule out that a merger benefits all firms located in a given 
municipality, for instance, by fostering economic activity or improving the business 
environment, our empirical investigation shows that this effect is not the case; only 
connected firms benefit from the reform. Another challenge is that the reform may 
have affected the selection of politicians differently across treatment and control 
municipalities. For example, the extra-electoral competition induced by having in the 
merged municipalities a number of seats that is lower than the sum of the seats in the 
old municipalities may have raised the quality of re-elected politicians. If the quality of 
re-elected politicians is correlated with delivering rent to the connected firms, our 
estimates on performance may be biased.16 To empirically cater to this challenge, we 
control for the selection in the pool of connections with blood-related politicians re-
elected in 2005. We use two exclusion restrictions for the likelihood that a connected 
politician is re-elected: the aggregated number of votes for the party excluding the 
politician’s own district; and the share of council members above 65 years of age 
before election in the council where a politician runs for re-election. In Section 4.3, we 
provide arguments for the validity of these exclusion restrictions. 
Table 2, Panel A, illustrates our electoral data. In total, 11,341 individuals ran for 
office in the 2005 municipal elections. Among them, 8,375 (2.966) ran in treatment 
(control) municipalities. In total, 2,502 candidates were elected in the 98 
municipalities, out of which 1,852 (650) candidates were elected in treatment (control) 
municipalities. While the ratio of the elected to all candidates is similar across the two 
groups, the ratios of re-elected to elected candidates in 2001 and to candidates running 
for reelection are lower in the treatment districts; so, too, are the ratio of candidates 

16 In the case of a positive correlation—i.e., better politicians provide more rents to the connected 
firms—our estimates will be upward biased because the increase in profitability arises from both the 
increase in power and the superior quality of politicians. By contrast, in the case of a negative 
correlation—i.e., better politicians are less willing to deliver rents to the connected firms, perhaps 
because they are more accountable to voters—our estimates will be downward biased. 
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running for re-election to candidates elected in 2001. Hence, the evidence in Panel A 
indicates the possibility of an increase in electoral competition in treatment districts 
and thus motivates the need to control for selection bias. 
Table 2, Panel B, shows the same figures for politically connected firms. 
Overall, 1,964 firms were connected with candidates in the 2005 elections. The 
fraction of firms connected with elected candidates relative to all connections is 
approximately 38 %, with no significant differences across treatment and control 
groups. The last row of Table 2 describes the set of re-connected firms that we use for 
establishing the causal link between political connections and corporate performance. 
Of a total of 419 firms connected with politicians re-elected in 2005, 321 of them were 
connected in treatment municipalities, and 98, in control municipalities. The ratio of 
connections with re-elected candidates relative to all connections is approximately 
21%, with no significant differences across treatment and control groups. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the personal characteristics of all 
candidates (Panel A) and winning candidates (Panel B) for the years 2001 and 2005. 
Education and labor income are particularly useful, as they are typically used as 
proxies for the observed quality of politicians (e.g. Brollo et al. 2010; Ferraz and Finan 
2011). The average candidate in 2005 is approximately 50 years old, has 13 years of 
schooling and labor income of 403,284 DKK (Panel A, Column 4). Winning 
candidates have similar ages and education levels, although they have a higher labor 
income (Panel B, Column 4). Focusing on changes in politicians’ characteristics 
between 2001 and 2005, we notice that candidates (both the entire pool and the 
subsample of winners) in treatment municipalities became older, slightly more likely 
to be male, significantly more educated, and with a higher labor income (Columns 7). 
Similar changes are present, though they display lower significance, for candidates in 
control municipalities (Panels A and B, Column 8). Taking the difference between 
changes in the characteristics of candidates in treatment and control groups (Column 9) 
indicates that the average candidate in a treatment municipality became significantly 
more educated. This positive effect, however, becomes insignificant once we focus on 
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winning candidates (Panel B, Column 9), whereas, among these candidates, we find a 
significant and positive effect increase in labor income. In sum, Table 3 highlights the 
importance of choosing winning politicians as counterfactuals to minimize the 
observable differences between firm-connected politicians in treatment and control 
groups. Further, the small observable differences indicate that unobservable 
differences may also exist; hence, Table 3 reconfirms the importance of controlling for 
selection. 
Table 4 reports the average characteristics of connected and non-connected firms 
prior to the implementation of the administrative reform. Our main measure of 
corporate performance is OROA, computed as the ratio of earnings before interests 
and taxes (EBIT) to the book value of total assets. An important advantage of using 
OROA as a measure of operating returns is that, unlike net income-based measures of 
performance, OROA is unaffected by differences in firms’ capital structure. To 
mitigate the effect of outliers, we drop 1% of observations on the right and left tails of 
the OROA distribution. To check whether differences in OROA are explained by 
differential industry trends, we also report industry-adjusted OROA. The industry 
adjustments are calculated using the median OROA of each 4-digit industry, 
considering all active firms in our dataset, including those that are not politically 
connected. For each industry, we require that at least 20 firms exist in a given year; 
when this restriction is not satisfied at 4-digit, we move to 3-digit or 2-digit level.  
In Table 4, Columns (1), (2), and (5), we look at the pre-reform differences 
between connected and non-connected firms. On average, connected firms are larger 
and perform less well than do non-connected firms, corroborating the cross-country 
evidence provided by Faccio (2009) and reconfirming the finding that non-connected 
firms are weak counterfactuals.17 In Table 4, Columns (3), (4), and (6), we show that 

17 Examining the industry distribution (untabulated), we find only minor differences between connected 
and non-connected firms: connected firms are slightly more present in real estate and slightly less 
present in insurance and financial sectors. Further, we find only small differences in the industry 
distribution of connected firms in treatment and control municipalities: connected firms in treatment 
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the differences between treatment and control firms are much smaller both in 
economic and statistical terms, except for a marginal significance in OROA (Column 
6). Even if these differences are smaller than those in Columns (1), (2), and (5), the 
evidence still raises concerns about omitted factor bias. Furthermore, a comparison 
between firms that are connected with winning and non-winning candidates may suffer 
from reverse causality in the likely event that the probability of a business-connected 
politician winning a seat is affected by the characteristics of the firm to which he or 
she is connected. 
To circumvent such endogeneity issues, we focus the analysis on firms that are 
connected with politicians re-elected in 2005 (i.e., politicians who had a place on the 
municipal council both before and after the 2005 elections, in both treatment and 
control municipalities). Table 4, Columns (7) - (10), shows that no significant 
differences exist between firms in treatment and control groups in terms of total assets, 
performance, sales, and employees. While we cannot rule out the presence of 
unobserved differences between the two groups, the lack of significant differences in 
observable terms suggests that this problem is much less likely to interfere with our 
results. Taken together with the argument that the selection of merging municipalities 
was not influenced by corporate characteristics, this lack of differences is  strong 
confirmation of the validity of our counterfactuals. 
4. Results 
We begin by establishing the effect of increasing district size on blood-related firm 
performance, using OLS difference-in-differences estimates (Section 4.1). We then 
proceed to provide evidence for a causal effect by showing that the effect is only 
present for firms connected to winning politicians and that no significant differences in 
performance exist between treatment and control firms prior to the reform (Section 
4.2). We control for selection concerns in Section 4.3, and provide matching and 

municipalities are marginally more present in manufacturing, trade, and transport, whereas firms in 
control municipalities operate more in other business segments. 
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discontinuity estimations in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we provide evidence of how 
variations in political power affect connected firm performance, and in Section 4.6 we 
identify business activities with the public sector as the channel through which 
connected firms benefit from increased political power. Finally, we analyze firm 
variations and alternative outcomes in Section 4.7. 
4.1. OLS difference-in-differences 
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the 
change in firm profitability around 2005 (the local election year during which the 
administrative reform was implemented). We consider three years after and three years 
before, excluding the election year itself. The main variable of interest, called 
treatment, is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is connected with a politician re-elected in 
a treatment district and 0 if the firm is connected with a politician re-elected in a 
control district. 
In Column (1), we report estimates using unadjusted OROA as dependent 
variable and only controlling for regional localization to reduce the scope for omitted 
factor bias. We compute Huber-White robust standard errors. The treatment effect is 
3.25 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result 
indicates that re-connected firms with merging municipalities experienced, on average, 
a 3.25 percentage-point improvement in OROA compared with re-connected firms 
with municipalities that did not change size. This impact becomes marginally higher 
when we control for lagged assets and operating performance (Columns 2 and 3). In 
Columns (4) to (6), we employ as dependent variable the change in industry-adjusted 
OROA around the election year. The results are very similar in size and significance to 
the unadjusted results, suggesting that our findings are not driven by different industry 
trends. As the treatment is defined at the municipality level, we allow for correlation of 
residuals within municipalities by clustering standard errors at the municipality level. 
We present these estimates in Column (7), using industry-adjusted OROA as the 
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dependent variable. As shown, the treatment effect remains statistically significant at 
the 5% level. 
On the basis of these estimates, we conclude that the increase in profitability is 
statistically significant and ranges between 3.1 and 3.4 percentage points. Given that 
the average OROA is 4.2% for all firms and 2.5% for firms connected with re-elected 
politicians (Table 4), the economic magnitude of such an increase is large. We will 
explore in more detail the relationship between political power and blood-related firm 
performance in Section 4.5. For now, we conclude that by increasing the power of 
politicians in treatment districts, the reform created significant benefits for blood-
related companies. 
4.2. Falsification and robustness tests 
Our identification hinges crucially on the exogeneity of the administrative reform 
relative to corporate outcomes. However, two additional risks remain to the causal 
interpretation of our results. The first is whether the effect of enlarged municipalities 
improves the performance of all connected firms or even non-connected firms. This 
happens, for example, when a merger positively affects the demand for private services 
and other goods, or improves accounting standards by allocating more resources to the 
auditing process. Results in Table 6 help to rule out this interpretation. In Columns (1) 
and (2), we present results obtained using non-connected firms, whereas in Columns 
(3) and (4) we use firms that are connected with non-elected candidates. In both cases, 
we find that the treatment is not significant in either statistical or economic terms. The 
second issue is about the implicit assumption of parallel trends between treatment and 
control groups needed for the validity of the DD model. To underline the similarity of 
the two groups before the implementation of the reform, we propose a falsification test 
in Columns (5) and (6) that estimates DD regressions in a pre-treatment window 
centered at t = - 3. The lack of statistical significance confirms that the two groups 
were similar before the 2005 elections and confirms, therefore, the validity of the 
parallel trends hypothesis in our setting. 
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We perform a number of further checks to assess the robustness of the estimates 
reported in Table 5. In computing the dependent variable, we have trimmed OROA to 
1% on the right and left tails of the distribution to mitigate the concern of outliers. To 
confirm that our results are not driven by outliers, we further trim the dependent 
variable to 1% on the right and left tails of the distribution. Alternatively, we run a 
median regression (computing standard errors by bootstrap, using 500 replications), 
and perform a graphical inspection of residuals to detect influential observations.  
In addition to clustering at the municipality level, we consider an alternative way 
of computing standard errors based on block-bootstrap (Bertrand et al. 2004), using 
500 replications. Finally, we exclude firms in financial, insurance, and utilities 
industries (for which operating returns are typically an unreliable measure of 
performance), or firms connected with municipalities that were split into separate 
larger entities, given that for these firms the effect of a merger is ambiguous. All 
results from these tests (un-tabulated, but available upon request) are in line with our 
previous estimates (coefficients range between 1.5 and 4.3 percentage points 
depending on the specification adopted, and they are at least significant at a 10% 
level). 
 
4.3. Controlling for selection 
As discussed above, the increase in political competition induced by the reform might 
affect the quality of the re-elected politicians in merging districts in a way that 
correlates with the ability to transfer rent to the connected firms. In such cases, the 
effect estimated on the sample of firms connected with re-elected politicians would not 
only measure the benefits of an increase in political power but also the superior quality 
of re-elected politicians; and, our estimates would not be able to separate out these two 
channels. Even if Table 3 did not provide strong evidence for any major change in the 
observable characteristics of re-elected politicians after the reform, controlling for 
unobservable differences would nevertheless be worthwhile.  
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Table 7 reports the results when we use Heckman models to control for selection 
into the pool of connections with politicians re-elected in 2005. We adopt two 
alternative exclusion restrictions, which are correlated with a connected politician’s 
likelihood of being re-elected but, at the same time, do not affect corporate 
performance in any other way than through the rent transferred to the firms. The first is 
the average number of votes that the politician’s party has received in other 
municipalities, excluding the politician’s own municipality. The idea here is similar to 
that of Dal Bó et al. (2009), who use the re-election probabilities of a legislator’s 
current cohort by state and party as an instrument for the probability of re-election. In 
our setting, the idea is that the aggregate votes received by a given party can serve as 
common shock that affects all candidates’ probability of re-election but does not affect 
the profitability of connected firms through channels different than the re-election of 
the connected politicians. The second is the number of elected politicians in 2001 in 
the same municipality who are older than 65 years in 2005. A higher incidence of old 
politicians suggests that fewer will stand for re-election; this condition increases the 
likelihood that a politician who runs for re-election is elected again. Again, we claim 
that the age distribution of the municipality council in 2001 is independent of the 
characteristics of a given connected firm. 
Table 7, Panel A, provides estimates from the selection equation, in which the 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm was connected with a re-elected 
politician, and the explanatory variables are the two exclusion restrictions (separately 
reported in Columns 1, 2 and 3, 4) with and without their interaction with the dummy, 
indicating whether the municipality was treated by the reform or not.18 Consistent with 
the idea of tougher competition in districts that were merged by the reform, we observe 
that the treatment indicator has a negative sign. We also observe that the use of both 
variables as exclusion restrictions increases the likelihood that a connected politician is 

18 An alternative approach might be to estimate the re-election probabilities on the entire pool of 
politicians. This method, would, however, introduce another selection problem, concerning a 
politician’s likelihood of political connectedness. 
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re-elected. However, a difference between the two selection models exists: the 
aggregate party vote has an impact primarily in the merging municipalities, whereas 
the age distribution works equally across merged and control districts. 
Panel B presents the performance results obtained using both maximum 
likelihood (ML) and 2-step estimations. As is similar to our baseline results in Table 5, 
the ML estimates vary from 3.2 to 3.6 percentage points and are significant at a 5% 
level. The 2-step estimates vary more depending on the exclusion restriction used. 
Using the aggregate votes gives smaller and less significant results (around 2.7 
percentage points, and significant at 10%), but using the age distribution yields results 
very similar to our baseline OLS estimates.  
On the basis of these results, we conclude that controlling for selection of 
politicians does not alter the effect of an increase in political power on the performance 
of connected firms. 
 
4.4. Matching and discontinuity estimates 
We now investigate whether our findings are robust to the use of alternative estimation 
methods. We show results based on re-weighting and nearest-neighbor matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Abadie and Imbens 2007). The benefit of these 
approaches is that we not only use re-connected firms with municipalities that do not 
change in size as counterfactuals, but also, for each firm in the treatment group, we 
find the most similar firm in the control group, discarding dissimilar observations. By 
minimizing the distance between the two groups, we reduce the bias induced by 
differences in observable firm and political characteristics that might be unbalanced 
across treatment and control groups. 
The covariates included in the matching procedure are pre-treatment assets and 
industry-adjusted operating performance; regional localization; logarithm of age and 
gender of the connected politician; and his or her position in the electoral list. We 
compute the matching estimators in the following way: (1) we run a probit regression 
where the dependent variable is the binary treatment and the explanatory variables are 
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the above-mentioned covariates; (2) we use the predicted values to construct the 
propensity score, discarding the few observations outside the common support; (3) we 
match with replacement each firm in the treatment group with a firm in the control 
group and then estimate the difference in change of profitability around the election. 
We start by showing estimates after re-weighting observations on the basis of the 
propensity score. Table 8, Column (1), presents the results. The estimate is significant 
at the 5% level and marginally lower than the OLS estimates, confirming the 
robustness of our previous results. In Column (2), we match observations with 
replacement on the covariates directly. In Column (3), we match with replacement on 
the propensity score and rematch on the covariates, reporting the bias-adjusted results. 
Column (4) yields results from a 1-to-1 match without replacement. All the estimates 
are significant both in statistical and economic terms, and range between 2.9 and 3.3 
percentage points. 
A further concern about our identification approach is that the treatment group 
may be formed by municipalities with declining economic or demographic 
performance, and therefore, connected firms with those municipalities will not be fully 
comparable with firms connected with large unchanged municipalities. Although we 
have already proved that such potential differences are not reflected in a different 
profitability between treatment and control firms prior to the reform, we offer two 
additional ways to address this problem. 
First, we exclude the smallest municipalities in the treatment group and the 
largest municipalities in the control group. Results, reported in Columns (5) and (6), 
are qualitatively in line with our baseline estimates. Second, we exploit the sharp 
discontinuity at 20,000 inhabitants that was adopted to select merging municipalities 
by comparing firms connected with municipalities above and below this threshold. As 
this variable is precisely measured and cannot be manipulated by politicians, it offers 
an ideal context for a regression discontinuity design. We create the running variable 
as the distance in terms of number of inhabitants in 2004 from the threshold, and then 
we parametrically estimate a linear specification, adding it to the usual set of controls 
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(Column 7). In Column (8), we further add the interaction between the treatment and 
the running variable. Results show that the treatment effect is positive at the 5% level 
and marginally higher than the OLS estimates. In conclusion, all our alternative 
estimation methods confirm the presence of an increase in political power as a 
significant and large causal effect on the performance of blood-related firms.  
4.5. Variations in political power 
 We now focus on how the variation in power among districts and politicians impacts 
connected firms’ performance, and on the channel through which the transfer of rent 
takes place. In Table 5, we noticed that the average performance improvement for 
firms connected to municipalities that merged was around 3.1 to 3.4 percentage points.  
A municipality merger increases political power through many channels, 
including increasing population, budget, and outsourcing. In the unconditional 
correlation, we observe that doubling population is correlated with an increase of 
105% in connected firms’ operating performance. Doubling the local government 
expenditure is correlated with a 77% increase in performance, and doubling 
outsourcing expenditures is correlated with a performance improvement of 80%. In 
Figure 2, we show unconditional averages indicating how connected firm performance 
is correlated with actual variations in these three areas. We split our municipalities at 
the median level of the three measures; then, we show the mean performance for the 
groups below and above the median. As shown, the increase in population per 
politician is positively correlated with the increase in industry-adjusted OROA. 
However, the correlation between changes in budget size and firm performance is 
stronger; we find the largest correlation when we focus on the increase in outsourcing 
in the municipalities. Overall, these correlations are consistent with the notion that 
connected firms benefit from politicians being more powerful, and suggest that 
outsourcing was an effective way for transferring rent. 
In Table 9, we investigate how variations in political power affect firm 
performance by studying different types of connections and politicians. In Column (2), 
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we begin by looking at nuclear connections, i.e., where the CEO or board member or 
his/her spouse or sons/daughters are members of the municipality. We notice that the 
coefficient for nuclear connections in Column (2) is slightly larger than the one 
obtained on the full sample (Column 1). Column (3) focuses on powerful politicians, 
defined as those who won more than the median share of personal votes in a given 
party and district. Again, the coefficient is marginally higher than the average impact 
and significant at the 5% level. In Column (4), we look at firms connected to 
politicians belonging to the mayor’s party or coalition. We notice that the coefficient is 
notably higher than the average impact even if the standard error is larger, likely as a 
result of a smaller sample. What these sample splits suggest—even if the differences 
are not statistically significant—is that the benefits to the firm produced by political 
ties increase with the level of  power of the politician involved in the connection. 
4.6. Proximity to the public demand 
Previous studies have examined several channels through which firms benefit from 
political connections. For example, Faccio et al. (2006) find that connected firms are 
more likely to be bailed out by governments and to benefit from financial support 
provided by the international institutions. Boubakri et al. (2008b) argue that connected 
firms exhibit a lower cost of equity capital. Other studies show that political 
connections shape the firms’ capital structure (Claessens et al. 2008; Li et al. 2008), 
mainly through an easier access to bank lending (Khwaja and Mian 2005). Goldman et 
al. (2009b) document that politically connected firms are favorably treated in the 
allocation of procurement contracts.  
Table 10 provides evidence that the public demand plays a major role in 
determining how political connections create benefits for the companies in our 
‘corruption-free’ environment. In Panel A, Columns (1) and (2), we test the 
importance of outsourcing for rent transfer. Motivated by the unconditional evidence 
in Figure 2, our hypothesis is that the increased political power in merging 
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municipalities has a stronger impact on firm performance when municipalities 
outsource more. To capture this effect, we split merged municipalities into two 
subsamples according to the ratio of activities outsourced to private contractors 
divided by total expenditures. In municipalities that have a low outsourcing ratio, we 
observe a positive treatment effect; however, this effect is much higher and more 
statistically significant in municipalities with a high outsourcing ratio. One 
interpretation of this result is that connected firms after the reform have the ability to 
increase their share of existing outsourcing activity because they are preferentially 
treated when new procurement contracts are offered. 
 In Panel B, we further investigate how the public sector influences the value of 
political connections by exploiting the heterogeneity in the sectoral dependence on 
public demand. Following Cingano and Pinotti (2010), we analyze the cross-entries 
between public consumption and industries in the 2-digit Danish Input-Output matrix 
to classify industries as highly or weakly/not dependent on public demand.19 Then we 
run regressions interacting our treatment with a dummy equal to 1 if the firm operates 
in an industry that has a high dependence on the public sector. The results indicate that 
the positive effect of merging on operating returns is strongly present in industries that 
are closely linked to the public sector. Overall, these findings support the notion that 
connected firms benefit from business relations with the public sector. 
 
4.7. Firm variations and alternative outcomes 
In Table 11, we explore the heterogeneity in the treatment effect along firm, industry, 
and political characteristics. For the sake of comparisons, Column (1) reports our 
baseline estimate using the full sample. In Columns (2) and (3), we separately analyze 
small and large firms. While the treatment coefficient is positive in both samples, 
results indicate that the effect is larger for smaller firms. Because we focus on the 
corporate value of local political connections, the different effect depending on firm 

19 Examples of highest dependence on the public demand are sectors related to education, hospitals, 
recreational activities, and civil engineering. 
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size may show up because large firms are more likely to focus their business outside 
the local district.  
In Columns (4) and (5), we also observe that the effect is only present among 
firms that exhibited worse performance prior to the reform year. This result is 
consistent with highly profitable firms being more oriented outside the local 
municipality or, in general, being dependent on their political connections. In Columns 
(6) and (7), we divide our sample by industries that have a high or low concentration 
of politically connected firms. In industries where political connections are more 
common—and, perhaps, where companies have more to offer or gain from interactions 
with local government—the treatment effect is larger (4.2%) than in industries with 
low political connections (3.1% ). 
In sum, Table 11 provides evidence suggesting that local political connections 
are more valuable for small and less productive firms, and in certain industries. 
Together with evidence that connected firms are, on average, less profitable (Table 4), 
this picture indicates that the rent transferred to connected firms reduces social 
welfare.  
In Table 12, we test the impact of blood-related connections on a number of 
alternative corporate outcomes.20 In Column (1), we show that firms connected in 
merged municipalities experience an increase in revenues relative to the industry level; 
thus, our results on profitability may be related to an increase in market share arising 
from an increase in business activities. In Column (2), we find that the firms in merged 
municipalities increase net income to assets, which is used as an alternative measure of 
performance. In Column (3), we show that no significant effect is had on firm size, 
measured by changes in total assets; this result rules out the possibility that the 
differences in performance are merely determined by smaller increases in total assets 
of treatment firms as compared to control firms. In Column (4), we show that the firms 

20 The number of firms varies across the different columns in Table 12 due to data availability. Our 
sample is formed mostly by small- and medium-sized private companies, and not all firms publish data 
beyond that which is legally required. 
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in merged municipalities experience an increase in liquidity holdings, which is 
consistent both with the interpretation that these firms retain earnings and/or that they 
accumulate cash to be able to invest in the new business opportunities as they show up. 
In Column (5), we focus on the volatility of profits measured by the change in standard 
deviation of OROA around 2005. We find a positive and marginally significant effect, 
which suggests that in the post-reform period the positive effect on firm profits was 
partly driven by transitory expenses that the municipalities faced to reorganize their 
activities in the first year after the administrative reform. Finally, in Column (6), we 
test whether any impact on the capital structure of firms occurs, using the ratio of total 
debt to assets as dependent variable. The treatment is not significant; neither do we 
find any impact on the maturity structure of debt, measured as the ratio of long-term 
debt to total debt (unreported). These results suggest that an increase in political rent 
does not influence locally connected firms through the cost of capital or access to debt 
financing.21 
5. Conclusion 
We have shown that an exogenous increase in political power improves the 
performance of connected firms even in an institutional context where the effect may 
be expected to be negligible. Using an administrative reform to identify exogenous 
variations in political power, we have documented that being tied to local politicians is 
extremely important for the profitability of companies even in a country ranked as the 
least corrupt in the world. Our analysis thus suggests that political networking can be a 
powerful business strategy irrespective of the stability of political institutions. 
While political connections are valuable both in developed and developing 
countries, we argue that the channels through which political rent is transferred to 
connected firms may vary. Previous studies on developing countries have documented 
that political connections affect firms’ capital structure through lower cost of capital, 

21 In unreported results, we also find no significant effects on wages or employment. 
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protection in times of financial distress, and easier access to bank credit. Our evidence 
suggests that doing business with the public sector represents the main channel for 
transferring political rent to connected firms, supporting the earlier finding of 
Goldman et al. (2009b). Thus, our analysis suggests that in developed countries with 
strong institutions, the transfer of rent through political connections is demand driven; 
connected firms are in a better position to gain from the outsourcing activities of the 
public sector.  
Analyzing the full welfare effects of political connections is beyond the scope of 
this article. However, our analysis does contain some suggestions that political 
connections are welfare reducing. First, politically connected firms tend to be less 
productive before the connection is established. Second, the value of political 
connections is higher among less profitable firms. Both arguments indicate that 
political connections may transfer rent from more productive to less productive firms. 
The welfare reduction is mitigated, however, because our results also indicate that 
connected firms use the rent to increase their operating efficiency. 
Finally, our analysis contributes to the discussion on how to measure corruption. 
While there is general agreement that a distinctive feature of corruption is the misuse 
of public office for private gain (Treisman 2000), a clear definition is hard to establish. 
Corruption encompasses at least three elements: it is (1) illegal, (2) an attempt to 
circumvent existing rules, and (3) generally associated with favors extended to 
particular firms (Bennedsen et al. 2010). We do not claim that any of the connected 
firms or politicians in our study have engaged in illegal behavior. However, our 
analysis provides evidence that is consistent with the last two elements of the 
description above, in particular that political connections induce measurable firm-
specific benefits which appear to be detrimental for economic welfare. As such, our 
findings indicate that a significant level of ‘legal’ corruption can be present, even in 
the least corrupt country in the world. 
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Figure 1. Danish municipalities before and after the administrative reform 
This chart illustrates the map of Danish municipalities before and after the administrative reform of 2005. Source: 
Wikipedia.
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Figure 2. Operating performance and changes in the size of political 
offices
 
This chart illustrates the average unconditional change of industry-adjusted OROA around 2005, 
by above or below-median changes in a municipality’s population, expenditures, and outsourcing 
divided by the number of elected politicians. Outsourcing represents the sum of expenses referred 
to contractors and other services. Outsourcing and expenditures ratios are computed using budget 
items from 2004-2007 and election data from 2001-2005. Population ratio is computed using data 
for 2005-2007 and election data for 2001-2005. Source: Denmark Statistics. 
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Table 1. Danish municipalities before and after the administrative reform 
Panel A illustrates the impact of the Danish administrative reform on the number of municipalities by 
treatment and control groups. Panel B reports changes in the number of municipalities by population 
size. Panel C compares the average municipality’s outsourcing, expenditures, and population divided by 
the number of elected politicians, by treatment and control municipalities. Outsourcing represents the 
sum of expenses referred to contractors and other services. Outsourcing and expenditures ratios are 
computed using budget items from 2004-2007 and election data from 2001-2005. Population ratio is 
computed using data for 2005-2007 and election data for 2001-2005. Source: Denmark Statistics. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A. Number of municipalities 
  
 Before After 
Total 271 98 
   
Treatment 238 65 
   
Control 33 33 
  
Panel B. Municipalities by population size 
 Before After 
>100,000 4 6 
50,000-100,000 13 28 
30,000-50,000 24 39 
20,000-30,000 25 18 
10,000-20,000 77 3 
5,000-10,000 114 1 
<5,000 14 3 
Panel C. Measures of political power 
  Before 
 
After 
 
Difference  
After - Before 
Population/politicians Treatment 776.9 1,798.7 1,021.8*** 
 
 
Control 2,323 2,344 21 
Expenditures/politicians Treatment 30,066.6 88,474.2 58,407.6*** 
 
 
Control 106,093.9 122,154.4 16,060.5 
Outsourcing/politicians Treatment 2,879.6 8,078.3 5,197.7*** 
 
 
Control 9,515.2 1,0352.3 837*** 
37
38 
Table 2. Electoral results and political connections 
Panel A illustrates the electoral results of the administrative elections held in 2005 by control and treatment municipalities. 
In square brackets, we report a number of ratios. Panel B shows the number of politically connected firms in the 2005 
elections. The fraction of firms connected with elected candidates to the total number of firms connected to running 
candidates is reported in square brackets. Panel B also shows the number of firms connected with politicians re-elected in 
2005, by control and treatment municipalities. The fraction of firms connected with re-elected candidates to total number of 
firms connected to running candidates is reported in square brackets. 
Panel A. Results of the 2005 administrative elections 
 
 
Total 
 
Treatment 
 
Control 
 
 
All candidates 11,341 8,375 2,966 
   
Elected candidates 2,502 1,852 650 
Ratio elected to all candidates [22%] [22.1%] [21.9%]
 
Re-elected candidates 1,679 1,287 392 
Ratio re-elected to all candidates [14.8%] [15.3%] [13.2%]
Ratio re-elected to all candidates running for re-election [61.3%] [57.5%] [78.4%]
Ratio candidates running for re-election to candidates elected in 2001 [62.3%] [60.3%] [73.6%]
    
Panel B. Connections between firms and politicians in the 2005 administrative elections 
 
 
Total 
 
Treatment 
 
Control 
 
 
Firms connected with all candidates 1,964 1,453 511 
 
Firms connected with elected candidates 752 566 186 
Ratio connections with elected to all connections [38.3%] [38.9%] [36.4%]
 
Firms connected with re-elected candidates 419 321 98 
Ratio connections with re-elected to all connections [21.3%] [22.1%] [19.2%]
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Table 5. Difference-in-differences estimates 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions using the sample of firms connected with politicians re-elected in 2005 in the 
treatment and control group. The dependent variable is the change in unadjusted OROA around the 2005 elections (three years after 
minus three years before, excluding the election year) in Columns (1) - (3), and the change in industry-adjusted OROA in Columns 
(4) - (7). The industry adjustment is computed as the firm’s OROA minus the median OROA of the relevant industry. Explanatory 
variables are in all regressions a treatment dummy equal to 1 for firms connected with politicians in municipalities touched by the 
reform and 0 for firms connected with politicians in control municipalities, and a set of regional dummies. Additionally, in Columns 
(2), (3), and (5) - (7), we control for the lagged logarithm of total assets and lagged industry-adjusted OROA. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Columns (1) - (6) report robust standard errors, whereas in Column (7) standard errors are clustered by the 
new municipality classification. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: OROA 
  
Industry-adjusted OROA 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Treatment 0.0325** 0.0331** 0.0343**  0.0309** 0.0315** 0.0338** 0.0338** 
 (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0149)  (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0147) 
Ln assets  -0.0022 -0.0015   -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0010 
  (0.0024) (0.0022)   (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Profitability t-1   -0.2155**    -0.2189** -0.2189**
   (0.0911)    (0.0946) (0.1029) 
Number of firms 419 419 419  419 419 419 419 
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Table 6. Falsification tests 
Columns (1) and (2) report the results of OLS regressions using the sample of non-connected firms. Columns (3) and (4) 
report the results of OLS regressions using the sample of firms connected with non-elected candidates in 2005. The 
dependent variable in Columns (1)-(4) is the change in industry-adjusted OROA around the 2005 reform. Columns (5) 
and (6) show the results of OLS regressions using the sample of firms connected with re-elected politicians in 2005; the 
dependent variable is change in industry-adjusted OROA in a pre-treatment period computed as the difference between 
the average three-year profitability after t = - 3 minus the three-year average before. Explanatory variables are in all 
regressions a treatment dummy equal to 1 for firms connected with politicians in municipalities touched by the reform 
and 0 for firms connected with politicians in control municipalities, and a set of regional dummies. Additionally, in 
Columns (2), (4), and (6) we control for the lagged logarithm of total assets and lagged industry-adjusted OROA. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted OROA 
      
 
Non-connected firms 
 
 Firms connected with 
non-elected candidates 
 Connected firms: 
pre-treatment period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment -0.0013 -0.0013  -0.0032 -0.0015  0.0086 0.0049 
 (0.0016) (0.0015)  (0.0088) (0.0085)  (0.0124) (0.0125) 
Ln assets  -0.0006*   -0.0012   0.0018 
  (0.0003)   (0.0016)   (0.0021) 
Profitability t-1  -0.2953***   -0.1243***   -0.1997* 
  (0.0071)   (0.0498)   (0.1047) 
Number of firms 47,814 47,814  1,201 1,201  405 405 
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Table 7. Controlling for selection 
 
This table shows the impact of the reform once we control for selection into the pool of connected politicians who were re-
elected in 2005. In Panel A, each column reports the results from a first-stage probit regression, where the dependent variable 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is connected with a politician re-elected in 2005 and 0 for connections with politicians not re-
elected in 2005. The explanatory variables are in all regressions a treatment dummy equal to 1 for firms connected with 
politicians in municipalities touched by the reform and 0 for firms connected with politicians in control municipalities, a set of 
regional dummies, lagged logarithm of total assets, and lagged industry-adjusted OROA. In addition, the specification contains 
an exclusion restriction, which is the average fraction of votes obtained by the same party of the connected politician in 
municipalities different from the one of the politician itself (in Columns 1 and 2), or the number of politicians older than 65 
years  in councils elected in 2001 (Columns 3 and 4). In Columns (1) and (3) we include the exclusion restriction only, 
whereas in Columns (2) and (4) we further include the interaction between the treatment dummy and the exclusion restriction. 
Standard errors (which are clustered by the new municipality classification), are reported in parentheses. In Panel B, each 
column reports the estimates obtained from a Heckman selection model, where in the first step we estimate the probability of 
being connected with a re-elected politician using the sample of politicians connected with firms that were elected in 2001 and 
ran again for election in 2005. In Columns (1) and (3), we estimate the selection equation including the treatment dummy and 
the exclusion restriction as well as the usual firm-level controls. In Columns (2) and (4), we further include the interaction 
between the treatment dummy and the exclusion restriction. In the first row, we estimate the model by using ML procedure. In 
the second row, we estimate the model using a two-step (Heckit) procedure. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Firm connections with re-elected politicians in 2005
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -0.2314 -0.9956***  -0.2080 -0.0974 
 (0. 1409) (0.2867)  (0.1436) (0.1938) 
Aggregate party votes 1.9562*** -1.0798    
 (0.4702) (1.0811)    
Treatment × Aggregate party votes  3.7306***    
  (1.1973)    
Nr. politicians older than 65    0.2273*** 0.3393** 
    (0.0716) (0.1528) 
Treatment × Nr. politicians older than 65     -0.1442 
    (0.1719) 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted OROA
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment (ML) 0.0326** 0.320**  0.0358** 0.0352** 
 (0.0146) (0.0143)  (0.0153) (0.0157) 
Treatment (2-step) 0.0276* 0.0278*  0.0368** 0.0346** 
 (0.0164) (0.0160)  (0.0169) (0.0168) 
Connections with re-elected politicians 415 415  415 415 
Connections with re-elected & 
non re-elected politicians 641 641 
 
641 641 
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Table 9. Variations in political power 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions using the sample of firms connected with politicians 
re-elected in 2005 in the treatment and control group. The dependent variable is the change in 
industry-adjusted OROA around the 2005 elections. Explanatory variables are in all regressions a 
treatment dummy equal to 1 for firms connected with politicians in municipalities touched by the 
reform and 0 for firms connected with politicians in control municipalities, lagged logarithm of total 
assets, lagged industry-adjusted OROA, and a set of regional dummies. In Column (1), we report the 
estimate obtained from the full sample for the sake of comparison. Nuclear-family connections (in 
Column 2) are defined as direct connections and connections with spouse and sons. Connections 
with powerful politicians (in Column 3) include firms connected with politicians who obtained more 
than the median fraction of votes in their list and in a given municipality. Connections with mayors’ 
coalitions (in Column 4) include firms that are connected with politicians belonging to the same 
party/coalition as the mayor in a given municipality. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
clustered by the new municipality classification. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted OROA 
     
 
All 
firms 
  
Nuclear 
connections 
 
 Connections 
with powerful 
politicians 
 Connections 
with 
mayors 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.0338**  0.0400**  0.0361**  0.0474* 
 (0.0147)  (0.0159)  (0.0172)  (0.0280) 
Ln assets -0.0010  -0.0009  0.0005  -0.0035 
 (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0026)  (0.0043) 
Profitability t-1 -0.2189**  -0.2665**  -0.1150  -0.5005*** 
 (0.1029)  (0.1067)  (0.1211)  (0.1679) 
Number of firms 419  364  283  187 
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Table 10. The role of outsourcing and public demand
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions using the sample of firms 
connected with politicians re-elected in 2005 in the treatment and control group. In 
Panel A, Columns (1) and (2), we separately analyze firms connected with 
municipalities experiencing a low (high) increase in outsourcing per politician, 
defined as changes in the lower (upper) quartile of increase in outsourcing per 
politician around 2005 (2007 minus 2005). Explanatory variables are in all 
regressions a treatment dummy equal to 1 for firms connected with politicians in 
municipalities touched by the reform and 0 for firms connected with politicians in 
control municipalities, lagged logarithm of total assets, lagged industry-adjusted 
OROA, and a set of regional dummies. In addition, in Panel B, Columns (1) and (2), 
we include a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is operating in industries above and 
below the median fraction of output sold to the public sector relative to total output, 
as well as its interaction with the main treatment dummy. The sectoral dependence is 
computed at the 2-digit industry level using the Input-Output matrix issued by 
Denmark Statistics in 2006. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by 
the new municipality classification. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively. 
Panel A. Heterogeneous results depending on outsourcing 
 
Dependent variable: OROA 
 High  
increase of 
outsourcing 
Low  
increase of 
outsourcing 
(1) (2) 
Treatment 0.0406* 0.0168 
 (0.0220) (0.0252) 
Ln assets -0.0019 -0.0003 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Profitability t-1 -0.3093** -0.1087 
 (0.1231) (0.1726) 
Number of firms 289 128 
Panel B. Proximity to the public demand 
 
Dependent variable:  
 
OROA 
 
Industry-adj. 
OROA 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment -0.0032 -0.0050 
 (0.0155) (0.0158) 
Treatment*High sectoral dependence 0.0578** 0.0610** 
 (0.0282) (0.0286) 
High sectoral dependence -0.0059 -0.0107 
(0.0232) (0.0235) 
Number of firms 419 419 
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Table 12. Impact on alternative outcomes 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions using the sample of firms connected with politicians re-elected 
in 2005 in the treatment and control group. The dependent variables are changes around the 2005 elections of 
the following variables: logarithm of sales (Column 1); net income to assets (Column 2); ratio of liquid assets 
to total assets (Column 3); logarithm of total assets (Column 4); standard deviation of industry-adjusted OROA 
(Column 5); the ratio of total debt to total assets (Column 6). Explanatory variables are in all regressions a 
treatment dummy equal to 1 for firms connected with politicians in municipalities touched by the reform and 0 
for firms connected with politicians in control municipalities, lagged logarithm of total assets, lagged industry-
adjusted OROA, a set of 2-digit industry dummies, and regional dummies. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered by the new municipality classification. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
Dependent variable: 
 
 
Log of 
Sales 
 
Net income 
to assets 
 
Total  
assets 
 
Cash  
holdings 
 
Profit 
volatility 
 
Leverage 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment 0.3929* 0.0632*** 0.1584 0.0638*** 0.0196* 0.0236 
 (0.2095) (0.0197) (0.1323) (0.0201) (0.0117) (0.0329) 
Ln assets -0.0432 -0.0067* 0.0052 -0.0036 0.0018 0.0165***
 (0.0288) (0.0037) (0.0187) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0061) 
Profitability t-1 -0.8328 -0.0746 0.5854 0.0474 0.0099 -0.1676 
 (0.6326) (0.1118) (0.4371) (0.0956) (0.0732) (0.1997) 
Number of firms 210 409 419 373 414 195 
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Corporate governance and international trade shocks 
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We study how the quality of corporate governance affects firms’ reaction to changes in the 
competitive environment. Our identification strategy relies on exogenous variations in both 
corporate governance and product market competition experienced by U.S. firms in the late 
1980s. While the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989 increased foreign competition, 
the business combination laws, passed between 1985 and 1991 in thirty U.S. states, weakened 
corporate governance for firms incorporated in those states. We find that the operating and stock 
market returns of firms with worse corporate governance were more negatively affected by the 
increase in competitive pressures. We also find that worse corporate governance impaired the 
ability of exporters to benefit from the reduction in export tariffs to Canada. These differences 
in performance are related to the lower financial constraints of well-governed firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Extensive research has documented that, by shaping agency conflicts within the firm, 
corporate governance has significant implications for such corporate policies as 
acquisitions (Masulis et al. 2007), innovation (Aghion et al. 2009; Sapra et al. 2009), 
cash holdings (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Harford et al. 2008) and debt financing 
(Klock et al. 2005). Other work underlines the importance of corporate governance in 
facing an adverse shock such as the Asian financial crisis (Johnson et al. 2000; Mitton 
2002). Overall, better-governed firms have higher productivity (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003) and value (Gompers et al. 2003; Cuñat et al. 2011). We contribute 
to this literature by examining how corporate governance affects a firm’s response to 
changes in the competitive environment.  
 The relationship between competition and corporate governance has long been 
debated theoretically. Hart (1983) formalizes the notion that competition might mitigate 
managerial slack. Scharfstein (1988) shows, however, that whether competition 
mitigates or exacerbates managerial slack crucially depends on the assumptions made 
on the managers’ utility function. Schmidt (1997) provides a model in which, by 
reducing profits and increasing at the same time the liquidation threat, competition has 
an ambiguous effect on managerial effort. In disentangling empirically the effects of 
governance and competition on corporate outcomes, we face two major obstacles. First, 
corporate governance is typically correlated with unobservable factors, which can bias 
any inference regarding the effect of corporate governance on firm outcomes. Second, 
because governance and competitive actions are jointly determined in equilibrium, it is 
difficult to separate out their individual consequences for firms. In order to avoid these 
problems, we consider an exogenous variation in corporate governance and how it 
affects a firm’s reaction to a subsequent exogenous increase in competitive pressures. 
These exogenous variations are provided by two policy changes: the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) of 1989, which led to a significant increase in foreign 
competition for U.S. firms; and the business combination (BC) laws, passed by thirty 
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U.S. states over the period of 1985-91, which worsened corporate governance of firms 
incorporated in those states by reducing the threat of hostile takeovers.  
 Using a sample of publicly traded U.S. firms over 1976-95, we find that the 
FTA’s negative effect on operating performance and stock market valuation was greater 
for firms incorporated in states that had previously passed BC laws. This evidence 
indicates that worse corporate governance rendered firms either unable or unwilling to 
respond to changes in the competitive environment. Non-exporters under worsened 
governance became more vulnerable to the increase in competition induced by lower 
import tariffs. Moreover, worse-governed exporters did not benefit from the decrease in 
export tariffs to Canada, even though it increased the size of their product market. The 
negative effect of the FTA was greater for firms that were small, young, less productive, 
and located closer to the Canadian border. We establish that the effect of governance 
was in part due to lower financial constraints of better-governed firms, suggesting that 
financial constraints became more important after competition strengthened. 
 The Canada-U.S. FTA provides a plausibly exogenous variation in competition. 
Contrary to some other free trade agreements, the Canada-U.S. FTA was largely 
unanticipated and was not accompanied by any other significant economic reform; nor 
was it a response to prevailing economic conditions (Trefler 2004; Breinlich and Cuñat 
2011). In addition, as Canada and the U.S. are main trading partners, the effect of the 
FTA was economically significant for the U.S. economy.22 Furthermore, since the 
agreement consisted mainly of abolishing existing import tariffs that differed across 
industries, the increase in competition following the FTA had a measurable cross-
sectional variation. Similarly, the passage of BC laws induced exogenous variations 
along an important dimension of corporate governance: the market for corporate 
control. In particular, BC laws restricted certain transactions (e.g. mergers and asset 
sales) between firms and their large shareholders for a period of three to five years after 

22 Clausing (2001) finds that a 1% reduction in post-FTA import tariffs was associated with a 10-11% 
increase in U.S. imports from Canada. He also estimates that the FTA raised annual Canadian exports to 
the U.S. by $23 billions. Since Canada was the main U.S. trading partner (accounting for about one fifth 
of total imports) and since there was no trade diversion, the effect of the FTA was substantial for the U.S. 
economy. 
52

the large shareholder’s stake passed a pre-specified threshold. This moratorium had the 
effect of hindering acquirers’ access to target firms’ assets and thus limited the former’s 
ability to pay down acquisition debt. By making hostile takeovers more difficult if not 
impossible, BC laws weakened the overall quality of corporate governance and thereby 
increased managerial slack (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). 
 We focus first on operating performance. In particular, we interact a dummy 
indicating whether a firm was incorporated in a state with BC laws and a variable 
measuring the FTA-induced reduction in import tariffs within the firm’s industry. Thus, 
our identification gains from the staggered implementation of BC laws and also from 
the different extent to which the trade reform affected different industries. The inclusion 
of firm fixed effects allows us to control for time-invariant differences in corporate 
governance and competitive positions. Also, since our identification relies on the 
interaction between states of incorporation and industries, we can control for the 
economic conditions of the states where firms are headquartered as well as for general 
industry trends. 
 Consistently with the notion that BC laws increased managerial slack, we find that 
the adoption of BC laws had a significant negative impact on the operating performance 
(measured by return on assets, or ROA) of firms incorporated in that state: on average, 
ROA dropped by 1.9% for these firms. The FTA, too, had a negative impact on 
operating performance. The ROA of firms that experienced an average tariff cut 
declined by 1.1% after the trade agreement. Examining the combined effect of the two 
policy changes, we find that the interaction between BC laws and lower import tariffs is 
also negative and statistically significant. The total effect for firms exposed both to BC 
laws and an average reduction in import tariffs was a decline of 3.1% in ROA. 
 After establishing an effect for the average firm, we examine whether our results 
are more pronounced for firms that are expected to be most affected by BC laws and the 
FTA. We first posit that non-exporters are affected negatively by trade liberalization 
because they are less likely to benefit from reduced export tariffs – that is, the FTA 
affected them primarily through the import tariff reduction. In line with this prediction, 
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we find that worse corporate governance amplifies the negative effect of import 
competition for non-exporters. For exporters, in contrast, we find that worse governance 
reduces their ability to benefit from the lowered export tariffs to Canada. 
 Trade liberalizations have been found to induce welfare gains as the market shares 
are reallocated from the least to the most productive firms (Pavcnik 2002; Melitz 2003). 
It has also been shown that low-productivity firms are more likely to be taken over 
because they offer higher potential efficiency gains (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001). 
Thus, the combination of worse corporate governance and a subsequent increase in 
foreign competition should harm less productive firms the most. Indeed, our results 
indicate that, when the competition increases, worse corporate governance is especially 
harmful to firms with lower total factor productivity.  
 Gravity models of international trade suggest that trade intensity decreases with 
distance. We examine the geographic heterogeneity of our results by testing for whether 
the negative effect of the trade shock (and its interaction with governance quality) 
depends on the distance between Canada and the U.S. firm’s headquarters. We find that 
both of these negative effects on profitability are concentrated among firms located 
closer to the Canadian border.  
 One concern with our results is that passage of the FTA or of BC laws may have 
been anticipated – in other words, that the “parallel trends” hypothesis required for the 
validity of our model is violated. We therefore perform a placebo test, which assumes 
that the FTA was already enacted in 1986 (in fact, negotiations on the agreement began 
in September 1985), but find no effects of such placebo policy on operating 
performance. Similarly, we find no significant effects of a placebo implementation of 
BC laws three years before their actual passage. Another concern is that the size of the 
tariff reduction was correlated with some pre-FTA industry characteristics and instead 
of the change in competition with our empirical specification we capture these inherent 
characteristics. To mitigate this concern, we control for several industry characteristics 
that are typically associated with trade protection (Guadalupe and Wulf 2010). Our 
results are robust to the inclusion of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which 
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controls for the domestic competition in U.S. industries, and also to the interaction 
between the HHI and BC laws (as in Giroud and Mueller 2010). Furthermore, our 
results are robust to the exclusion of firms incorporated in Delaware and of firms that 
operate in more than one industry (multisegment firms). Finally, we confirm our 
findings by adopting an alternative proxy for the quality of corporate governance – the 
extent of institutional ownership in the firm (Nikolov and Whited 2009) – and an 
alternative proxy for foreign competition – the industry-level import penetration as 
instrumented by the real exchange rate (Bertrand 2004). 
 In addition to these results on operating performance, we document a significant 
decline in the market value of firms that are affected by tariffs cuts and are incorporated 
in states with BC laws. First, we confirm the results in terms of market-to-book ratios. 
Second, we use an event study to show that companies with worse corporate 
governance had a more negative stock price reaction to the FTA. The trade agreement 
encountered substantial opposition in Canada, and its fate was determined by a narrow 
victory of the Progressive Conservative Party in the federal election of November, 
1988. Thus, the election date offers a good setting for assessing the stock market 
reaction to the FTA (Morck et al. 2000; Breinlich 2010). We examine abnormal returns 
for U.S. firms on the trading days following the election. Our findings indicate that, 
over a period of six days, stock prices dropped by 1.88% more for firms subject to BC 
laws than for other firms. 
 Finally, we examine the channels through which corporate governance might 
affect firm performance when competition changes. Broadly, such effect can be justified 
in two ways. Entrenched managers could be taking advantage of a “quiet life”; thus, 
because of earlier poor actions or unwillingness to react to a shock that requires new 
actions to be taken, their firms would suffer the most. Also, managers in firms with 
worse governance might be unduly constrained and thus not able (although willing) to 
respond appropriately to an increase in competition. We explore the latter explanation 
by looking into firms’ financial constraints, which play an important role in how firms 
react to trade liberalization (Manova 2008). First, we find evidence of larger effects on 
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operating performance among the firms that were ex ante the most financially 
constrained, i.e. firms in industries that rely heavily on external finance, firms without a 
credit rating, and small and young firms. Second, we test for whether a subsequent 
exogenous increase in financial need magnified the negative effect on performance for 
worse-governed firms facing the competitive shock. Examination of the oil spike that 
occurred during the first Gulf War in 1990 reveals that an unexpected change in credit 
conditions mostly affected firms that had recently experienced declining tariffs and the 
introduction of BC laws. Third, looking at the actual changes in the capital of U.S. 
firms, we find that firms subject to BC laws raised less external finance (both debt and 
equity) in the post-FTA period than other firms did. When combined, these results 
support the explanation that increased competition had a more negative effect on worse-
governed firms (at least in part) because of the more binding financial constraints they 
faced. 
 This paper contributes to several streams of literature. First, our work is closely 
related to the literature that studies how firms adapt to an increase in competition. It has 
been shown that more competition leads to outsourcing (Grossman and Helpman 2004), 
to flatter and more decentralized organizations (Bloom et al. 2010; Guadalupe and Wulf 
2010), to greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (Cuñat and Guadalupe 2005, 2009), 
and to upgrading of technology (Bustos 2011). In demonstrating how firms’ responses 
to trade liberalization are shaped by the quality of their governance, our results indicate 
that misalignment of incentives between managers and shareholders limits the readiness 
of firms to face changes in the competitive environment. We thus also extend the work 
of Khanna and Tice (2000) who show that firms with less agency conflicts (those with 
higher inside ownership, or the ones that are privately owned) respond less aggressively 
to the entry of a new rival. Our paper establishes the value effects, i.e. that after a rise in 
competition worse-governed firms in fact suffer in terms of operating and stock market 
performance. 
 Another study that is close to ours is that of Morck et al. (2000), who find that the 
Canadian firms affected most by the FTA were heir-managed family firms. Following 
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the expansion of export markets, these firms lost their domestic advantage over the 
widely-owned firms. Here we instead focus on U.S. companies and, in particular, on the 
corporate governance aspect on the firm’s response to a trade shock. In addition, we 
control for the endogeneity of corporate governance by employing BC laws as a shock 
to the market for corporate control. We also uncover a channel – namely, the need to 
raise external funds – that explains why corporate governance matters for a firm’s 
ability to compete in the product market. Finally, we document that the role played by 
corporate governance in responding to trade liberalization depends on the nature of a 
firm’s operations. For domestic firms, worse governance limits their response to 
increases in import competition; for exporting firms, worse governance reduces their 
capacity to benefit from greater business opportunities in Canada. 
 Our paper is also related to the literature studying whether competition acts as a 
governance device (Alchian 1950; Stigler 1958). More recent work has provided 
empirical support to this claim. For instance, Giroud and Mueller (2010) document that 
BC laws reduced profitability primarily in less competitive industries.23 But whereas 
Giroud and Mueller (2010) explore how changes in corporate governance affect firms in 
a given competitive environment, we investigate governance-induced differences in 
firms’ readiness to compete under increasing import competition in product markets. In 
fact, we find that increased competition for a given firm does not reduce the importance 
of worse corporate governance. On the contrary, weaker corporate governance impairs 
firm’s profitability after the rise in competition. This shows that, even if competition is 
a corporate governance device, it takes time for the threat of being driven out of the 
market to actually realize. 
 Finally, our work is related to the literature on heterogeneous firms and 
international trade (Melitz 2003). Recent research in this field has emphasized the role 
of credit supply on firms’ exports (Manova 2008, 2010; Paravisini et al. 2011). We 
focus on how different levels of access to financing affect the response of domestic 

23 Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2011) find that the interaction between industry concentration and 
corporate governance can be either positively, or negatively associated with a firm’s value depending on 
the type of the governance provisions considered. 
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producers to an increase in import competition. Our results suggest that corporate 
governance is one of the factors determining which firms are likely to benefit (or suffer) 
from trade liberalization. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and key variables. 
Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our main findings on 
operating performance. Section 5 discusses results on market values. Section 6 looks at 
the effect of export tariff reduction for exporting firms. Section 7 explores the role of 
financial constraints. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Data and variables 
2.1. Data sample
Our data set consists of publicly listed firms located and incorporated in the United 
States. We restrict our analysis primarily to manufacturing firms (SIC codes up to 4000) 
because the FTA affected only the tradable sector (Guadalupe and Wulf 2010). We 
draw our data on firm outcomes from the Compustat data set24. We exclude the firms 
for which net sales or book value of assets are either missing or negative as well as 
firms in the industries for which we have no data on tariffs. Our sample period ranges 
from 1976 through 1995 and consists of 3,567 unique firms and 34,279 firm-year 
observations, although the presence of missing values for control variables reduces the 
number of observations used in the regressions. 
 
2.2. Measures of corporate governance 
A first generation of anti-takeover statutes were passed by some U.S. states in the 
1970s. These statutes were deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1982, 
primarily because states exceeded their jurisdictional reach in applying them to firms 

24 We use the Compustat data set of public firms – rather than establishment-level data from the U.S. 
Census – because most of the financial decisions that drive our results are made at the headquarters and 
not at individual plants. Note also that, since private firms are typically more constrained financially than 
are public firms, our results should generalize to the broader array of firms covered by the U.S. Census. 
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incorporated outside their state. The mid-1980s saw states introducing anti-takeover 
legislations aimed to firms incorporated in the legislating state, and the practice spread 
across the country after Indiana’s new law was declared constitutional by the Supreme 
Court in 1987. As reported by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999), the most stringent of 
these anti-takeover regulations were BC laws that made hostile takeovers more difficult 
by restricting an acquirer’s access to the target firm’s assets for a period of three to five 
years, thus limiting the ability to use debt to finance the acquisition. We exploit the 
introduction of BC laws as our key variation in corporate governance. 
 BC laws were introduced in various U.S. states at different times. Table 1 reports 
when BC laws were passed in each state as well as the distribution of firms by states of 
location and states of incorporation.25 In our sample, only 33.1% of the firms are 
actually incorporated in their state of location.26 Twenty states, which account for 
15.7% of firm-year observations, never passed a BC law.
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of BC legislation with respect to the FTA. Most of 
the firms (79.1%) are incorporated in a state that passed a BC law in or before 1989, the 
year of the FTA. For this reason, we interpret our results as indicating the combined 
impact of an exogenous worsening of corporate governance and a subsequent increase 
in foreign competition.27
As a robustness check, we use the fraction of institutional ownership as a proxy 
for the quality of corporate governance. Standard corporate governance indices, such as 
those constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009), are unavailable 
for the period we study. Moreover, Nikolov and Whited (2009) claim that those indices 
fail to capture latent poison pills which can be introduced without shareholder consent. 
Hence they suggest that institutional investor ownership is a better proxy for corporate 

25 Given that firms are affected by BC laws in their state of incorporation, the potential for 
misclassification arises because Compustat only reports the state of incorporation for the latest year 
available. However, re-incorporation during the period considered was rare (Romano 1993) and so we 
assume that no such changes occurred over the sample period. 
26 The table reveals that, as expected, most of our sample firms are incorporated in Delaware; however, in 
Section 4.3 we demonstrate that our results are robust to the exclusion of Delaware-incorporated firms. 
27 To confirm this interpretation, we perform a robustness check (see Section 4.3) that excludes firms 
incorporated in states that passed BC laws after the FTA. 
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governance. We draw the annual data on institutional investor holdings from SEC 13 
filings recorded in the Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum database.28
 
2.3. Measures of competition and industry concentration 
The FTA abolished existing trade duties between U.S. and Canada. Because these tariffs 
differed across industries, we quantify how the FTA influenced foreign competition for 
U.S. firms by using the tariffs on imports from Canada that applied to a given industry 
before the implementation of the FTA. As shown by Clausing (2001), the larger were 
the import tariffs in place in a given industry, the greater was the competitive shock. 
 We use each firm’s primary four-digit SIC code to identify its industry and thus 
the relevant tariffs. We extract data on tariffs from the Center for International Data at 
UC Davis. We start by computing average tariffs in the industry by summing the 
customs value of imports and duties paid across all sub-industries of each four-digit SIC 
industry in each year before 1989. We then divide the total duties paid by the total 
customs value of imports and use this as our proxy for the import tariffs from Canada 
that each four-digit SIC industry faced in a particular year. The main treatment in our 
specification is the change from the average import tariffs in the pre-FTA period, 
computed over the three years prior to the implementation of the FTA (1986-88), to 
zero tariffs in the post-FTA period (from 1989 onwards). Table 2 lists the twenty 
industries with the highest tariffs on Canadian imports. The median cut in import tariffs 
due to the FTA was 3.3% and it ranged between 0% and 36%.  
 We validate that the FTA represented a competitive shock for U.S. firms by 
estimating its effect on price-cost margins, after controlling for firm size, age, and year 
and firm fixed effects. Unreported results, as in Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), suggests 
that more exposure to import tariff cuts indeed leads to a greater decline in the price-
cost margin.29  

28 All institutional investors with more than $100 million of securities under management must report 
their holdings to the SEC on form 13F and must also disclose all common stock positions that exceed 
10,000 shares or $200,000.
29 By contrast, we do not find any direct effect of BC law passages on firms’ price-cost margin. 
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 Because of its bilateral nature, the FTA also improved opportunities for U.S. 
exports to Canada. To separate this effect from the increase in competition, we use 
export tariffs data from Trefler (2004) and construct a variable similar to our variable 
for the import tariffs. Again, we measure the reduction in export tariffs to Canada at the 
level of U.S. four-digit SIC industry.  
 Although we consider the import and export tariffs to be zero for all industries 
after 1989, in some industries the tariffs reductions were phased out over periods as 
long as ten years following the FTA’s passage.30 Nevertheless, we treat all industries 
equally regardless of their phase-out schedule.31 As discussed in Guadalupe and Wulf 
(2010), this has the advantage of mitigating the potential endogeneity of the phase-out 
schedule.  
 We control for existing domestic concentration with the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index (HHI) based on the sales distribution of publicly listed firms in each three-digit 
SIC industry. A higher HHI corresponds to greater industry concentration. We correct 
for potential misclassifications due to the presence of a single firm in a given industry 
by omitting 2.5% of the firm-year observations at the right tail of the HHI distribution 
(cf. Giroud and Mueller 2010). The average HHI in 1988 – that is, one year prior to the 
passage of the FTA – is around 0.2 (see Panel A of Table 3).  
 As a robustness check, we adopt the industry-level import penetration as an 
alternative measure of foreign competition. An industry’s import penetration is defined 
as the dollar value of imports divided by the sum of dollar value of imports and dollar 
value of domestic production. Because import penetration can be endogenous to 
industry’s profitability, we follow Bertrand (2004) and instrument it using the weighted 
average of the real exchange rates of the importing countries. In particular, the weights 

30 Annex 401 of the FTA prescribes the actual phase-out schedules. However, there is anecdotal evidence 
that many industries lobbied to hasten the phase-out with the first review of the initial schedule adopted 
just a year after the FTA (see, e.g., “Canadian Trade Pact Accelerated”, New York Times, March 14, 
1989). 
31 Thus, we implicitly assume that (i) firms started adjusting to the new competitive situation immediately 
following the FTA’s passage, and (ii) phase-outs served only to maintain temporary profits. However, 
untabulated results show that the results are robust to using the actual tariffs, as re-estimated annually 
after 1989. 
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for each industry are the shares of each foreign country’s imports in the total imports of 
that industry; thus, the instrument varies both by time and industry. 
2.4. Firm outcomes 
Our main measure of operating performance is the return on assets, computed as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the 
beginning-of-year book value of assets.32 To mitigate concerns about outliers, we drop 
1% of the firm-year observations from each tail of the ROA distribution, although this 
procedure does not affect our results.  
 We also employ the ratio of market value to book value (MB ratio). To compute it 
we divide the market value of each firm (at the end of its fiscal year) by its book value 
of common equity. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), the MB ratio is limited to the 
interval between 0 and 10.  
 We define a few of firm characteristics in order to examine whether our 
hypothesized effect is stronger for firms expected to be more affected by the FTA. First, 
we sort firms by their total factor productivity (TFP) in 1984, which is estimated via the 
semi-parametric procedure described in Olley and Pakes (1996).33 Second, we measure 
each firm’s proximity to the Canadian border; this is proxied by the distance from the 
largest city in the state of location of the firm's headquarter to the nearest U.S.-Canada 
border crossing. Finally, when examining the effect of the reduction in export tariffs for 
exporting firms, we classify exporters as firms that have exports which constitute at 
least 1% of sales in the pre-FTA period.34 

32 We are primarily interested in how an increase in foreign competition affects the profitability of the 
firms; however, since profitability is monotonically and positively related to productivity (Imrohoroglu 
and Tüzel 2011) and since productivity is often proxied by profitability measures in the finance literature 
(Novy-Marx 2010, Gourio 2007), our results also suggest that a bilateral weakening of trade barriers has, 
on average, a more negative effect on the productivity of domestic firms with worse corporate 
governance. In fact, our results on profitability are broadly in line with those based on using a measure of 
total factor productivity as our dependent variable. 
33 The firm-level variables used to compute TFP are the logarithms of sales, employment, capital 
expenditures, and property, plants and equipment. 
34 We use a 1% threshold to avoid trivial values in exports. However, our results are qualitatively similar 
if exporters are simply classified as firms reporting any exports (and non-exporters as firms reporting no 
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2.5. Financing 
We measure financial constraints in three ways. First, following Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), we classify firms based on whether the industry in which they operated was 
above or below the across-industry median of the dollar value of external financial 
capital raised in 1984 (i.e. one year prior to the passage of the first BC law), normalized 
by the dollar value of industry assets. Second, we sort our sample by whether or not in 
1985 the firms had been assigned a long-term bond rating by Standard & Poors (as 
reported in Compustat).35 A bond rating enables firms to access public debt markets and 
is therefore related to lower credit constraints (Kashyap et al 1994; Faulkender and 
Petersen 2005). Moreover, as smaller and younger firms are more vulnerable to capital 
market imperfections (Almeida et al. 2004), we look at the firms at different stages of 
development (i.e., young and old firms) and different sizes (i.e. small and large firms). 
 We also provide a test using an exogenous shock that affected the financing needs 
of some firms: the oil price spike at the end of 1990. In particular, we measure a firm’s 
exposure to this shock by the correlation between daily returns on its stock price and the 
changes in the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil spot price, estimated using the 
data from 1989.  
 Finally, our measures of external financing activity are based on net changes in 
debt and equity, estimated as in Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Leary and Roberts (2005). 
We define the capital raised in a given year as the net change in equity and debt, 
normalized by the firm’s book value of assets in the previous year. We are interested in 
firms that raise (rather than return) capital, so we consider only positive values of the 
capital raised. That is, if the net change in debt and equity is negative, we record the 
capital raised as 0.36 To deal with outliers, the fraction of capital raised to existing assets 
is capped at 1. Finally, due to data reliability we follow Leary and Roberts (2005) in 
restricting our external finance analyses to the period of 1984-95.  

exports) in a given year. Note that due to lack of export data by destination country, we consider the 
overall export activity and not just export to Canada. 
35 Data limitations necessitate that we use data from 1985 rather than 1984. 
36 However, allowing negative net changes in debt and equity does not substantially alter our results. 
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 We report summary statistics for the main variables of interest in Table 3. 
Appendix describes all the variables used. 
 
3. Identification strategy 
Because corporate governance is an equilibrium outcome that is largely determined by 
the firm itself, it is difficult to establish a causal link between corporate governance and 
firm performance. A positive association between profitability and a measure of 
governance quality, such as board independence, could indeed mean that good 
governance is beneficial for firm performance. However, such an inference is plagued 
by three problems. First, companies may adopt effective governance mechanisms in 
response to good performance, in which case, corporate governance is not the 
determinant but rather the consequence of firm performance. Second, the quality of 
corporate governance may be correlated with factors (e.g. CEO’s preferences) that are 
not observed by the researcher, yet directly affect firm policies; in this case, one would 
wrongly attribute the effect of such omitted factors to corporate governance. Third, if 
we seek to establish whether corporate governance alters the effect of a changing 
competitive environment on the firm’s performance, then we run into additional 
problems. For the industries in which good corporate governance becomes increasingly 
more important for operating performance, competition could intensify. In such a 
scenario, firms could be improving their governance as the means to improve 
performance and thus could end up competing more aggressively. Finally, some 
unobservable factors (e.g., increases in industry’s productivity) might be increasing the 
extent of competition while also cementing the link between corporate governance and 
performance. 
 We deal with these concerns by combining two types of difference-in-differences 
models that establish exogenous variations in both the quality of corporate governance 
and the intensity of foreign competition. First, we exploit the staggered passage of BC 
laws in the states of incorporation (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Giroud and 
Mueller 2010). After controlling for state-level business conditions and firm fixed 
64

effects, we assume that the parallel trends between treatment and control groups hold, 
and thus we are able to identify the effect of worsened corporate governance on a firm’s 
performance.37 Second, we use passage of the FTA as an exogenous variation in the 
competitive environment. Even though the timing of the change was uniform, the 
exposure to the FTA and thus the agreement’s effect on competition varied across 
industries, because pre-FTA tariffs for imports from Canada differed across U.S. 
industries.38  
 There are several methodological advantages to combining the FTA and the BC 
laws in order to establish exogenous variations in competitive pressures and corporate 
governance. First, note that addressing the combined impact of competition and 
corporate governance on firms solely by means of their cross-sectional measures would 
leave the analysis open to omitted factor bias. Adopting shocks to competition and 
governance provides a more tractable way to mitigate this concern than controlling for 
all potentially omitted variables. Second, one could argue that corporate governance has 
an effect on the firm’s strategy in the product market, and hence on measures of 
industrial composition. It is therefore difficult to interpret the impact of BC laws and, 
for example, HHI on firm outcomes if the HHI itself changes in response to BC laws. 
Using the FTA addresses this concern because BC laws should not have induced 
immediate systematic increases in import tariffs, which are decided at the international 

37 Because our identification relies on BC laws that were passed a few years before the FTA, one concern 
is that firms might already have adjusted their internal governance mechanisms, in which case the BC 
laws (especially those passed early in the period under consideration) should not matter by the time of the 
FTA. Yet, such concerns mean only that we are estimating a lower bound of the corporate governance 
effect to the FTA since we are unable to control for the fact that some firms having already reduced their 
managerial slack. Still, we address this concern in two ways. In the first place, our results are robust to the 
exclusion of firms that were exposed to the earliest passage of BC laws (in 1985) and thus had the most 
time to adjust. Second, when looking at the dynamic effect of BC laws on firms, we find that their 
negative effect on ROA did not diminish, but rather persisted over the years after the BC was passed. 
38 In adopting this approach, we follow Card (1992), who uses a variable to classify cross-sectional units 
in terms of their exposure to a law change. A statistically significant coefficient for this treatment variable 
means that it is a good predictor of changes in the dependent variable induced by the policy change 
(Angrist and Pischke 2008). In our case, the extent of exposure is measured by the average tariffs on 
Canadian imports that applied in the industry prior to the FTA. 
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level.39 Third, using the FTA to establish exogenous and measurable variations in 
competition circumvents the methodological difficulties of measuring actual 
competitive pressures.40 Similarly, BC laws provide a reliable way to assess the effect 
of corporate governance because consistent firm-level corporate governance measures 
are lacking for the period surrounding passage of the FTA.41 Figure 2 depicts our 
identification strategy in the graphical form.  
 Our baseline model combines variations induced both by BC laws and the FTA. 
Whereas each policy taken separately measures the respective impact of changing 
governance and competition, their interaction identifies the effect on operating returns 
of exogenously worsened governance and a subsequent increase in foreign competition. 
Thus, we estimate the following regression: 
1 2
3 4
    
                'X
ijkt i t jt jt
kt kt jt ijkt ijkt
ROA Import Tariff cuts Export Tariff cuts
BC BC Import Tariff cuts e
   
  
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 (1) 
where i indexes firms, j indexes four-digit SIC industries, k indexes states of 
incorporation, and t indexes time. The dependent variable ROAijkt is the return on assets. 
Import tariff cutstj measures the average level of tariffs on imports from Canada in the 
industry j before the passage of the FTA, interacted with a dummy, set equal to 1, for 
the post-FTA period, i.e. Import tariff cutstj is equal to 0 before 1989 and to a positive 

39 If anything, import tariffs decreased slightly over time over the period during which the BC laws were 
passed. 
40 Many empirical works have stressed the importance of dealing with the endogeneity of product market 
competition, by using, for example, regulation indexes (Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzales 2011), exchange 
rates and import tariffs as instruments (Cuñat and Guadalupe 2005), sharp appreciation of currencies 
(Cuñat and Guadalupe 2009), and policy instruments (Aghion et al. 2005). Note also, that such measures 
as the HHI and the Lerner index are strongly non-monotonic in the actual competitive situation 
(Schmalensee 1989), and fail to account for the competitive pressure exerted by potential entrants. An 
additional issue – that HHI values in the empirical corporate finance research are often based only on 
public corporations that constitute a small fraction of the universe of firms – is addressed by Ali et al. 
(2009). 
41 One concern is that BC laws may have had no corporate governance effect and merely made it more 
difficult to take over inefficient firms. In fact, previous research finds no actual drop in the M&A activity 
after BC laws were passed (see, e.g., Comment and Schwert 1995; Giroud and Mueller 2010). Garvey 
and Hanka (1999) suggest that BC laws raise the cost of takeover activity but also the resulting slack 
increases the payoff from a successful takeover. Therefore, reduced threat of takeovers need not reduce 
actual takeover activity. 
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value after 1989.42 Export tariff cuttj is the corresponding measure for tariffs on exports 
to Canada in the industry j. We assume that no tariffs remained after 1989, so the 
coefficient for Import tariff cutstj measures how ROA changed for firms that were 
exposed to greater foreign competition due to the FTA. BCkt is a dummy, set equal to 1 
if the firm’s state of incorporation k has BC laws in year t (and to 0 otherwise). If BC 
laws do have a negative effect on corporate governance that translates into lower 
operating returns, then we expect 3 to be negative. The coefficient for our key variable 
of interest BCkt × Import tariff cutstj measures how the negative effect of the cut in 
import tariffs varies as a function of the exposure to BC laws. The null hypothesis for 4 
is that an increase in foreign competition affects firms’ returns uniformly, regardless of 
their governance, i.e. 4 = 0. We expect a negative 4 if worse governance makes firms 
respond inadequately to increases in competition.  
 As documented by Giroud and Mueller (2010), firms incorporated in the states 
with and without BC laws differ in many observable characteristics. For this reason we 
must control for a number of confounding influences. Our specification includes year 
dummies, t, and firm fixed effects, i, to mitigate the scope for omitted factor bias. In 
addition, our vector of controls, Xijkt, includes firm size, its squared term and firm age.43 
Moreover, we control for the one-year lagged HHI in order to control for the domestic 
industry concentration.  
 Also, we control for general conditions at the industry level as well as for 
contemporaneous economic conditions in the states where firms operate. We do so by 
estimating state and industry linear trends. In particular, we calculate time-varying 
averages of the ROA of firms in certain state of location, excluding the firm in question 
when computing these averages. In a similar fashion, we calculate time-varying 
averages of the ROA of firms in certain industry, excluding the firm in question when 
computing these averages. In our robustness checks, we include polynomial terms (up 

42 Following Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), we compute the pre-FTA import tariffs using four-digit SIC 
averages for the period between 1986 and 1988 as the baseline treatment. As robustness checks, we use 
alternative procedures, such as those based on three-digit or two-digit SIC codes, averages taken for the 
period between 1983 and 1988, or averages for the entire period (1976-88) preceding the FTA. 
43 In unreported analyses, we find that our results are unchanged after controlling for lagged leverage. 
67

to cubic) of the state and industry linear trends; also, we follow Guadalupe and Wulf 
(2010) and control for preexisting industry characteristics that are typically related to 
trade protection: skill intensity, capital intensity, and TFP growth.44  
 We cluster the standard errors by the state of incorporation, which accounts for 
arbitrary correlations of residuals across different firms in a given year and state of 
incorporation, across different firms in a given state of incorporation over time, as well 
as over different years for a given firm. However, our findings are robust to alternative 
clustering methods: at the firm level, at the industry level, two-way clustering at the 
levels of industry and state of incorporation, and by block-bootstrap, as proposed by 
Bertrand et al. (2004). 
 
4. Operating performance 
4.1. Baseline results 
Table 4 presents results for the full specification which includes BC laws, a cut in 
import tariffs and the interaction between them. First, to validate our claim that BC laws 
are a shock to corporate governance that negatively affected operating returns, we look 
at the effect of BC law (Column 1). The results, which are in line with those reported by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), confirm a negative effect of BC laws on 
profitability. Meanwhile, consistently with the prediction that the FTA increased foreign 
competition for U.S. firms, we find that the coefficient for reduced import tariffs is 
negative and significant; firms exposed to the average (3.3%) tariff reduction saw their 
ROA decline by 1.1% (the average ROA in our sample is 6.7%). These findings remain 
unchanged after controlling for the industry HHI (Column 2).  
 Columns (3) and (4) report our main test by including the interaction between BC 
laws and import tariff cuts. The coefficient for this interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5%, even though the cut in import tariffs by itself is not 

44 Industry controls are extracted from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. We compute 
these controls in the same way as our main tariffs, i.e. by taking the averages for the period 1986-88 and 
interacting them with a dummy, set equal to 0 before 1989 and set equal to 1 on and after 1989. 
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significant. The drop in ROA was 3.1% for firms incorporated in states with BC laws 
and exposed to the average cut in import tariffs. Thus, the increase in competition 
affected operating returns only for firms with recently worsened corporate governance. 
 In Columns (5) and (6), we add the variable measuring the reduction in export 
tariffs and its interaction with BC laws, thereby controlling for the fact that the FTA 
also reduced export tariffs to Canada. Our estimates indicate that the interaction 
between BC laws and the reduction in import tariffs remains negative and statistically 
significant, whereas the interaction between BC laws and export tariffs cut is not 
significant. For the average firm, our findings are thus driven by the increase in foreign 
competition in U.S. domestic markets and not by the greater ease of exporting to 
Canada. In Section 6 we examine how this result varies for exporters and non-exporters. 
 Overall, our findings indicate that worse corporate governance impairs the 
performance of firms that are subject to greater foreign competition. 
 
4.2. Firm characteristics 
We now explore whether the effect is stronger for firms that should have been affected 
more by the FTA. First, we check whether less productive firms were hurt most. We 
then show that our effect is present mainly among firms that are more closely located to 
the Canadian border. 
 We begin by differentiating firms by their productivity. Models of trade 
integration with heterogeneous firms (see, e.g., Melitz 2003) suggest that only low-
productivity firms are negatively affected by trade liberalization. Moreover, low-
productivity firms are ex ante more likely to be taken over because of greater potential 
efficiency gains (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001). Hence, the passage of BC laws which 
reduce the threat of takeover should affect them more negatively than high-productivity 
firms. We thus test whether the negative effect of the interaction between BC laws and 
trade liberalization on operating returns is mostly prevalent among low-productivity 
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firms.45 We measure firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) by following the semi-
parametric procedure developed in Olley and Pakes (1996).46 Then, we estimate 
separate regressions for subsamples of firms with lower and higher TFP than their 
industry peers in 1984 (Table 5, Columns 1 and 2). The interaction between BC laws 
and import tariff cuts is negative in both subsamples, but the economic magnitude is 
more than twice as large for the subsample of low-productivity firms. Our findings thus 
indicate that low-productivity firms suffered more from the FTA than did other firms 
and especially so if they were subject to BC laws.  
 Next, we explore how our results vary depending on the geographic proximity to 
the Canadian market. Gravity models of international trade imply that the intensity of 
trade decreases with the distance between the trading partners, so we expect the FTA to 
have a stronger effect on firms that operate closer to the Canadian border.47 As BC laws 
were introduced at the level of state of incorporation, we avoid spurious correlation 
between distance and the quality of governance. We measure proximity to Canada as 
the distance from the largest city in the firm’s state of location to the closest U.S.-
Canada border crossing. We then split the sample according to whether the firms are 
located closer to or farther from the median distance to Canada (300 miles) and analyze 
separately the effect of BC laws and reduced import tariffs for both subsamples (Table 
5, Columns 3 and 4). We find that the combined effect of tariff reduction and BC laws 
is statistically significant only for those firms located closer to the Canadian border.  
 The effect of BC laws on managerial slack was arguably heterogeneous also 
depending on a firm’s ownership structure. For example, family firms may have been 
less exposed to the negative consequences of BC laws, either because the managers are 
controlling owner or because the concentration of shares in the hands of families is in 
itself an effective device to monitor non-family managers. While our estimates quantify 

45 BC laws have a direct effect on firm-level productivity (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). We thus sort 
the firms according to their productivity before the first BC law was passed (in 1984). 
46 Our findings are also robust to computing TFP as Solow residuals from a Cobb-Douglas production 
function estimated with OLS. Untabulated results are available at request. 
47 Northern and southern states differ along other dimensions as well. For instance, southern states have 
laxer employment protection laws (Autor et al. 2004) and may therefore be able to adapt more quickly to 
increases in competition. Such an explanation is in line with our hypothesis. 
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the effect of worse governance and increase for the average firm, due to lack of data we 
are unable to explore how this effect is affected by firms’ ownership structures. 
 
4.3. Robustness to industry characteristics 
We next explore the robustness of our main result in a number of tests. We start by 
examining whether import tariffs in fact proxy for some inherent industry 
characteristics. We then look into whether our assumption of parallel trends holds, and 
also check results while excluding multisegment firms and firms incorporated in 
Delaware. Finally, we provide alternative computations of standard errors and 
dependent variables, as well as methods for dealing with outliers.  
 One concern is that the effect of BC laws could differ across industries for reasons 
other than competitive pressures. Thus, the reduction in import tariffs might instead 
reflect some inherent differences across industries that are typically correlated with the 
protection from foreign competitors. To tackle this issue, we control for a number of 
industry characteristics as well as for their interaction with the BC law dummy. As we 
show in Table 6, the inclusion of these controls does not substantially affect our results.  
 First, industries that are the least competitive globally might be protected by 
higher import tariffs, yet also be the most affected by the worsening corporate 
governance. We therefore control for a time-invariant measure of the average import 
tariffs that a firm faced before the FTA. This variable is related to the static 
characteristics of the industry such as its global competitiveness. A statistically 
significant coefficient for the interaction between BC laws and average import tariffs 
would suggest that the least efficient industries are the most affected by worsening 
corporate governance. The results are reported in Column (1). This coefficient is not 
statistically significant, but the interaction between BC laws and the reduction in import 
tariffs remains significant. Hence, the negative effect stems from changes in 
competition and not from static industry characteristics.  
 Second, we provide a specification including the interaction between BC laws and 
lagged HHI in order to control for the differing effects of BC laws on concentrated 
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versus competitive industries, as documented in Giroud and Mueller (2010). In Column 
(2) we again find a negative and significant effect for the interaction between BC laws 
and the tariff cut. The latter result also holds if HHI when estimated 
contemporaneously.  
 Third, in Column (3), we follow Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) by including a set of 
pre-FTA industry characteristics that are typically related to trade protection: skill 
intensity, capital intensity, and TFP growth over 1986-89, as well as their interaction 
with the post-FTA dummy. These controls allow us to further absorb the effect of 
observable industry differences potentially related to the magnitude of the tariffs cut. 
We find that none of these controls significantly affect our main findings. Finally, in 
Column (4), we include all controls separately used in Columns (1)-(3) and again find a 
significant effect for our coefficient of interest.  
 
4.4. Further robustness checks 
In Table 7, we assess the robustness of our findings in a number of additional ways. An 
important concern about our identification strategy is the possible violation of the 
parallel trends hypothesis concerning the implementation of BC laws and the FTA. 
Previous literature offers arguments that support the abrupt adoption of both BC laws 
and the FTA. Romano (1987), who investigates the adoption of BC laws from a 
political viewpoint, claims that such legislature is typically advocated not by a larger 
coalition of firms but rather by a single firm facing a threat of imminent takeover. That 
only a few firms lobbied for BC laws and that they were often adopted during 
emergency legislative sessions without public hearings should mitigate the concerns for 
endogeneity (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). Moreover, passage of the FTA was 
highly improbable and unexpected (Guadalupe and Wulf 2010). Its fate was decided in 
the Canadian federal election, which was won by the Progressive Conservative party, in 
favor of the FTA, after trailing in the polls to the Liberal party that opposed the 
agreement. We address these concerns empirically by estimating placebo policy 
changes three years before their actual passage (Columns 1 and 2). Results indicate that 
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neither placebo BC laws nor the placebo FTA are statistically significant. Their 
economic effects are also less economically pronounced than our baseline finding in 
Table 4, Columns (1) and (2). These results confirm that our sample exhibits no 
diverging trends, due to e.g. selection of worse-governed firms into BC states prior to 
the actual law passage, that could confound our findings.  
 An additional concern of our specification is that the control variables (e.g. firm 
size) might themselves be responsive to the policy changes and/or be correlated with 
omitted factors. In Column (3), we therefore provide the results for a specification that 
controls only for time and firm fixed effects.   
 Moreover, since most of the firms in our sample are incorporated in Delaware (see 
Table 1), our results could reflect some non-governance related changes in the 
legislature of Delaware-incorporated firms. Yet the results reported in Column (4) show 
that our findings are robust also to the exclusion of firms that incorporated in Delaware.  
 Our treatment measuring the reduction in import tariffs relies on the correct 
assignment of firms to industries. Since we only use the primary segments reported in 
Compustat for each firm, the FTA treatments might suffer from measurement errors for 
firms that are active in multiple segments. To address this concern, we restrict our 
analysis to single-segment firms, as inferred from the number of segments for which 
Compustat Segments database reports sales. The results in Column (5) indicate that the 
interaction between BC laws and reduction in import tariffs is statistically significant at 
the 10% level and economically relevant.  
 Additionally, we address the issue of the timing of BC laws. Our baseline results 
(Table 4) estimate the interaction of an increase in competition with BC laws regardless 
of whether the BC laws were passed before or after the FTA. As shown in Figure 1, 
seventeen states (in which 79.1% of our sample firms are incorporated) passed BC laws 
before the FTA, eight states did so in 1989, while five states passed BC laws in 1990-
91. Since we aim to identify how a change in governance affects the response to a 
subsequent change in competition, our analysis could be biased by including even the 
few states that passed BC laws after the FTA. Hence, we exclude firms incorporated in 
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states that passed BC laws in 1990 and 1991, and the results, shown in Column (6), are 
robust to this analysis.  
 A possible source of selection bias in our estimates is represented by entry and 
exit effects. New firms may choose where to incorporate depending on whether a BC 
law was present or not in their headquarter state. Similarly, worse-governed firms in 
states without a BC law may be more prone to exit from the sample. We reduce these 
potential biases by estimating our baseline model for a subsample of firms that are 
present in the dataset from 1981 until 1995 (i.e. the last year in our sample). Results 
reported in Column (7) confirm our main finding.  
 We also provide alternative computations of the standard errors. We estimate our 
baseline regression by clustering at the four-digit industry level (Column 8), to allow for 
any intra-industry correlation of residuals induced by the FTA. We adopt treatments on 
two different dimensions and we are interested in the interaction between them. Thus, 
since our specification is identified at both the industry and the state of incorporation 
levels, we employ two-way clustering at the levels of industry and state of 
incorporation. These results are reported in Column (9). In untabulated regressions, we 
also cluster residuals at the levels of firm and at the state of location. Although the 
precision of our estimates varies, the interaction between BC laws and reduction in 
import tariffs remains statistically significant at conventional levels. The interaction 
coefficient remains significant at the 5% level even when we compute standard errors 
by block-bootstrap using 200 replications (Bertrand et al. 2004).  
 Finally, we adopt several ways to deal with outliers. In our baseline estimates, we 
trim 1% at each tail of the ROA distribution. We obtain similar results, however, if we 
exclude firms with assets of less than $1 million, if we trim 1% at each tail of the 
distribution of total assets, and if we estimate a median regression (including industry 
fixed effects and bootstrapping standard errors using 100 replications). Our results are 
also robust to the adoption of alternative measures of performance. These include sales 
divided by assets, net profit margin (computed as EBITDA divided by sales), ROA after 
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depreciation (computed as operating income after depreciation divided by total assets), 
and ROE (computed as EBITDA divided by book value of common equity).48  
 
4.5. Alternative measures of corporate governance and competition 
In addition to using BC laws to identify variations in corporate governance, we use a 
firm-level measure of corporate governance to show that the FTA had a more negative 
effect on the worse-governed firms. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional 
ownership concentration is associated with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity and 
lower executive compensation, both of which reduce agency problems between 
shareholders and management. Furthermore, Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that 
institutional investors are more likely to invest in better-governed firms. Nikolov and 
Whited (2009) further claim that, given the measurement problems associated with 
other proxies, institutional ownership should be the preferred proxy for firm-level 
corporate governance. Following these studies, we adopt the fraction of institutional 
ownership in the firm as a proxy for the quality of its corporate governance. We 
estimate an equation in which Import tariff cutstj is interacted with the fraction of firm’s 
stock owned by institutional investors. Controlling for firm fixed effects allows us to 
look at within-firm variations in institutional ownership.  
 The results of this estimations are reported in Table 8.49 First, Column (1) shows 
that there is a positive relation between profitability and ownership by institutional 

48 We conduct a number of additional robustness checks that are available upon request. First, we 
compute the average tariffs for the entire period before the FTA was passed (from 1976 to 1988). In 
computing the average tariff for the pre-FTA period, we had to exclude one industry in 1978 that reported 
an implausibly high tariff. Second, we adopt a symmetric window around the FTA passage (1982-95). 
Third, we restrict the analysis to manufacturing sectors (SIC between 2000 and 4000). Fourth, we only 
consider only the cases involving tariff reductions that are not extreme (i.e. strictly larger than 0% and 
lower than 8%). Fifth, we control for leverage and/or cash holdings. All results confirm our previous 
findings, in both economic and statistical terms. Finally, we include the square of reduced import tariffs 
and its interaction with BC laws, and our main results remain largely unchanged. The latter interaction of 
BC laws with the squared term of reduced import tariffs is not significant by itself, a result that implies 
the absence of the non-linear effect of reduced import tariffs on operating returns. 
49 Our main specification restricts the sample of firms with a non-missing value for extent of institutional 
ownership; however, our results are robust to using the full sample where the missing values of 
institutional ownership are replaced with 0. 
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investors. Moreover, in support of our hypothesis, we find that the coefficient for 
Import tariff cutstj is negative whereas the interaction term for this variable and 
institutional investor ownership is positive. Thus we find that reduced tariffs have a 
negative effect only for the firms with a small institutional investor base, i.e. firms with 
worse governance.50  
 Finally, we employ import penetration at the industry level as an alternative 
measure of import competition, estimating an equation in which import penetration is 
interacted with the dummy indicating the passage of BC laws. Import penetration is 
defined as the ratio of imports to imports plus domestic production in a given industry 
and year. Because import penetration can be endogenous to an industry’s profitability, 
we follow Bertrand (2004) and instrument it with the weighted average of the real 
exchange rates of the importing countries. In particular, we construct the weights for 
each industry from the shares of each foreign country’s imports in the total imports of 
that industry. As in Bertrand (2004), we fix these shares of foreign country’s imports at 
their year 1981 levels. We then use both the current and one-year lagged weighted real 
exchange rates as instruments for import penetration and use the interaction of these 
exchange rates with BC laws as an instrument for the interaction of import penetration 
with BC laws. The results reported in Column (2) show that greater foreign competition 
reduces profitability, although it mainly affects the profitability of firms with worse 
corporate governance.  
 Although the results using alternative measures are in line with our main findings, 
we prefer to use the FTA and the passage of state-level BC laws as the ways to identify 
our effect because they provide more exogenous variations in corporate governance and 
in import competition. 
 
 
 

50 Our results are robust to using membership in the S&P500 index (as in Aghion et al. 2009) to 
instrument the fraction of institutional ownership. 
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5. Market values 
We complement our results on operating performance by studying stock market 
reactions to the FTA. If corporate governance indeed reduces the readiness to react to 
competition and if markets efficiently incorporate this information, then a stock’s 
market value should decrease more for firms with worse corporate governance than for 
firms with better governance following the implementation of the FTA. We first provide 
results for the panel estimation of market-to-book ratios. We then conduct an event 
study on how announcement of the results of the Canadian federal election results, 
which significantly increased the FTA’s probability of being adopted, affected the stock 
prices of U.S. firms. 
 
5.1. Market-to-book ratios 
Our first dependent variable is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity (the MB ratio). We again control for firm fixed effects, which absorb firm-level 
differences in valuation; for average MB ratios of industry and state of operation, which 
capture industry and local economy trends; and for time-fixed effects, which control for 
general market movements. The resulting analysis can therefore be interpreted as 
estimating the effect of BC laws and reduced tariffs on long-term equity returns. The 
results are reported in Table 9. In Column (1), we report estimates using the same 
specification as in the ROA regressions. We find that the coefficient for the interaction 
between BC laws and reduced tariffs is negative and significant: firms exposed to the 
worse governance experience a decrease in market value following the increases in 
competition. In Columns (2)-(4) we sequentially include other controls, typically 
associated with market value: ROA, extent of leverage and ratio of R&D expenditures 
to sales. We use one-year lagged values in order to reduce the concern that these 
controls are simultaneously affected by the FTA directly. In Column (5), we include all 
controls together. Again, our estimates indicate a significant decrease in the market 
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value of firms that are both subject to increasing competitive pressures and incorporated 
in states with BC laws.  
 A consistent finding for the market value of equity also eliminates an additional 
concern regarding our results on profitability. One could argue that firm’s investment 
may follow decreasing returns to scale, in which case a firm could continue to expand 
even if its average ROA declines. If either the passage of BC laws or the reduction in 
import tariffs increases the sizes of firms, we could have misinterpreted our findings on 
ROA. However, the decline in market values of firms incorporated in states with BC 
laws runs counter to such interpretation of our profitability results. 
 
5.2. Event study 
Accounting-based measures can be manipulated in response to worsened corporate 
governance and the competitive shock. Moreover, the annual panel data cannot fully 
absorb the endogeneity of the phase-out schedules of tariffs. To mitigate these concerns, 
we perform an event study to test whether the FTA’s adoption had a different 
immediate impact on the stock prices of U.S. firms incorporated in states with and 
without BC laws. Morck et al. (2000) and Breinlich (2010) summarize the political 
events around the implementation of the FTA. Contrary to the political process in the 
U.S., the debate about the adoption of the FTA was very contentious in Canada. After 
the agreement was signed between U.S. and Canada in October, 1988, the legislation to 
implement it stalled in Canada’s Senate. Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister at the time, 
called federal election for November 21, 1988. The FTA was the main issue in the 
election and the outcome of the election was highly uncertain. Although Progressive 
Conservatives won the majority, a Gallup poll published two weeks before the election 
still showed a 12% lead in favor of the Liberal Party, which opposed the 
implementation of the FTA. The uncertainty surrounding this election offers an ideal 
context for conducting an event study that examines the U.S. stock market reaction to 
the FTA. 
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 First, since all firms within the same industry are affected to a similar extent and 
since their abnormal returns are likely to be correlated (MacKinlay 1997), we form 
industry-level portfolios. Second, for each of these portfolios we estimate cumulative 
abnormal stock returns over several event periods surrounding the election date: [-20,-
1], [-5,-1], [-1,0], [0,0], [0,1], [0,3], and [0,5], where [-1,0] for example, denotes a two-
day event window. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated as the 
difference between actual returns (extracted from CRSP, the Center for Research in 
Security Prices) and expected returns, where the latter are projected using a market 
model with the parameters estimated from 241 to 41 trading days prior to November 21, 
1988. We then test whether the average CARs of these 326 industry portfolios are 
statistically different from zero for each event window.  
 The results are given in Table 10. Columns (2)-(4) confirm that a greater 
reduction in tariffs led to a decline in stock prices, a finding that validates our 
identification strategy. This effect shows up in all the time windows adopted from [0,0] 
to [0,5]. For instance, the six day return was -1.25% for firms operating in industries 
subject to large tariffs reductions but was not significantly different from zero for the 
other firms.  
 Finally, in the same manner as for the industry portfolios, we form portfolios at 
the level of state of incorporation, estimate cumulative abnormal stock returns over the 
same event windows and test for whether the average CARs of these state-level 
portfolios are statistically different from zero for each event window. In Columns (5)-
(7), we document that firms incorporated in states subject to BC laws experienced a 
larger decline in stock prices. Again, the effect shows up in the various time windows 
from [0,0] to [0,5]. A six day return was -1.44% for firms subject to BC laws but not 
significantly different from zero for other firms. Overall, the event study evidence 
confirms our previous findings that firms incorporated in environments associated with 
worse corporate governance were less prepared to face an increase in competitive 
pressures. 
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6. Exporters 
FTA affected both import and export side of trade. We thus separately look into how 
firms were affected by the reduction in the export tariffs. We first distinguish between 
exporters and non-exporters. We expect the results for these two groups to differ for two 
reasons. First, exporters might have benefited from the expanded business opportunities 
in Canada due to the reduction in export tariffs. Second, exporting firms are typically 
associated with a high level of productivity (e.g. Clerides et al. 1998, Delgado et al. 
2002; Bernard and Jensen 2004), hence the effect of import tariffs should be lower for 
these firms.51 To account for both effects, we estimate separate regressions for exporters 
and non-exporters, including the reduction of both import and export tariffs as well as 
their interactions with BC laws. It is important for our identification that the firms in our 
sample do not change their exporting status after 1988 – in other words, that there is no 
effect from the FTA on the extensive margin to export. 
 Results, reported in Table 11, Columns (1)-(3) show that our previous findings on 
import tariff cuts are concentrated in the sample of non-exporters. The interaction 
between BC laws and import tariffs is both significant (at the 10% level) and 
economically large for this group of firms. On the contrary, neither export tariffs cut, 
nor its interaction with the BC laws are significant at conventional levels. Thus, non-
exporting firms were negatively affected by the FTA mostly through the increase in 
competition, and this negative impact was especially strong in environments 
characterized with poor corporate governance.  
 On the contrary, we find that for exporters the reduction in export tariffs is 
positive and significant. This result suggests that exporters were able to benefit from the 
cut in export tariffs to Canada, which expanded their product market. Moreover, we find 
that the interaction between the cut in export tariffs and BC laws has a negative 
coefficient of almost similar size, indicating that even though exporters were positively 

51 Another reason why exporters might have been less affected by reduced import tariffs is that their 
production inputs are more likely to be imported (Bernard et al. 2009), which means that exporters are 
more likely to benefit from the reduction in import tariffs on their supplies. 
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affected by the FTA, worse corporate governance impaired their ability to benefit from 
the increased opportunities for exporting to Canada. 
 Due to the data limitations we are not able to distinguish whether the firm is in 
fact exporting to Canada, or it only exports to the other countries. However, we can 
look whether our results differ across industries. In particular, some industries have 
higher fraction of exports to Canada than other industries, and thus we sort exporting 
firms according to whether their industry mainly exports to Canada. We use data from 
Schott (2008) and consider industries to be prone to exports to Canada if their share of 
exports to Canada over all exports in 1985 was larger than 15%. This figure roughly 
corresponds to the sample median. When we split our sample of exporters, we indeed 
find that export tariff reduction had a positive effect for exporters that operate in the 
industries with large export share to Canada (Columns 4 and 5). 
 
7. Why does governance matter? 
So far we have shown that worse corporate governance amplifies the negative effect of 
an increase in competition on operating and stock market performance. These results 
can be explained in two ways. First, managers that are protected from hostile takeovers 
can become entrenched and thus exert less effort while an increase in competition 
would likely require additional effort to remain competitive in the market and to sustain 
profits. For this reason, firms with worse governance should be the ones affected more 
negatively by the FTA. Second, managers in firms with worse governance could be 
more constrained than those in better-governed firms what regards the actions that they 
can take. Thus, even though these managers are willing, they may be unable to respond 
adequately to increased competition. 
 We examine whether the performance of worse-governed firms deteriorated more 
after the FTA solely because of unwillingness to adapt, or rather also because some 
constraints jeopardized firm’s ability to do so. In particular, we look at one reason why 
corporate governance is important for how firms react to an increase in competition: a 
close relationship between corporate governance and financial constraints. Because 
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increased competition requires firms to reorganize their activities, access to external 
finance may play an important role in adapting to the FTA. Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
show that, as an industry becomes more dependent on external finance, the availability 
of outside capital becomes more important. Also, greater credit constraints limit a firm’s 
ability to react to trade liberalizations (Manova 2008). Yet the quality of corporate 
governance establishes the terms on which firms can raise external funds and that 
agency problems increase the cost of external finance.52 
 Our procedure is based on three different tests. First, we link our findings on 
profitability to financial constraints; that is, we check whether firms that were ex ante 
more financially constrained were more affected by the governance and trade shocks. 
Second, because financing decisions are endogenous to competition (Phillips 1995; 
Kovenock and Phillips 1997), we look at an exogenous increase in the need for finance. 
We want to see whether the latter mainly affected firms exposed to both BC laws and 
the trade shock, namely, those that we claim to be more financially constrained. In 
particular, we investigate effects of a sharp spike in oil prices during the first Gulf War 
in late 1990. Because this oil price spike unexpectedly drained resources of firms with 
negative exposure to oil prices, the event provides an exogenous source of variation in 
the need for external financing. Third, we directly test whether firms exposed both to 
BC laws and to reduced import tariffs actually raised less external finance. 
 
7.1. Financial constraints and performance 
First, we check whether firms operating in industries more likely to require external 
finance suffered more in terms of operating performance. We therefore classify firms 
based on whether the industry in which they operate was above or below the across-
industry median of external financial capital raised in 1984 (i.e., one year prior to 

52 In an extended version of this article, we discuss one explanation for why external finance activity was 
important after the FTA: industries that raised more external finance were better able to resist price 
pressure. 
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passage of the first BC law).53 Our measure is similar to Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) 
proxy for an industry’s financial constraints. The results, which are reported in Columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 12, indicate that the negative effect on operating returns of reduced 
import tariffs was mainly concentrated among firms incorporated in states with BC laws 
and operating in industries that are highly dependent on external finance.54  
 Second, we split the firms according to whether they had an S&P long-term debt 
rating in 1985. Firms can issue public debt only if they have a bond rating and thus 
access to this additional source of capital reduces financial constraints. Results from 
these regressions, reported in Columns (3) and (4), also show that the combined 
negative effect of the FTA and worse corporate governance on operating returns was 
concentrated among firms that did not have credit rating, i.e. those that were ex ante 
more financially constrained firms.  
 Finally, we use firm size and age as indirect measures of financial constraints. As 
discussed in Almeida et al. (2004), smaller and younger firms are less well known and 
more vulnerable to capital market imperfections. In Columns (5) and (6), we estimate 
separate regressions for firms that are smaller or larger than their industry peers. Small 
(large) firms are defined as firms having assets below (above) the industry median in 
1984, one year before the passage of the first BC law. We find that the impact of BC 
laws is close to zero and insignificant for larger firms, perhaps because their size 
already rendered takeovers less likely. In contrast, the BC laws had a large and negative 
effect on the ROA of smaller firms. Although the coefficient for the interaction between 
BC laws and the FTA is negative and significant at conventional levels for both large 
and small firms, its economic magnitude is much greater for smaller firms. This result 
indicates that smaller firms subject to worse corporate governance were most negatively 
affected by an increase in competition. Columns (7) and (8) report similar results for 
younger and older firms, again defined relative to the industry medians in 1984.  

53 The average import tariffs were not statistically different for any of the pairs of subsamples studied in 
this section. 
54 An industry's net change in capital can be assessed by balance sheet measures or instead by security 
issuances reported in the SDC New Issues database. Our results are consistent using either method. For 
the sake of brevity, we report results only for a sorting based on the balance sheet measures. 
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 So far we established that interactions between corporate governance and ex ante 
financial constraints were important factors in firms’ responses to increased 
competition. We now look more carefully at the identification to establish whether 
financial constraints were one of the main channels through which corporate 
governance affected the reaction of firms to the FTA. 
 
7.2. Exogenous variation in financing needs 
Here we exploit an exogenous variation in the financing needs of U.S. firms. We look 
into the first Gulf War which began with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi armed forces 
on August 2, 1990, and resulted in a spike in the price of oil that did not subside until 
U.S. military action commenced in January, 1991. Our test builds on the notion that 
firms more negatively exposed to oil prices experienced an unexpected drain of 
resources following the oil price spike.55 The production costs of such firms might have 
been tied to oil, or perhaps their business activities relied on discretionary consumer 
spending and were thus exposed to the inflation shocks. Hence, the effect of the 
resulting unexpected change in financing needs differed across firms as a function of 
their exposure to oil prices. Of these firms, we assume that the least financially flexible 
ones were most hard hit by the oil price spike.56 
 This setting offers an excellent opportunity to test whether a combination of BC 
laws and the trade shock57 had an effect on financial constraints. In particular, we test 
whether the effect on ROA in 1990 was stronger for firms that experienced a 
combination of (1) large tariffs cut; (2) passage of BC laws; (3) negative exposure to the 
oil price shock. If the interaction between BC laws and reduced tariffs had no effect on 

55 Lamont (1997) showed that 1986 oil price shock affected financing costs for the firms dependent on 
oil.  
56 These claims are in line with the anecdotal evidence. For instance, in an article entitled “Junk Defaults 
May Rise in U.S. Recession Climate”, the news service Reuters reported on August 8th, 1990 that “If oil 
goes to 30 dollars a barrel and inflation rises in excess of six pct, this will have a general negative impact 
on the junk bond market” and that “Analysts said that highly leveraged credits with limited financial 
flexibility will be hard hit as cash coverage for debt repayment declines.” 
57 In unreported results, we study the dynamics of the FTA effect and find that it does not diminish over 
the first years following the adoption. Here we exploit this finding that the trade shock had not yet been 
fully absorbed by U.S. firms in 1989. 
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financial constraints, then we should expect the triple interaction not to be significant. 
 We estimate the firm’s exposure to oil prices by using the correlation of daily 
stock returns and changes in the WTI crude oil spot price in 1989. As such, we follow 
Adler and Dumas (1984) who suggest inferring a firm’s exposure to currency risk from 
how its stock price correlates with exchange rate changes. For the sake of easier 
interpretation, we take the negative value of this correlation as the firm’s exposure to 
the oil price spike. We estimate the following regression: 
1 2 3
4 5
6
    
               
               
         
ijkt i t jt kt kt jt
it kt it
jt it
ROA Import Tariff cuts BC BC Import Tariff cuts
Oil spike exposure BC Oil spike exposure
Import Tariff cuts Oil spike exposure
    
 

      
   
  
7      'Xkt jt it ijkt ijktBC Import Tariff cuts Oil spike exposure e     
 (2) 
The term Oil spike exposureit is equal to the correlation between the oil price and the 
firm’s stock price (estimated as just described) in 1990 and is equal to 0 in all other 
years. The remaining variables are as defined previously. The coefficient for our key 
variable of interest here, BCkt × Import tariff cutstj × Oil spike exposureit measures 
whether Oil spike exposureit affects performance differently depending on BCkt × Import 
tariff cutstj. The null hypothesis is that BCkt × Import tariff cutstj. does not proxy for 
financial constraints and so an increase in financing needs affected firms’ operating 
returns uniformly, (i.e., that 7 = 0). However, we would expect a negative value of 7 if 
the interaction between worse governance and increased competition led to greater 
financial constraints, and thus the firms with more binding financial constraints would 
experience a more negative effect on performance in response to increased financing 
needs.  
 Table 13 reveals a negative and statistically significant effect on ROA for firms 
that were subject to BC laws and exposed both to the oil shock and the trade shock, in 
other words for firms that needed finance the most but were the least able to raise it. 
The result holds if we include our usual control variables as in our baseline 
specification, or if we control for the export tariff cut.  
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 As coefficient for BCkt × Import tariff cutstj is not significant in these regressions, 
one could worry that our baseline estimations in Section 4 in fact identify an effect of 
oil spike rather than the trade shock. However, it should be noticed that the analysis 
here is performed on a sample of firms that is smaller than that used for previous 
estimations, because continuous stock price data are needed to estimate Oil spike 
exposureit. In order to perform the analysis on the full sample, we replace missing 
values of Oil spike exposureit with zero. The results reported in Column (4) show that 
coefficients for both BCkt × Import tariff cutstj as well as for its interaction with Oil 
spike exposureit are significant and negative, confirming that worse governed firms 
were affected most by the trade shock but their performance further deteriorated in 1990 
if they were negatively exposed to the oil price changes. The additional drop in ROA 
for a firm with an average oil spike exposure amounted to 0.5%. 
 In unreported results we also perform splits similar to those used in our baseline 
regressions, thereby checking whether 7 is more negative for firms that are more 
affected by the trade shock. Indeed, the effect is again concentrated among non-
exporters and firms closer to Canada. Moreover, we find a greater effect for firms that 
are ex ante more financially constrained firms (i.e. firms in industries characterized by 
higher levels of external financing activity as well as non-rated and younger firms). 
 
7.3. Actual external financing activity 
Finally, we look at the actual issuance of new external capital. This analysis does not 
distinguish between firms that have more constrained supply of finance and firms that 
demand less external finance. Yet it provides supporting evidence that after the trade 
shock external financing activity differed for better- and worse-governed firms.58 
 Table 14, Column (1), gives estimates for a specification in which the dependent 
variable is total net change in capital as a fraction of the firm’s book value of assets. In 
addition to the usual explanatory variables adopted in our profitability regressions, we 

58 In untabulated results, holding the firm effects fixed, we find a positive and significant (at 1%) 
association between ROA and the external financing activity. 
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control for the beginning-of-year leverage as well as for the general issuance activity by 
industry and state of location. First, we show that being subject to BC laws reduces 
fund-raising.59 We also show that this reduction is larger for firms that face the trade 
shock. In fact, firms incorporated in states without BC laws increase their external 
financing activity in response to reduced import tariffs, whereas firms in states with BC 
laws make not changes in that regard.  
 As a robustness check, we collect data on new capital raised from the SDC New 
Issues database. In particular, we consider all types of securities (bonds, secondary 
equity offerings, and other type of securities) that firms issue over the year and that are 
reported in the database.60 Our main dependent variable is the proceeds from the issue 
of securities as a fraction of total assets in the preceding year. We restrict this variable 
to lie between 0 and 1. If SDC New Issues does not report data on the issuances of a 
particular firm, we assume that no issuances were made by that firm. Estimates, 
reported in Column (3), confirm our previous results; following a large reduction in 
tariffs, a firm is less likely to raise funds if it is incorporated in a state with BC laws. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We investigate how the quality of corporate governance affects a firm’s performance 
following an increase in foreign competition. Our empirical approach is based on the 
intersection of two policies implemented in the United States at the end of 1980s. On 
the one hand, business combination laws reduced the threat of hostile takeovers, thus 
rendering ineffective an important corporate governance device: the market for 
corporate control. On the other hand, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement increased 
foreign competition for U.S. manufacturing firms as tariffs on Canadian imports were 
abolished. We adopt a combination of difference-in-differences models based on the 

59 Consistently with this argument, Qiu and Yu (2009) find that the cost of new debt rose after the passage 
of BC laws. 
60 One concern is that SDC New Issues does not report borrowing from banks. Therefore, even if firms 
with worse corporate governance raise less capital via the publicly listed securities, they could substitute 
it with more capital from the banks. 
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observations that (i) states passed BC laws at various times (mostly before the passage 
of the FTA), while (ii) because of the FTA industries experienced different levels of 
reduction in import tariffs – and thus varying increases in foreign competition. 
 Our main finding is that corporate governance has a positive effect on a firm’s 
readiness to compete in the product market. The exposure to BC laws magnifies the 
negative effect of the import tariff cuts on operating returns and firm value. 
Furthermore, we find that the negative effect of BC laws on operating returns following 
the trade shock is predominantly concentrated among non-exporters, low-productivity 
firms, and firms located closer to the Canadian border. 
 Our evidence is consistent with the “quiet life” notion that managers in firms with 
worse governance are unwilling to undertake the actions needed to face an increase in 
competition. We also provide evidence that worse governance exacerbates financial 
constraints that hamper the ability to react to competitive shocks. 
 In the face of stronger competition, an increase in firm-level productivity can stem 
either from a uniform rise in the productivity of all firms or from forcing the least 
efficient firms to exit the market. Worse-governed firms could thus be less ready to 
adjust their actions or alternatively they might have a higher probability of going 
bankrupt. Our findings focus on worse-governed firms improving less than their peers.61 
However, future research could further discriminate between these two explanations and 
explore the role of other corporate governance mechanisms. 
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Appendix. List of variables 
Variable
Name 
Description Source
 
Governance Characteristics 
BC (or BC law 
present) 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 starting from the year when the BC law was passed by 
the state where the firm is incorporated (and to 0 otherwise); see Table 1 for the listing of 
passage dates. 
 
Institutional 
ownership 
Fraction of firm’s outstanding shares that are held by institutional investors. Thompson 
Financial CDA/ 
Spectrum 
 
Competition Variables 
Pre-1989 tariffs Average tariffs on imports of Canadian goods during the period 1986-88 for each four-
digit SIC industry. For each year tariffs are estimated as the total duties paid across all 
sub-industries (of each four-digit SIC industry) divided by the total customs value of 
imports. 
UC Davis Center 
for International 
Data 
Import tariff cuts Change in the tariffs on imports of Canada. Before 1989 it is equal to 0, in and after 1989 
it takes a positive value equal to pre-1989 tariffs (see description of Pre-1989 tariffs 
variable). 
UC Davis Center 
for International 
Data 
Export tariff cuts Change in the tariffs on exports of U.S. goods to Canada. Before 1989 it is equal to 0, in 
and after 1989 it takes a positive value equal to pre-1989 export tariffs. Pre-1989 export 
tariffs are estimated as the average over 1986-88 for each four-digit SIC industry. 
Trefler (2004) 
High (resp. low) 
tariff 
Dummy, set equal to 1 if Pre-1989 tariffs exceeds (resp. does not exceed) 0.033 and set to 
0 otherwise. 
UC Davis Center 
for International 
Data 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index, computed as the sum of squared market shares of all 
publicly listed firms (based on sales), in a given three-digit SIC industry in each year. 
Compustat (or 
U.S. Census) 
Import penetration     Dollar value of imports divided by the sum of dollar value of imports plus the dollar value 
of domestic production in a given four-digit SIC industry. 
Schott (2008) 
Source-country 
weighted real 
exchange rate 
Weighted average of real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar versus other currencies. For any 
given four-digit SIC industry, the weights are the shares of each foreign country’s imports 
in the total imports of that industry, fixed in 1981. 
Datastream 
PPI Annual average (M13) of the Producer Price Index for a given four-digit SIC industry. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln (age) =ln(age+1), where age is the number of years that the firm has been in Compustat. Compustat 
Asset size =ln(at), where at is the size of assets, in millions of U.S. dollars. Compustat 
ROA =ebitda/at t-1, where ebitda is the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization and where at is the size of assets. 
Compustat 
Leverage =(dlc+dltt)/at, where dlc is the amount of financial debt due in one year, dltt is the 
amount of long-term financial debt and at is the size of assets. 
Compustat 
Market-to-book =(prcc_f ×cshtr_f)/ceq, where prcc_f is the market price of a common share at the end of 
the fiscal year, cshtr_f is the number of common shares outstanding and ceq is the book 
value of equity. This variable is limited to the interval between 0 and 10. 
Compustat 
R&D/Sales =xrd/sale, where xrd is the amount of R&D expenditures and sale denotes the annual 
sales. 
Compustat 
Large (resp. small) 
firm 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the firm’s asset size of the firm is greater (resp. lower) 
than the median size of the firms within the firm’s three-digit SIC industry in 1984 and 
set to 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
High (resp. low) 
TFP firm 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the firm’s total factor productivity (TFP) of the firm is 
greater (resp. lower) than the median TFP of the firms within the firm’s three-digit SIC 
industry in 1984 and set to 0 otherwise; here TFP is estimated using the procedure 
described by Olley and Pakes (1996). The firm-level variables used to compute TFP are 
Compustat 
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the logarithms of sales, employment, capital expenditures, and property, plants and 
equipment. 
Young (resp. old) 
firm 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the firm’s age is greater (resp. lower) than the median 
within the firm’s three-digit SIC industry in 1984 and set to 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Closer to (resp. 
farther from) the 
border 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the distance from the principal city of the state in 
which the firm’s headquarter is located is less (resp. more) than 300 miles from the 
nearest road crossing of U.S.-Canada border and set to 0 otherwise. 
Various 
Exporters (resp. 
non exporters) 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the firm reports an average of at least (less than) 1% of 
export to sales and set to 0 otherwise. Due to lack of export data by destination country, 
we consider the overall exports and not only export to Canada. 
Compustat 
Industries with high 
(resp. low) exports 
to Canada 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the industry’s share of exports to Canada over all 
exports in 1985 is higher (resp. lower) than 15%. 
Schott (2008) 
 
State (Industry) Trends 
State-year Average of the dependent variable across all firms in the same state of location of the 
firm, where averages are computed excluding the firm in question. 
Compustat 
Industry-year Average of the dependent variable across all firms in the same four-digit SIC industry of 
the firm, where averages are computed excluding the firm in question. 
Compustat 
 
Financing Variables 
Net change in 
capital 
=((dd1t+dlttt)-(dd1t-1+dlttt-1)+ (sstk-prstkc))/at t-1, where dd1 is the amount of financial 
debt due in one year, dltt is the amount of long-term financial debt, sstk is the amount of 
newly issued common and preferred stock, prstkc is the amount of repurchased common 
and preferred stock and at is the size of assets. This variable is limited to the interval 
between 0 and 1. 
Compustat 
Net change in 
equity 
=(sstk-prstkc)/att-1, where sstk is the amount of newly issued common and preferred 
stock, prstkc is the amount of repurchased common and preferred stock and at is the size 
of assets. This variable is limited to the interval between 0 and 1. 
Compustat 
Net change in debt =((dd1t+dlttt)-(dd1t-1+dlttt-1))/att-1, where dd1 is the amount of financial debt due in one 
year, dltt is the amount of long-term financial debt, and at is the size of assets. This 
variable is limited to the interval between 0 and 1. 
Compustat 
High (resp. low) 
capital intensive 
industry 
Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the four-digit SIC industry’s net change in capital is 
greater (resp. lower) than the median net change in capital across all industries in 1984 
and set to 0 otherwise. 
SDC,  
Compustat 
Bond rating Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if, in 1985, the firm has been assigned a long-term bond 
rating by Standard & Poors and set to 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Oil spike exposure Negative of the correlation between the daily returns on a firm’s stock price and changes 
in the WTI crude oil spot price, where correlation is estimated over 1989. 
CRSP, 
Datastream 
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Figure 1. Sequence of BC law legislation with respect to the FTA 
This figure shows the cumulative number of states and firms subject to BC laws. The vertical line 
in 1989 indicates passage of the FTA.
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Figure 2. Identification 
This figure depicts our identification strategy considering, to simplify the illustration, states that passed BC laws one period before FTA.
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Table 1. States of incorporation and states of location 
 
This table shows the number of firms by state of location (state in which a firm’s headquarter is located) and incorporation. “BC 
year” is the year in which a business combination law was passed in the state.  
  Number of firms  Number (%) of firms incorporated in 
State 
 
BC year 
 
State of  
incorporation 
State of 
location 
 State of 
location 
(%) 
 
 Delaware 
 
(%) 
 
 Other 
states 
(%) 
 
Delaware 1988 1956 5 5 100.0 0 0.0  0 0.0
California  199 667 184 27.6 423 63.4  60 9.0
New York 1985 158 297 103 34.7 173 58.2  21 7.1
Colorado  115 160 70 43.8 68 42.5  22 13.8
Minnesota 1987 112 138 96 69.6 37 26.8  5 3.6
Massachusetts 1989 103 199 87 43.7 102 51.3  10 5.0
Nevada 1991 89 18 7 38.9 6 33.3  5 27.8
Texas  83 359 65 18.1 220 61.3  74 20.6
Pennsylvania 1989 77 142 59 41.5 72 50.7  11 7.7
New Jersey 1986 74 200 56 28.0 115 57.5  29 14.5
Ohio 1990 65 117 54 46.2 53 45.3  10 8.5
Florida  55 132 42 31.8 66 50.0  24 18.2
Utah  43 37 23 62.2 10 27.0  4 10.8
Washington 1987 39 53 29 54.7 17 32.1  7 13.2
Michigan 1989 38 89 33 37.1 46 51.7  10 11.2
Virginia 1988 33 51 17 33.3 23 45.1  11 21.6
Maryland 1989 32 44 14 31.8 28 63.6  2 4.5
Wisconsin 1987 30 45 27 60.0 15 33.3  3 6.7
Indiana 1986 28 37 21 56.8 11 29.7  5 13.5
Georgia 1988 26 66 24 36.4 37 56.1  5 7.6
Oklahoma 1991 26 65 23 35.4 31 47.7  11 16.9
Oregon  26 41 21 51.2 12 29.3  8 19.5
Illinois 1989 20 146 14 9.6 117 80.1  15 10.3
Missouri 1986 17 41 10 24.4 23 56.1  8 19.5
Kansas 1989 14 24 10 41.7 7 29.2  7 29.2
North Carolina  14 44 11 25.0 25 56.8  8 18.2
Connecticut 1989 12 95 11 11.6 69 72.6  15 15.8
Tennessee 1988 12 29 9 31.0 15 51.7  5 17.2
Iowa  10 18 8 44.4 6 33.3  4 22.2
Wyoming 1989 8 4 2 50.0 0 0.0  2 50.0
Arizona 1987 7 44 6 13.6 29 65.9  9 20.5
New Mexico  6 8 3 37.5 2 25.0  3 37.5
Rhode Island 1990 6 15 6 40.0 7 46.7  2 13.3
South Carolina 1988 6 17 5 29.4 9 52.9  3 17.6
Louisiana  4 19 1 5.3 12 63.2  6 31.6
New Hampshire  4 19 2 10.5 12 63.2  5 26.3
Mississippi  3 8 3 37.5 4 50.0  1 12.5
Montana  3 5 3 60.0 1 20.0  1 20.0
North Dakota  3 2 1 50.0 0 0.0  1 50.0
Kentucky 1987 2 11 2 18.2 9 81.8  0 0.0
Maine 1988 2 2 2 100.0 0 0.0  0 0.0
South Dakota 1990 2 3 1 33.3 1 33.3  1 33.3
Hawaii  1 4 1 25.0 3 75.0  0 0.0
Idaho 1988 1 6 6 100.0 5 83.3  1 16.7
Nebraska 1988 1 6 1 16.7 4 66.7  1 16.7
Vermont  1 5 1 20.0 3 60.0  1 20.0
West Virginia  1 5 1 20.0 3 60.0  1 20.0
Alabama  0 13 0 0.0 12 92.3  1 7.7
Arkansas  0 9 0 0.0 5 55.6  4 44.4
District of Columbia  0 3 0 0.0 3 100.0  0 0.0
Total  3567 3567 1180 33.1 1951 54.7  436 12.2
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Table 2. Industries with the highest tariffs on imports from Canada 
This table lists the 20 industries for which the FTA reduced tariffs by the greatest amount. 
Four-digit SIC  
(U.S. 1987) 
Industry 
 
Import 
tariff cuts 
3021 Rubber and plastics footwear 36.06% 
2326 Men’s and boys’ work clothing 28.88% 
3253 Ceramic wall and floor tile 20.00% 
2111 Cigarettes 19.33% 
2221 Broadwoven fabric mills, manmade fiber and silk 14.53% 
2037 Frozen fruits, fruit juices, and vegetables 11.85% 
2821 Plastics materials, synthetic resins, and nonvulcanizable 
elastomers 
11.26% 
3671 Electron tubes 11.06% 
2022 Natural, processed, and imitation cheese 10.46% 
3144 Women's footwear, except athletic 10.01% 
3171 Women's handbags and purses 9.73% 
3229 Pressed and blown glass and glassware, not elsewhere 
classified 
9.31% 
2824 Manmade organic fibers, except cellulosic 8.83% 
2211 Broadwoven fabric mills, cotton 8.81% 
3143 Men's footwear, except athletic 8.55% 
3824 Totalizing fluid meters and counting devices 8.06% 
2084 Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits 7.83% 
2015 Poultry slaughtering and processing 7.77% 
3661 Telephone and telegraph apparatus 7.76% 
3851 Ophthalmic goods 7.55% 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
This table gives summary statistics for firm and industry characteristics. Panel A reports 
mean, median, and standard deviation for average U.S. tariffs on imports from Canada for 
the period of 1986-88 as well as the HHI index computed in 1988. In Panel B, we report 
summary statistics for firm variables. See Appendix for the description of all variables.
Panel A. Competition and concentration measures 
 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard  
deviation 
Import tariff cut  0.0445 0.0333 0.0504 
Export tariff cut  0.0934 0.0646 0.1144 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1988)  0.1737 0.1482 0.1210 
     
Panel B. Firm characteristics 
 
 
Number 
of obs. 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
deviation 
Assets size 34,264 3.6303 3.4917 2.3506 
Ln (age) 34,279 2.1884 2.1972 0.9611 
ROA 33,462 0.0584 0.1181 0.2421 
Leverage 33,410 0.1937 0.1534 0.1874 
Market-to-book 27,770 1.6435 0.6649 2.4251 
Institutional investor ownership 14,428 0.2686 0.2207 0.2189 
Import penetration 34,264 0.1276 0.0939 0.1208 
Net change in capital 28,581 0.1261 0.0038 0.2579 
Net change in equity 29,032 0.0838 0.0001 0.2305 
Net change in debt 30,191 0.0576 0 0.1527 
Oil spike exposure 1,720 0.0099 .0085 0.0667 
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Table 4. Main specification 
This table reports OLS regressions. In Columns (1) and (2), we include the BC law dummy and the variable measuring the 
change in import tariffs; in Columns (3)-(6), we include the interaction between BC law dummy and the variable measuring 
the change in import tariffs. Column (5) also includes a variable measuring the change in export tariffs and Column (6) its 
interaction with the BC law dummy. Control variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors, clustered by state of 
incorporation, are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BC -0.0268** -0.0250** -0.0205* -0.0189* -0.0133* -0.0133* 
 (0.0102) (0.0097) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
BC × Import tariff cuts   -0.4497** -0.4615** -0.5595*** -0.5610**  
   (0.2132) (0.2168) (0.2058) (0.2614)    
Import tariff cuts -0.3245*** -0.2311** 0.0253 0.1315 0.2134 0.2146    
 (0.0958) (0.0960) (0.2089) (0.2078) (0.2008) (0.2465)    
Export tariff cuts     -0.0045 0.0009    
     (0.0219) (0.0596)    
BC × Export tariff cuts      -0.0052    
      (0.0559)    
Size  0.1061*** 0.1094*** 0.1061*** 0.1093*** 0.1080*** 0.1080*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0065)    
Size squared -0.0083*** -0.0085*** -0.0083*** -0.0085*** -0.0081*** -0.0081***
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)    
Ln (age) -0.0315*** -0.0205** -0.0318*** -0.0210** -0.0208** -0.0208**  
 (0.0056) (0.0101) (0.0056) (0.0099) (0.0093) (0.0093)    
State-year 0.2205*** 0.2220*** 0.2192*** 0.2205*** 0.2059*** 0.2059*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0623) (0.0573) (0.0613) (0.0560) (0.0560)    
Industry-year 0.1618*** 0.1593*** 0.1614*** 0.1587*** 0.1270*** 0.1270*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0283) (0.0318) (0.0281) (0.0275) (0.0275)    
HHI t-1  0.0840***  0.0848*** 0.0735*** 0.0735*** 
  (0.0272)  (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0263)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 32,777 29,512 32,777 29,512 29,512 25,001 
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Table 5. Firm characteristics 
This table reports OLS regressions. In Column (1) (resp. Column (2)) we estimate a 
regression for firms that have TFP greater (resp. lower) than the median TFP of the 
three-digit industry in which the firm operates in 1984. In Column (3) (resp. Column 
(4)), we estimate a regression for firms with headquarters located in a state with the 
principal city closer (resp. farther) than 300 miles to the U.S.-Canada border 
crossing. All regressions include the control variables used in Column (3) of Table 
4. Control variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors, clustered by state of 
incorporation, are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 
 
High-TFP
firms 
 
Low-TFP 
firms 
 
Closer to 
border 
 
Farther  
from 
border 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BC 0.0055 -0.0221* -0.0030 -0.0402** 
 (0.0090) (0.0113) (0.0070) (0.0161) 
BC × Import tariff cuts -0.4967** -0.9504** -0.4752** -0.1705 
 (0.2045) (0.3912)   (0.1865) (0.2458) 
Import tariff cuts 0.3097* 0.5680 0.0743 -0.1807 
 (0.1709)    (0.4254) (0.1696) (0.2830) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 11,571 9,755 16,880 15,897 
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Table 6. Robustness with respect to industry characteristics 
 
This table reports OLS regressions in which we add industry controls to the baseline regression 
reported in Column (3) of Table 4. In Column (1), we add the interaction between the BC law dummy 
and average tariffs before 1989. In Column (2), we add the interaction the BC law dummy and the 
HHI. In Column (3), we add - as industry controls - skill intensity, capital intensity and TFP growth 
(all averaged for the period 1986 to 1989 and interacted with a dummy, set equal to 1 in the post-FTA 
period). In Column (4), we add all the controls that were included separately in Columns (1)-(3). 
Control variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors, clustered by state of incorporation, are 
given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BC -0.0183 -0.0171 -0.0145** -0.0107 
 (0.0128) (0.0108) (0.0065) (0.0096) 
BC × Import tariff cuts -0.4476* -0.4600** -0.4963** -0.4236** 
 (0.2233) (0.2171) (0.2057) (0.1852)    
Import tariff cuts 0.1377 0.1346 0.2646 0.3052    
 (0.2289) (0.2074) (0.1949) (0.2104)    
Size  0.1093*** 0.1093*** 0.1082*** 0.1083*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0069)    
Size squared -0.0085*** -0.0085*** -0.0083*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)    
Ln (age) -0.0210** -0.0211** -0.0226** -0.0225**  
 (0.0098) (0.0100) (0.0095) (0.0095)    
State-year 0.2205*** 0.2207*** 0.1998*** 0.1997*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0612) (0.0579) (0.0580)    
Industry-year 0.1587*** 0.1592*** 0.1340*** 0.1342*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0245) (0.0245)    
HHI t-1 0.0847*** 0.0903*** 0.0832*** 0.0815** 
 (0.0265) (0.0336) (0.0269) (0.0308) 
BC × Pre-1989 tariffs -0.0260   -0.1447    
 (0.1855)   (0.1104)    
BC × HHI t-1  -0.0098  0.0013    
  (0.0229)  (0.0229)    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 29,512 29,512 26,018 26,018    
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Table 8. Alternative measures of competition and corporate governance 
 
This table reports OLS and instrumental variables regressions. In Column (1) we 
estimate regressions in which corporate governance is proxied by the fraction of 
the firm’s shares held by the institutional investors. In Column (2) we estimate 
regressions in which foreign competition is proxied by import penetration of the 
firm’s industry. Import penetration is instrumented with the weighted average of 
the real exchange rates of the importing countries, where weights for each 
industry are the shares of each foreign country’s imports in the total imports of 
that industry, fixed in 1981. All regressions include the control variables used in 
Column (3) of Table 4. Control variables are described in Appendix. In columns 
1-2 Standard errors are clustered by industry while in columns 3-4 they are 
clustered by state of incorporation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 
 (1) (2) 
Institutional ownership  0.0640***  
 (0.0191)  
Institutional ownership × Import tariff cuts  0.9574**  
 (0.3952)  
Import tariff cuts -0.3687  
 (0.2312)  
BC   0.0982 
  (0.0599) 
BC × Import penetration   -0.8743* 
  (0.4679) 
Import penetration   2.2823 
  (1.4989) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 14,011 33,490 
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Table 9. Market value 
  
This table reports OLS regressions. Market-to-book ratio is estimated as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year 
divided by the book value of common equity; this ratio is limited to the interval between 0 and 10. In Column (1), we report 
estimates using the same specification as in Column (3) of Table 4. In Columns (2)-(4) we sequentially include other controls 
(lagged by one year): ROA, extent of leverage and ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. In Column (5), we include all controls 
together. Control variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors, clustered by state of incorporation, are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Market to book ratio 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BC 0.0716 0. 0599 0.0792 0.0634 0.0595 0.0803    
 (0.0683) (0.0704) (0.0736) (0.0749) (0.0701) (0.0784)    
BC × Import tariff cuts -6.6526** -9.3694** -8.1342* -9.6753** -9.3674** -8.2615**  
 (2.5484) (4.3318) (4.0729) (4.1935) (4.3312) (3.9814)    
Import tariff cuts 3.6672 6.1295 5.4033 6.1128 6.1411 5.1769    
 (2.2125) (3.9027) (3.6081) (3.7178) (3.9007) (3.4771)    
Size  0.4731*** 0.4756*** 0.3934*** 0.4790*** 0.4690*** 0.4024*** 
 (0.1003) (0.1015) (0.0899) (0.1105) (0.1038) (0.1047)    
Size squared -0.0034 -0.0038 0.0024 -0.0031 -0.0032 0.0029    
 (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0074)    
Ln (age) -0.2208*** -0.2217*** -0.1977*** -0.1942** -0.2231*** -0.1643** 
 (0.0752) (0.0752) (0.0697) (0.0803) (0.0740) (0.0688)    
State-year 0.1744*** 0.1756*** 0.1797*** 0.1649*** 0.1761*** 0.1687*** 
 (0.0577) (0.0571) (0.0589) (0.0546) (0.0572) (0.0555)    
Industry-year 0.3058*** 0.3056*** 0.3105*** 0.3095*** 0.3057*** 0.3124*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0285) (0.0292) (0.0305) (0.0277)    
HHI t-1 0.9125*** 0.9180*** 0.8930*** 0.8836*** 0.9146*** 0.8411*** 
 (0.3000) (0.3045) (0.3139) (0.2832) (0.3054) (0.2938)    
Export tariff cuts 0.5436 -1.0025 -0.7388 -1.1933 -1.0111 -0.7697    
 (0.4565) (1.5086) (1.4247) (1.4295) (1.5062) (1.4110)    
BC × Export tariff cuts  1.4100 1.9807 1.6981 1.6981    1.5590    
  (1.5045) (1.4180) (1.4368) (1.5029) (1.4131) 
ROA t-1   0.4612***   0.5780*** 
   (0.1273)   (0.1521)    
Leverage t-1    -0.5752***  -0.5367*** 
    (0.1211)  (0.1129)    
R&D t-1     -0.1043 1.0297*** 
     (0.0944) (0.3442)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 22,091 22,091 21,714 21,747 21,818 21,188    
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Table 10. Abnormal returns around the 1988 Canadian general election 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of stocks of U.S. firms. These returns are calculated as the 
difference between actual holding returns (as extracted from CRSP), and expected returns (projected using a market model with 
the parameters estimated from 241 to 41 trading days prior to November 21, 1988). Event date [0] in the table corresponds to 
November 21, 1988. Columns (1)-(3) report results for different equally weighted portfolios, constructed at the three-digit SIC 
industry level: Column (1) reports results of all industry portfolios; Column (2) reports the average abnormal returns for 
portfolios of the firms in industries subject to high (i.e. greater than 3.3%) tariff; and Column (3) reports the average abnormal 
returns for portfolios of the firms in industries subject to low (i.e. lower than 3.3%) tariff. Columns (5)-(6) report results for 
different equally weighted portfolios, constructed at the state of incorporation level: Column (5) reports the average abnormal 
returns for portfolios of the firms incorporated in a state that passed a BC law before 1989; and Column (6) reports the average 
abnormal returns for portfolios of the firms incorporated in a state that passed a BC law in or after 1989. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
CARs around Canadian election results 
 
 
All 
firms 
 High 
tariffs 
Low 
tariffs 
Difference: 
(2)-(3) 
 BC laws 
present 
No BC 
laws 
Difference: 
(5)-(6) 
Event period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
[-20,-1] -0.0035  -0.0138 0.0075 -0.0212*  -0.0013 0.0186 -0.0199 
 (0.0064)  (0.0087) (0.0093) (0.0127)  (0.0168) (0.0227) (0.0332) 
[-5,-1] -0.0024  -0.0063 0.0018 -0.0081  0.0013 -0.0069 0.0081 
 (0.0034)  (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0068)  (0.0042) (0.0087) (0.0122) 
[-1,0] -0.0003  -0.0045 -0.0021 -0.0024  -0.0050 -0.0037 -0.0012 
 (0.0039)  (0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0049)  (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0067) 
[0,0] -0.0009  -0.0043** -0.0030 -0.0013  -0.0057** -0.0034 -0.0023 
 (0.0034)  (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0034)  (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0052) 
[0,1] -0.0016  -0.0086*** -0.0003 -0.0083*  -0.0064* 0.0043 -0.0106 
 (0.0037)  (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0043)  (0.0038) (0.0058) (0.0083) 
[0,3] -0.0049*  -0.0091*** -0.0003 -0.0088  -0.0135*** 0.0020 -0.0155* 
 (0.0028)  (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0057)  (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0088) 
[0,5] -0.0034  -0.0125*** 0.0063 -0.0188***  -0.0144*** 0.0044 -0.0188* 
  (0.0032)  (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0062)  (0.0052) (0.0069) (0.0101) 
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Table 11. Exporters 
 
This table reports OLS regressions. We distinguish between exporters and non-exporters (a firm is classified as an exporter if exports 
constituted at least 1% of its sales prior to the FTA). These regressions also include, as an explanatory variable, the interaction between 
the change in export tariffs and our BC law dummy. In Column (1) we estimate the regression for the sample of non-exporting firms. 
In Columns (2)-(5) we estimate regressions for the sample of exporting firms. In Column (4) (resp. Column (5)) we estimate separate 
regressions for exporting firms in industries with the share of exports to Canada over all exports in 1985 higher (resp. lower) than 15%. 
All regressions include the control variables used in Column (3) of Table 4. Control variables are described in Appendix. Standard 
errors, clustered by state of incorporation, are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 
 
Non- 
exporters  
Exporters 
 
     
Industries 
with high 
exports to 
Canada 
Industries 
with low 
exports to 
Canada 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BC -0.0173*  -0.0002 0.0011    -0.0005 0.0054 
 (0.0096)  (0.0056) (0.0056)    (0.0109) (0.0076) 
BC × Export tariff cuts -0.0242   -0.2653**  -0.3388** -0.1816 
 (0.0554)   (0.1176)    -0.1423 -0.173 
Export tariff cuts 0.0419  0.0672** 0.3184*** 0.3877*** 0.2081 
 (0.0587)  (0.0267) (0.1140)    (0.1193) (0.1671) 
BC × Import tariff cuts -0.5624*  -0.4729*** -0.0622    0.0955 -0.3185 
 (0.3249)  (0.1698) (0.1721)    (0.7126) (0.2132) 
Import tariff cuts 0.0508  0.1933 -0.1917    -0.044 -0.0963 
 (0.2818)  (0.1405) (0.1403)    (0.7033) (0.1925) 
Controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 12,542  9,119    9,119    5,011 4,081 
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Table 13. Oil price spike 
 
This table reports OLS regressions. We include the BC law dummy, variables measuring the change in import tariffs 
exposure to oil price spike in 1990, all pairwise interactions as well as triple interaction among them. Column (1) reports 
the results of a regression without any control variables. Column (2) reports the results of a regression with the control 
variables used in Column (3) of Table 4, and Column (3) also includes the reduction in export tariffs. Column (4) 
performs the regression on our full sample, replacing Oil spike exposure variable with 0 where values are unavailable. 
Control variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors, clustered by state of incorporation, are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BC -0.0111 -0.0144* -0.0149* -0.0097 
 (0.0084) (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0067) 
BC × Import tariff cuts × Oil spike exposure -16.3904* -16.8277** -16.7903* -15.0903* 
 (8.2565) (8.2587) (8.4216) (7.7437) 
BC × Import tariff cuts -0.2637 -0.2026 -0.2559 -0.5075** 
 (0.3793) (0.4094) (0.5493) (0.2464) 
Import tariff cuts × Oil spike exposure 10.5049 11.2219 11.1796 9.3238 
 (7.8530) (7.6550) (7.8249) (7.3099) 
BC × Oil spike exposure 0.6592 0.7225 0.7218 0.6184 
 (0.4115) (0.4274) (0.43) (0.3919) 
Oil spike exposure -0.4132 -0.4764 -0.4723 -0.393 
 (0.3993) (0.4106) (0.413) (0.3814) 
Import tariff cuts 0.0334 -0.0817 -0.092 0.2178 
 (0.3453) (0.3854) (0.5216) (0.2307) 
Export tariff cuts   0.0147  
   (0.0968)  
BC × Export tariff cuts   0.0322  
   (0.0982)  
Controls No Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 14,847 14,483 14,483 28,370 
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Table 14. External finance 
 
This table reports OLS regressions. In Columns (1)-(2), we consider the 
combined net change in equity and debt, normalized by the firm’s book 
value of assets at the beginning of the year. In Column (4), the dependent 
variable is instead security issuance, which is estimated from data in the 
SDC New Issues database and is equal to total proceeds from issuance of 
securities over the year divided by the book value of assets at the 
beginning of the year. All dependent variables are limited to the interval 
between 0 and 1. All regressions include the control variables used in 
Column (3) of Table 4 as well as beginning-of-year leverage and the 
reduction in export tariffs; in Column (2) we also include the interaction 
between BC laws and reduction in export tariffs. Control variables are 
described in Appendix. Standard errors, clustered by state of 
incorporation, are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable: 
 
 
Net change in 
equity and debt 
 
 Security 
issuance 
 
 (1) (2) (3)
BC -0.0436** -0.0445**  -0.0065 
 (0.0165) (0.0168)  (0.0109) 
BC × Import tariff cuts -0.4452** -0.6387*  -0.4569** 
 (0.1849) (0.3434)  (0.1933) 
Import tariff cuts 0.4900* 0.6526*  0.3014** 
 (0.2721) (0.3636)  (0.1262) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry and state trends Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of obs. 17,334 17,334  20,239 
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We present causal evidence that financial development plays a key role in 
technological progress.  We focus on firms’ innovative performance, measured by 
patent-based metrics, and exploit the staggered passage of banking deregulations in the 
U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s as a source of variation in the availability and quality 
of credit. We find that the deregulation of banking activities across U.S. states had 
significant beneficial effects on firms’ innovation activities. This effect, which does 
not become evident until some years after deregulations, is partly driven by a greater 
ability of deregulated banks to diversify credit risk, and by a relaxation of financial 
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1. Introduction 
Schumpeter argued that developed and well-functioning financial systems are essential 
for promoting innovation and long-term economic growth. As discussed by Jarayatne 
and Strahan (1996), this relationship arises via two possible mechanisms. First, a pure 
volume effect results when financial intermediaries channel savings to investment 
(Bencivenga and Smith 1991). Second, financial systems can increase the productivity 
of that investment by allocating funds to the most qualified firms (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic 1990; King and Levine 1993a). Our contribution is to establish the causal 
effect of financial development on firms’ innovative performance. 
Recent works document a positive association between innovation and various 
financing sources, such as equity issues (Atanassov et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2009), 
venture capital (Kortum and Lerner 2000), bank credit (Ayyagari et al. 2011; 
Benfratello et al. 2008; Winston Smith 2011) and internal resources (Himmelberg and 
Petersen 1994). As shown in Figure 1, our data also point to a positive correlation 
between patenting activity and loan supply in the U.S. While this evidence suggests 
that a wider access to external finance may favor innovation, the empirical study of 
finance’s effects on innovation is plagued by the endogeneity of financial 
development. Arguably, general economic conditions, industry characteristics and 
other unobserved factors may influence both firms’ innovation activities and credit 
availability. In addition, firms with higher value-added projects may have better access 
to financing. 
To overcome these concerns, we employ the passage of deregulations in the U.S. 
banking industry during the 1970s and 1980s. While intrastate deregulations eased 
bank branching within a given state, interstate deregulations allowed banks to enter 
different states. We exploit the staggered passage of deregulations to construct time 
variations in financial development across U.S. states. Banking deregulations induced 
exogenous variations in financial development for at least three reasons. First, banking 
deregulations, in particular those across states, facilitated banks’ geographic 
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diversification (Demyanyk et al. 2007; Goetz et al. 2011), thus encouraging lending to 
riskier projects. Second, deregulations strengthened competition, which is thought “to 
have improved allocative efficiency by allowing capital to flow more freely toward 
project yielding highest returns” (Kerr and Nanda 2009). Third, deregulations 
improved banks’ efficiency and quality of loan portfolios (Jayratne and Strahan 1996, 
1998), and also encouraged the adoption of better screening technologies allowing 
interest rates to reflect the underlying risk more accurately (Dick and Lehnert 2010). 
Our main result indicates that banking deregulations caused a relevant increase 
in firms’ innovative performance, as measured by the number of successful patents 
filed, which stemmed from across-state, rather than within-state, deregulations of 
credit markets. We also find an increase in the relevance of the patenting activity, 
measured by citations received from future patents, and in its originality and 
generality, suggesting that a wider access to external finance led firms to change the 
technological nature of their research projects.  
These findings remain significant after controlling for common patenting trends, 
firm fixed effects and other confounding factors. In particular, controlling for the stock 
of research and development (R&D) we observe that following deregulations firms 
made a more productive use of their existing innovation inputs – though these positive 
effects became larger a few years after deregulations were enacted. 
We claim that the channel behind our main findings relates to a greater 
willingness of banks to take risk once they become more diversified geographically, 
following interstate deregulations. Out-of-state banks may be thus willing to lend at 
more favorable terms – all the more so if credit risk in the deregulating state is less 
correlated with their existing exposure. We find that most of the increase in the 
patenting activity occurred in states whose economies exhibited least comovement 
with the overall U.S. economy. Moreover, the effect on innovation was highest in 
those states where new out-of-state banks were entering from the states least comoving 
with that state.  
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Although changes in the supply of credit can affect financing and investment 
decisions of a wide array of firms (Lemmon and Roberts 2010), the effects of bank 
credit shocks are most pronounced among firms with worse access to other segments 
of the capital markets (Leary 2009). Existing studies also show that bank debt is 
particularly important for young and informationally opaque firms (see e.g. Johnson 
1997; Hadlock and James 2002). Our findings indicate that bank-dependent firms, e.g. 
firms that are young and do not have a bond rating enabling access to the public debt 
market, shift their investment from capital expenditures towards R&D expenses 
following interstate deregulations. 
A large literature has tested the effect of deregulations on entrepreneurship 
(Bertrand et al. 2007; Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Kerr and 
Nanda 2009, 2010) and industry reallocation (Acharya et al. 2011; Bertrand et al. 
2007). Recent works have also identified significant effects of banking deregulations 
on the corporate policies of U.S. publicly listed firms (Correa and Suarez 2009; 
Francis et al. 2011). Our first contribution is to highlight for the first time that 
interstate deregulations had beneficial effects on firms’ innovative activities. 
Along this line, we also contribute to a broad research on the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth (King and Levine 1993b; 
Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998).62 While some 
determinants of this relationship, such as firm entry and entrepreneurial activities, have 
been widely analyzed (Black and Strahan 2002; Guiso et al. 2004; Cetorelli and 
Strahan 2006; Kerr and Nanda 2009), there is significantly less empirical evidence on 
the role of technological progress. In a closely related work, Benfratello et al. (2008) 
show that banking development increased the probability of process innovation. We 
extend this work in two ways. First, we adopt policy changes in the U.S. banking 
industry as a natural experiment to establish the causal effect of financial development 
on firms’ innovation activities. Second, by focusing on corporate patenting, we are 

62 See Levine (2005) for a comprehensive review of this literature. 
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able to establish an effect not only on the volume but also on the technological nature 
and relevance of the innovation activities pursued. 
Finally, our study complements a recent literature on how variations in the 
access to external finance affect corporate policies (Campello et al. 2010; Duchin et al. 
2010; Leary 2009; Lemmon and Roberts 2010). Although we are unable to test 
whether the increase in innovation stems directly from bank lending, or indirectly, i.e. 
from non-bank institutions or investors that in turn benefited from banking 
deregulations, our results reinforce the notion that changes in the supply of credit have 
strong effects on firms’ corporate policies. 
Section 2 describes the policy changes that transpired in the U.S. banking 
industry. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 outlines our empirical methodology. 
Section 5 presents our main finding that banking deregulation increased the number 
and quality of firm innovation. We then provide evidence on two channels explaining 
the increase in patenting: the improved ability of banks to diversity credit risk thus 
lending to riskier borrower (Section 6), and the increase in innovation inputs following 
a relaxation of financial constraints (Section 7). Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Deregulations in the U.S. banking industry 
The geographic expansion of banking activities in the U.S. has been historically 
restricted by laws such as the McFadden Act of 1927 and the Douglas Amendment to 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. However, during the 1970s and 1980s U.S. 
states passed a number of deregulations of branching and interstate banking activities 
which effectively terminated the restrictions on the expansion of banks across and 
within states. Our identification strategy exploits the staggered passage of these 
banking deregulations.  
Table 1 illustrates the timeline of deregulations by state and year. As shown, 
U.S. states first reduced restrictions on branching within states, and then barriers to 
banking across states. The first intrastate deregulations were passed in the early 1970s, 
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while the first state passing an interstate deregulation was Maine in 1978, followed by 
Alaska and New York in 1982. The wave of deregulations continued until the passage, 
in the mid-1990s, of the interstate banking provisions of the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBEEA).63 
Deregulations were associated with several major improvements in the credit 
market and set the stage for the emergence of “expansion-minded banks” (Black and 
Strahan, 2002). Kerr and Nanda (2009) show that the total number of banks fell from 
the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s but this reduction was mostly driven by a drop in the 
number of small local banks. By contrast, the fraction of large banks increased over 
this period. Jayratne and Strahan (1998) document that these changes were associated 
with greater banks’ efficiency. For example, they show that loan losses decrease by 
about 29 basis points in the short run and about 48 basis points in the longer run while 
operating costs decrease by about 4.2 percent initially and about 8 percent in the longer 
run. Furthermore, they argue that most of these reduced costs were passed along to 
bank customers in the form of lower loan rates. Such major improvements in both the 
quality and the availability of credit are thought to have produced benefits for a broad 
array of economic activities, including the financing of innovation activities. Existing 
evidence at the firm level already indicates that banking deregulations were relevant 
for the creation and closures of new ventures (see e.g. Kerr and Nanda 2009; 2010) as 
well as for the corporate policies of publicly traded firms (Francis et al. 2011). 
The two types of deregulation had distinct implications for the U.S. banking 
sector. Intrastate branching deregulations reduced entry barriers into new markets 
within the passing states and made it easier for banks to gain control over other banks’ 
assets, either by mergers and acquisitions or by opening new branches within a state. 
The effect was to reduce the banks’ ability to raise prices above their marginal cost in 
local markets and, in some cases, even to break local monopolies (Kerr and Nanda 
2009). 

63 The IBEEA was passed in 1994, went into effect on 30 September 1995 and became effective on 1 
June 1997 (Carow and Heron 1998). 
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Interstate deregulations allowed banks to enter different states. Prior to interstate 
deregulations, only bank holding companies located within a state could buy banks 
chartered in that state; however, after deregulations bank holding companies operating 
in other states were allowed to do so. Indeed interstate deregulations let to an 
expansion of banks across state borders. Since out-of-state banks were typically 
endowed with more capital, the expansion of banks across states led to an increase in 
loan supply. Using state-level data on commercial bank loans for the period 1976-1995 
provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) we find that, after 
controlling for year and state fixed effects, interstate deregulations were associated 
with a 8% increase in total net loan supply. Moreover, because out-of-state banks were 
endowed with sophisticated monitoring technologies, interstate deregulations 
encouraged lending to risky borrowers (Dick and Lehnert 2010). Finally, lower 
restriction to banking across states improved the scope for geographic diversification 
(Goetz et al. 2011), allowing banks to finance more freely risky projects yielding 
higher returns without increasing the overall risk. Given that innovation is inherently a 
risky activity and out-of-state deregulated banks’ were better able to geographically 
diversify such risk, we expect the effects of deregulations on firms’ innovative 
performance to stem from interstate deregulations, rather than intrastate deregulations. 
A concern with our identification strategy is that deregulation passages may have 
been correlated with pre-existing trends in financial development or product markets 
within the legislating states. If that is the case, our empirical approach would simply 
reflect pre-deregulation trends rather than an increase in innovation due to the 
exogenous changes in credit markets. We rule out this concern in two ways. First, we 
draw on existing information on the political economy of deregulations. Kerr and 
Nanda (2009) argue that “interstate deregulations were driven in part by the savings 
and loan crisis in the early 1980s when federal legislators allowed failed banks and 
thrifts to be acquired by banks in any state, regardless of state laws governing these 
transactions. These changes paved the way for bilateral negotiations between states to 
allow interstate banking in order to foster larger, diversified banks that were less 
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susceptible to failure”. Second, we empirically show that deregulations did not have a 
significant effect on innovations in the years prior to the actual deregulation passages 
(see Table 5, Panel A) and this finding reinforces the idea that our estimates do not 
merely reflect pre-deregulation trends. 
Another concern is whether banking deregulations should have any effect on 
innovative activity since a debt contract might be ill-suited to finance such activities as 
innovation that have uncertain returns (Atanassov et al. 2007; Stiglitz 1985). Yet, 
public firms might resort to private debt to fund innovation when they incur costs to 
raise capital in public markets. Indeed, funding innovation with public capital might 
provide sensitive information to the competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983; 
Maksimovic and Pichler 2001), or it can be costly to manager because of low tolerance 
for failure in the public markets (Ferreira et al. 2011). 
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
We measure innovation by using successful patent applications, which represent a 
widely-used approach to quantify a firm’s innovative performance (Griliches 1990). 
Figure 1 shows the state-level non-parametric relationship between U.S. patenting 
activity, computed from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and loan 
supply data from the FDIC. While the evidence is suggestive of a strong positive 
association, the endogeneity concerns discussed in the introduction complicate the 
causal interpretation. We establish causal effects by exploiting the exogenous 
variations in credit markets provided by the passage of banking deregulations.
We start by collecting data at the firm level from the Compustat dataset, which 
contains a rich set of financial characteristics for U.S. publicly traded firms. We focus 
the analysis on the period 1976-1995, which covers all years when interstate 
deregulations were passed and also a large time period of intrastate branching 
deregulations. We do not extend our sample after 1995 to avoid confounding the 
effects with the Reagle-Neal Act, which was passed in 1994 and went into effect at the 
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end of 1995. Another advantage of ending the sample in 1995 is that our analysis is not 
contaminated by the dramatic increase in cash flow and equity financing of R&D 
activities experienced by young U.S. firms during the second half of the 1990s (Brown 
et al. 2009). Following the literature on U.S. banking deregulations, we exclude 
observations in Delaware and South Dakota because these states were subject to 
special tax incentives. We also exclude firms with negative or zero book value of 
assets and sales, and firms headquartered outside the U.S.64 Finally, we consider SIC 
codes up to 4000 (mostly manufacturing firms). Thus, we exclude industries such as 
financial services or utilities, which typically operate under specific regulations, or the 
software industry, which is primarily dependent upon non-debt sources of financing 
such as equity issuances and venture capital.65 In fact, as documented in Scherer 
(1983) and more recently in Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011), the bulk of 
patenting activity occurs within the manufacturing sector, which for this reason has 
been the focus of many existing studies (e.g. Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Hall et al. 
2005).
Next, we match Compustat firms with the patent dataset assembled at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which contains information on the 
patents awarded by the USPTO and all citations to these patents (Hall et al. 2001; 
Bessen 2009). We also construct several firm characteristics such as logarithm of sales, 
capital-to-labor ratio, R&D stock66, return on assets (ROA), firm age, cash holdings 
and asset tangibility. In addition, we construct the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 

64 A concern arises from the fact that Compustat only reports the last state of operations, and we may be 
unable to observe changes of headquarter from a state to another that are potentially endogenous to the 
deregulation passages. However, using data on headquarter relocations from the Compact Disclosure 
database, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) argue that most of headquarter changes are driven by mergers and 
acquisitions. After excluding these and other major restructuring events, they found 118 relocations 
from a sample of more than 4000 firms in the period 1992-1997. Our results are robust to excluding 
firm-year observations with asset or sales growth exceeding 100%, which are typically associated with 
mergers, restructuring and other major corporate events (Almeida et al. 2004). 
65 In unreported analyses, we replicated our findings with the inclusion of wholesale (SIC 5000-5199) 
and retail trade (SIC 5200-5999). 
66 The R&D stock is computed following the conventional 15% depreciation rate used in the related 
literature (see e.g. Hall et al. 2005). Also, we use linear interpolations to replace missing values of 
R&D; however, our results are robust to leaving those observations missing or treating them as zeros. 
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to control for the impact of industry concentration on innovation. The HHI is based on 
the distribution of revenues of the firms in a particular three-digit SIC industry. A 
higher HHI implies a higher concentration. We correct for potential misclassifications 
due to the presence of a single firm in a given industry by dropping 2.5% of the firm-
year observations at the right tail of the HHI distribution (Giroud and Mueller 2010). 
The detailed construction of each variable is described in Appendix.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the sample we use in the empirical 
analysis, obtained after dropping observations with missing values in the key variables. 
As documented in previous works on the Compustat-NBER patent dataset, citation 
statistics are very skewed. In our sample, the average number of patents is 
approximately 10 but the median is 1.
 
4. Methodology 
We use a difference-in-differences model to explore the causal relationship between 
firm innovation and banking deregulations. The important advantage of using a 
difference-in-differences model is that we can control for omitted variables and absorb 
nation-wide shocks or common trends that might affect the outcome of interest. 
We expect the positive effect on innovation to arise primarily from interstate 
deregulations, since banks improved their ability to diversify credit risk, thereby 
lending to riskier companies without increasing the overall risk. We use a binary 
variable interstate deregulationsjt which is equal to one if a firm i is headquartered in a 
state j which has passed an interstate deregulation at time t, and zero otherwise.67 
Interstate deregulationsjt captures the effect of interstate deregulations on firm 
patenting comparing outcomes before and after each deregulation year, vis-à-vis 
deregulations passed later. To control for the potential effects of intrastate 
deregulations, we use a binary variable intrastate deregulationsjt which is equal to one 

67 As shown by Bharath et al. (2007), public firms have a strong propensity to borrow from local 
lenders, so we assume that firms should be primarily affected by the banking deregulations in the state 
of their headquarters.  
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if a firm i is headquartered in a state j which has passed an intrastate deregulation at 
time t, and zero otherwise. 
Our first approach consists in using the logarithm of patent counts as dependent 
variable and estimating OLS regressions. However, one concern with this approach is 
that it does not appropriately deal with firms that have zero patents. To avoid losing 
these observations we employ count data models, which are widely used in the 
econometric analysis of patents. Following Hausman et al. (1984), we hypothesize that 
the expected number of patents of a firm i applied for in year t is an exponential 
function of both types of deregulations, contained in , and firm- and industry-
specific characteristics.68 More specifically, we estimate conditional-mean Poisson 
models:   
              	
 	      	  	                      (1) 
We estimate fixed-effect Poisson models by Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood 
(QMLE), which provide consistent estimates as long as the conditional mean is 
correctly specified even if the true underlying distribution is not Poisson (Wooldridge 
1999). Since our deregulation treatments are defined at the state level, we cluster 
standard errors at the state of location. Following the literature on the production 
function of patents (see e.g. Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Aghion et al. 2009), our 
baseline specification includes a vector 	 of time-varying firm controls, such as 
firm sales69 and capital-labor ratio, which are lagged by one year to reduce 
simultaneity concerns. Furthermore, we control for firm idiosyncratic effects denoted 
by 	.  
In additional analyses, we include other controls such as firm age and tangibility, 
to control for existing dependence and access to bank credit; return on assets (ROA), 
to control for cash flow positions; cash holdings, to control for differences in liquidity; 
and HHI, to absorb the effect of concentration in the industry where a firm operates. 

68 Our main results do not change if we estimate models in which interstate and intrastate deregulation 
treatments are included separately. 
69 In unreported analyses, we control for firm size in alternative ways such as by including the square of 
firm sales, or replacing firm sales with the logarithm of total assets. 
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Depending on the specification, we also control for the current stock of R&D. As 
stressed by Aghion et al. (2009), not controlling for the R&D stock implies that the 
coefficient of the variable of interest on the right-hand side will reflect both the 
increase in R&D expenses and the productivity of R&D. By contrast, when the R&D 
stock is included in the specification, the effect of the variables of interest can be 
interpreted as an effect on the innovative productivity of firms. 
Given that the U.S. patenting activity increased substantially starting from the 
mid 1980s (see e.g. Hall 2004), it is important to control for aggregate trends. First, we 
include a full set of year dummies, denoted by  in equation (1). Second, we control 
for industry linear trends by including in the specification the annual three-digit SIC 
industry averages of the dependent variable, computed after excluding the firm in 
question. Third, we assess the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of linear 
geographic trends, computed as annual averages of each headquarter’s state after 
excluding the firm in question. In unreported analyses, we also check that our results 
are robust to including polynomial terms of industry and geographic linear trends. 
5. Innovation activity 
This section presents our empirical results. First, we show the results obtained on the 
number of patents successfully filed by the firms. Second, we analyze the quality of 
innovation, by exploiting information on the citations that each patent received from 
subsequent patent applications. We proceed by estimating the dynamic effects of 
banking deregulations and discussing a number of robustness checks. 
 
5.1 Innovation outputs 
Table 3, Panel A, shows OLS estimates using the logarithm of patent counts as the 
dependent variable. In Column (1), we show that the interstate deregulations had a 
positive effect on the innovation outputs. In particular, allowing out-of-state banks to 
enter the state increased innovation activity for a firm located in the state by 21%. 
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Meanwhile, the coefficient of intrastate deregulations is not statistically different from 
zero. 
While in Column (1) we only control for industry and year fixed effects, in 
Column (2) we add the logarithm of sales and capital-to-labor ratio. Controlling for 
these firm characteristics reduces the magnitude of the interstate coefficient, which is 
however more precisely estimated and becomes significant at 1%. In Column (3), we 
further control for R&D stock. As expected, the stock of R&D has a positive and 
significant effect on patenting; however, the interstate deregulation coefficient remains 
significant at 1%. In Column (4), we confirm our findings by including a host of 
controls that may potentially affect innovation, such as firm age, HHI, ROA, 
tangibility and cash holdings. The interstate deregulations coefficient remains both 
statistically and economically relevant, indicating a 19% increase in patenting.  
In Columns (5) - (8), we adopt a more restrictive specification that instead of 
industry fixed effects includes firm fixed effects. As expected, restricting the 
identification to within-firm variations leads to sensibly smaller deregulation 
coefficients, but the statistical significance is confirmed at 1% level. The economic 
magnitude of the effect is relevant as well: the most restrictive specification (Column 
8), indicate a 12.7% increase in patenting. As found above, the intrastate deregulations 
had no relevant effects. 
In Table 3, Panel B, we provide estimates from fixed-effect Poisson QMLE 
regressions, which take into account that patent counts are skewed to zero.70 Similar to 
our OLS results, the most restrictive specification (Column 4) indicates a 14% increase 
in patenting following interstate deregulations. 

70 An alternative approach could be to use transformations of the dependent variable to avoid losing 
observations with zero patents (as in Table 3, Panel A). For example, in unreported analyses we have 
estimated OLS regressions using the logarithm of (1 + patent counts) as dependent variable. However, 
these transformations are arbitrary and often not robust to alternative methods. 
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5.2 Innovation quality 
Our results so far suggest that interstate deregulations caused an increase in firms’ 
innovation activities as measured by the raw number of patents granted. However, the 
existing research has demonstrated that patents differ greatly in “value” and that 
simple patent counts do not capture the relative importance of the underlying 
inventions (Harhoff et al. 1999). In this section, we measure innovation by weighing 
each patent using the number of future citations received from subsequent patents 
(Trajtenberg 1990). Forward citations reflect the economic and technological 
“importance” as perceived by the inventors themselves (Jaffe et al. 2000) and 
knowledgeable peers in the technology field (Albert et al. 1991). Because forward 
citations suffer from truncation problems, we adopt patent counts weighted by 
truncation-adjusted citation counts from the NBER data (see e.g. Hall et al. 2001; Hall 
et al. 2005).71 
Results reported in Table 4, where we use cite-weighted patent counts as 
dependent variable, indicate that interstate deregulations lead to a significant and 
economically relevant increase in the quality of patenting, whereas intrastate 
deregulations have an insignificant effect. Hence, not only the number of patents have 
increased but their average quality has risen as well, suggesting that the effect did not 
purely come from the larger supply of financing and thus lower rationing of projects 
being financed. We further argue that the average increase in the quality of innovations 
stems from a rise in the risk of innovative projects being financed. 
5.3 Dynamic effects 
Although U.S. states passed deregulation legislations at specific points in time, the real 
consequence of interstate deregulations on credit supply caused by the actual entry of 
banks in the new states may manifest after several years. Even patenting an innovation 

71 The problem arises from the fact that “citations to a given patent typically keep coming over long 
periods of time, but we only observe them until the last date of the available data” (Hall et al. 2005). 
Besides the use of truncation-adjusted citation counts, the problem is mitigated by the inclusion of year 
fixed effect. In fact, our results are robust to the adoption of unadjusted citation counts. 
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is the outcome of a process that sometimes can require several years. A specification 
that compares raw outcomes before and after deregulations, as the one used in the 
previous sections, may not be well-suited to capture these potential dynamic effects. 
We test for dynamic effects by drawing on specifications similar to Kerr and 
Nanda (2009). First, we construct a dynamic difference-in-differences model 
employing a set of dummies that measure the distance in years from each deregulation 
passage, using as reference group the period three years or earlier before deregulations. 
Results, reported in Table 5, Panel A, show that the coefficient prior to the interstate 
deregulation is small and statistically insignificant, thus confirming that our results are 
not driven by diverging pre-deregulation trends. By contrast, the post-deregulation 
coefficients are all positive and significant at conventional levels. Importantly, they 
become larger as we move forward from the reform year, with the largest effect 
corresponding to six and seven years after interstate deregulations. 
Second, we allow the effect of deregulations on innovation to linearly grow over 
time using a variable equal to zero up to the deregulation year and then equal to the 
number of years since a deregulation was passed, capping the treatment effect at 8 
years. Results, reported in Table 5, Panel B, confirm that interstate deregulations had a 
positive growing impact on firms’ patenting activity. 
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
We test the validity of our findings in several ways. We do not tabulate the results 
described in this section, but they are available upon request. We start by addressing 
the concern that other policies potentially affecting innovation were adopted around 
the same period of the banking deregulations. In the late 1980s, 30 U.S. states passed a 
set of business combination (BC) laws that reduced the threat of hostile takeovers thus 
weakening the governance role of the market for corporate control (Giroud and 
Mueller 2010; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). These laws might affect our analysis 
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through the effect of corporate governance on the managerial incentives to innovate72, 
and that effect would not be captured by our specification since BC laws impacted 
firms at their state of incorporation. To mitigate this concern, we control for a dummy 
equal to one if firms were incorporated in the states that passed a BC law, from the 
year of the passage onwards, and zero otherwise. Our results indicate that the positive 
effect of banking deregulations on firm innovation is not confounded by the passage of 
BC laws. 
Re-examining findings in Black and Strahan (2002), Wall (2004) shows that the 
effect of deregulations on entrepreneurship was positive in some U.S. regions but 
significantly negative in others. We check in several ways how our results depend on 
regional effects. First, we our findings are unchanged if we augment our specifications 
with regional trends, computed as year averages of the dependent variables by region 
excluding the firm in question.73 Second, we estimate region-specific deregulation 
effects. Results from this last exercise show that interstate deregulation coefficients are 
all positive, though their statistical and economic significance is not homogeneous 
across U.S. regions. 
We perform a number of additional robustness checks that further validate our 
findings. First, we include state-level time varying characteristics as additional 
controls. In particular, we include lagged GDP growth and the logarithm of population, 
obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Second, we exclude 
observations corresponding to the year of interstate deregulations. Third, we show that 
our results are robust to the inclusion of linear state trends centering the identification 
on discontinuities surrounding the interstate deregulations (Kerr and Nanda 2009). 
Fourth, to better isolate the effect of interstate deregulations, we exclude those states 

72 The effect of corporate governance on innovation is ambiguous. Some empirical studies indicate that 
worse corporate governance reduces the incentives to innovate (Atanassov 2009). Chemmanur and Tian 
(2011) argue that some degree of managerial entrenchment isolates CEOs from short-term pressures, 
thus inducing them to focus on long-term value creation and innovate more. Sapra et al. (2011) show 
that the effect of corporate governance on innovation follows a U-shaped relationship.  
73 Regions are defined according to the four-grouping classification provided by the U.S. Census: west, 
midwest, northeast and south (http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf). 
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that passed intrastate deregulations within a year of interstate deregulations. Fifth, we 
restrict the analysis to firms that remain in the sample for at least 5 (10 or 15) years to 
purge the analysis from firm entry and exit. Sixth, we use contemporaneous rather than 
lagged controls. Seventh, we exclude firms headquartered in California and 
Massachusetts, since these states have a particularly high innovation activity. Eighth, 
we extend our sample up to 1997, i.e. the year when the implementation of the IBEEA 
finally enacted a nation-wide deregulation of the banking sector. Ninth, we allow for 
heterogeneous time and state effects by interacting all the covariates with year and 
interstate treatment dummies. 
 
6. Innovation risk 
6.1 Technological nature and risk of innovation  
So far our results indicate that firms subject to a wider access to high-quality credit 
patent more innovations that are also relevant, as suggested by the overall number of 
future citations received. In this section, we explore the technological nature and 
riskiness of innovation. First, we combine citations with information on patents’ 
technological fields. Second, we check if there is a simultaneous increase in both high-
quality and low-quality patents. Finally, we analyze the volatility of successful 
patenting. 
Technological fields, defined by the USPTO, consist of about 400 main (3-digit) 
patent classes. We use the generality and originality indexes, developed by 
Trajtenberg et al. (1997) and computed by Hall et al. (2001), to capture the 
fundamental nature of the research being patented. The generality index is equal to 
   	
 !"
  , where 	
  denotes the percentage of citations received by a patent i that 
belong to the patent technology class j out of ni patent classes. The index will take high 
values (high generality) if a patent receives citations from subsequent patents that 
belong to many different technological fields. The originality index is constructed in a 
similar way, but its computation relies on the citations made rather than citations 
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received; it will take a high value if a patent cites other patents that belong to many 
different fields (high originality). 
We use these two indexes as separate dependent variables and estimate a 
specification similar to the one used in Table 4. Our results, reported in Table 6, 
indicate that interstate deregulations had a positive and significant effect on the 
generality of patents: firms subject to the interstate treatment exhibited a higher 
propensity to patent within a broader technological field (Columns 1 and 2). The same 
result is found for the originality of patents (Columns 3 and 4). 
Showing that following deregulations firms patented in broader technological 
classes, our results suggest that a wider access to external finance led to a more 
ambitious innovation policy, which in turn may entail potential failures. We perform 
additional analyses showing that firms’ patenting activity indeed became riskier. First, 
we study whether there was a simultaneous increase in patents that received many 
citations as well as few citations in the future. We estimate quantile regressions at 
different percentiles of the distribution of the logarithm of cite-weighted patent counts. 
In line with our notion of increased risk, our results, reported in Table 7, Panel A, 
show that the effect is present both at low deciles (e.g. 30% and 40%) and high deciles 
(e.g. 80%). 
Second, we analyze the volatility of successful patenting. Specifically, we adopt 
as dependent variable the standard deviation of the logarithm of cite-weighted patent 
counts computed in the pre- and post-interstate deregulation periods, restricting the 
analysis to firms that are present at least two years in each period. Then, we estimate a 
regression including the interstate deregulation dummy together with the usual 
controls, averaged over the pre- and post-deregulation period, and the firm fixed 
effects. Results reported in Table 7, Panel B, indicate that interstate deregulations led 
to an increase in the volatility of successful patenting. By contrast, we do not find any 
relevant result for intrastate deregulations (untabulated). 
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6.2 Banks’ geographic diversification 
One of the channels that can explain the higher patenting activity of firms after the 
entrance of new banks is that out-of-state banks were better able to finance riskier 
projects as they were less exposed to the background risks of the state's economy. At 
the same time, credit in this state provides out-of-state banks an opportunity to 
diversify their loan portfolio, for instance, due to a different industry composition of 
the state. We use three empirical tests that provide empirical support to this argument. 
In our first test, we separate the states according to how their economic activity 
comoves with the rest of the U.S. economy. Here we expect that states that are least 
correlated with the activity of other states would provide highest diversification 
benefits for entering banks and thus would experience highest increase in patent 
quality. In particular, we extract a coincident index that summarizes state-level 
economic indicators from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The coincident 
index combines data on nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in 
manufacturing, unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the 
consumer price index (U.S. city average). The trend for each state’s index is set to the 
trend of its gross domestic product (GDP) so that long-term growth in the state’s index 
matches long-term growth in its GDP (Crone and Clayton-Matthews 2005). We 
estimate the correlation of a state's economy to the rest of the U.S. from the monthly 
values of the coincident indices of the states as well as the coincident index of the U.S. 
over 1979-1984, before interstate deregulations started to come into effect. We then 
interact this correlation variable that we call Diversification 1 with the interstate 
treatment. In Table 8, Columns (1) and (2), we show that the increase in patenting 
quality primarily rose in the states with the recent history of least covariation with the 
rest of the U.S. 
Our second test relies on the locations of banking institutions that enter the state. 
We investigate whether the effect on innovation was highest in those states where new 
out-of-state banks were entering from the states least comoving with the state in 
question. In particular, for each pair of states we estimate the correlation of their 
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monthly values of the coincident indices over 1979-1984. We then calculate the 
weighted average of these comovement measures across all out-of-state banking 
institutions operating in the state, based on the location of their bank holding 
companies. As a weight for each institution, we use the assets it has in the state as a 
fraction of the total assets in the state held by out-of-state banking institutions. We 
estimate such a measure for each state and each year. We call this variable 
Diversification 2.74 Our data on the banking institutions comes from the Reports of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports) that provide information on the financial 
activities as well as the ownership structures of each banking institution. All banking 
institutions regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal 
Reserve, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency are required to file the Call 
Reports. Since this data is only available to us starting from 1986, we conduct the 
analysis on a subsample between 1986 and 1995. In Table 8, Columns (3) and (4), we 
report that when we interact Diversification 2 with our interstate treatment dummy, we 
find that the increase in patenting quality was mainly evident in the states that 
experienced the entry of the banks from the states with the least comoving economic 
indicators. 
 
7. Innovation inputs and bank dependence 
If easier access to credit was a channel through which banking deregulations affected 
innovation, we expect the effect to be more prevalent among firms that faced higher 
costs to raise external finance or that were more dependent from bank credit prior to 
deregulations. Moreover, if a wider access to external finance made the need of 
physical collateral less relevant to finance future investment, we expect that following 
deregulations firms changed their investment in favor of R&D expenses. 
To test these notions, we focus the analysis on the intensity of expenditures in 
innovation inputs, measured as the ratio of R&D to total investment (i.e. the sum on 

74 Correlation between Diversification 1 and Diversification 2 is 0.2. 
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R&D and capital expenditures). We first perform the analysis for the whole sample 
and then focus on the more financially constrained firms, adopting a number of 
standard proxies for bank dependence and financial constraints. First, we consider firm 
age. Because old and well-established firms can access the public debt market or easily 
raise equity, they should not be influenced by changes in bank credit supply. By 
contrast, young firms, which are typically more financially constrained due to 
asymmetric information problems, are expected to respond more to changes in bank 
credit. We construct the interaction between interstate deregulations and a dummy 
equal to one for firms that were young at the time of the interstate deregulation. We 
define as young those firms that are present for less than 10 years in Compustat (Rajan 
and Zingales 1998; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006).  
As shown in Table 9, while there effect was positive but statistically 
insignificant for the average firm (Columns 1 and 2), Columns (3) and (4) indicate that 
the interaction of interstate deregulations and young firms is positive and significant. 
Young firms subject to interstate deregulations experience a 5 percentage points 
increase in R&D relative to total investment. Given that the average R&D to total 
investment ratio is 0.42, this increase is economically relevant. 
Next, we sort firms according to whether in 1985 they were assigned a long term 
bond rating by Standard&Poors.75 By allowing firms to access public debt markets, a 
bond rating is related to lower credit constraints (Kashyap et al 1994; Almeida et al. 
2004; Faulkender and Petersen 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2010) and, consequently, 
lower responsiveness to changes in bank finance (Leary 2009). We construct an 
indicator equal to one if a firm reports a bond rating and positive debt, and equal to 
zero if a firm is not assigned to a rating or it has no debt.  
Columns (5) and (6) show that the interaction between this dummy and the 
interstate deregulations treatment displays a positive and significant coefficient. 
Results so far show that the effect of shifts in bank credit supply are relevant for firms 
that are young and constrained in accessing the public debt market. This evidence is 

75 1985 is the first year when the coverage of S&P ratings in Compustat started. 
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consistent with previous findings that bank credit is most relevant for less-established 
and informationally opaque firms (Hadlock and James 2002). 
In conclusion, our results indicate that interstate deregulations had a positive 
effect on innovation inputs depending on firms’ financial constraints: the effect was 
present primarily among younger firms and firms with worse access to other segments 
of the credit market.76 
 
8. Conclusion 
While the relationship between economic prosperity and financial development has 
been widely debated, establishing the direction of causality remains a challenging task. 
We focus on firms’ innovative performance as a driving force of technological 
progress and growth, and exploit the passage of banking deregulations in the U.S. 
during the 1970s and 1980s to generate exogenous variations in financial development. 
Banking deregulations, in particular those that removed restrictions to the geographic 
expansion of banks, allowed banks to better diversify their loan portfolios, increased 
the availability and quality of credit, and induced the adoption of screening and 
monitoring technologies.  
Our results indicate that interstate deregulations played a beneficial role in 
spurring firms’ innovation activities, as measured by patent-based metrics. 
Furthermore, we find that the effect was not imminent and was mainly driven by bank-
dependent firms, which reacted to the deregulations by changing their investment 
policy in favor of R&D expenses. Finally, we provide evidence that the increase in 
firms’ innovation activities is associated with a better ability of out-of-state banks to 
diversify credit risk. 
 
 

76 Notice that the results of this section do not change if we include interactions between firm and 
intrastate deregulations; the interactions with interstate deregulations remain significant and with similar 
coefficient, whereas neither intrastate deregulations nor the interactions are statistically significant. 
133
 
References
Acharya V.L., Imbs J. and Sturgess J. (2011) “Finance and Efficiency: Do Bank 
Branching Regulations Matter?”, Review of Finance 15, 135-172. 
Aghion P., Van Reenen J. and Zingales L. (2009) “Innovation and Institutional 
Ownership”, Working paper No. 14769, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Ayyagari M., Demirguc-Kunt A. and Maksimovic V. (2011) “Firm Innovation in 
Emerging Markets: The Role of Finance, Governance and Competition”, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming. 
Albert M.B., Avery D., Narin F. and McAllister P. (1991) “Direct Validation of 
Citation Counts as Indicators of Industrially Important Patents”, Research 
Policy 20, 251-259. 
Almeida H., Campello E. and Weisbach M.S. (2004) “The Cash Flow Sensitivity of 
Cash”, Journal of Finance 59, 1777-1804. 
Atanassov J., Nanda V. and Seru A. (2007) “Finance and Innovation: The Case of 
Publicly listed Firms”, Working paper. 
Atanassov J. (2009) “Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovations? Evidence from Anti-
Takeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting”, Working paper. 
Balasubramanian N. and Sivadasan J. (2011) “What Happens when Firms Patent: New 
Evidence from US Economic Census Data”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, forthcoming. 
Bencivenga V., Smith B. (1991) "Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth," 
Review of Economic Studies 58, 195-209. 
Benfratello L., Schiantarelli F. and Sembenelli A. (2008) “Banks and Innovation: 
Microeconometric Evidence from Italy”, Journal of Financial Economics 90, 
197-217.  
Bertrand M. and Mullainathan S. (2003) “Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate 
Governance and Managerial Preferences”, Journal of Political Economy 111, 
1043-1075. 
Bertrand M., Schoar A. and Thesmar D. (2007) “Banking Deregulation and Industry 
Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985”, Journal of 
Finance 62, 597-628. 
Bessen J. (2009) “NBER PDP Project User Documentation: Matching Patent Data to 
Compustat Firms”, available at: http://www.nber.org/~jbessen/matchdoc.pdf 
Bharath S., Dahiya S., Saunders A and Srinivasan A. (2007) “So What Do I Get? The 
Bank’s View of Lending Relationships”, Journal of Financial Economics 85, 
368-419. 
Bhattacharya S. and Ritter J. R. (1983) “Innovation and Communication: Signaling 
with Partial Disclosure”. Review of Economic Studies 50, 331-346. 
Black S. and Strahan P.E. (2002) “Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability”, 
Journal of Finance 57, 2807-2833. 
134
 
Brown J.R., Fazzari S.M. and Petersen B.C. (2009) “Financing Innovation and 
Growth: Cash Flow, External Equity and the 1990s R&D Boom”, Journal of 
Finance 64, 151-185. 
Campello M., Graham J.R. and Harvey C.R. (2010) “The Real Effects of Financial 
Constraints: Evidence from a Financial Crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics 
97, 470-487. 
Carow K.A. and Heron R.A. (1998) “The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994: A Wealth Event for Acquisition Targets”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 22, 175-196. 
Cetorelli N. and Strahan P. (2006) “Finance as Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and 
Industry Structure in the Local U.S. Markets”, Journal of Finance 61, 437-461. 
Chemmanur T.J. and Tian X. (2011) “Do Anti-Takeover Provisions Spur Corporate 
Innovation?”, Working paper. 
Correa R. and Suarez G.A. (2009) “Firm Volatility and Banks: Evidence from U.S. 
Banking deregulation”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 46, Federal 
Reserve Board Washington. 
Crone T.M. and Clayton-Matthews A. (2005) “Consistent Economic Indexes for the 
50 States”, Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 593-603. 
Demirguc-Kunt A., Maksimovic V. (1998) “Law, Finance, and Firm Growth”, Journal 
of Finance 53, 2107-2137. 
Demyanyk Y., Ostergaard C. and Sørensen B.E. (2007) “U.S. Banking Deregulation, 
Small Businesses, and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income”, Journal of 
Finance 62, 2763-2801. 
Denis D.J. and Sibilkov V. (2010) “Financial Constraints, Investment, and the Value 
of Cash Holdings”, Review of Financial Studies 23, 247-269.  
Dick A. and Lehnert A. (2010) “Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Market 
Competition”, Journal of Finance 65, 655-686. 
Duchin R., Ozbas O. and Sensoy B.A. (2010) “Costly External Finance, Corporate 
Investment, and the Subprime Mortgage Credit Crisis”, Journal of Financial 
Economics 97, 418-435. 
Faulkender M. and Petersen M. (2006) “Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital 
Structure?”, Review of Financial Studies 19, 45-79. 
Ferreira D., Manso G., Silva A.C. (2011) “Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to 
Go Public or Private”, Working paper. 
Francis B., Hasan I. and Wang H. (2011) “Banking Deregulation, Consolidation, and 
Corporate Cash Holdings: U.S. Evidence”, Working paper. 
Galasso A. and Simcoe T. (2011) “CEO Overconfidence and Innovation”, 
Management Science, forthcoming. 
Giroud X. and Mueller H. (2010) “Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive 
Industries?”, Journal of Financial Economics 95, 312-331. 
Goetz M., Laeven L. and Levine R. (2011) “The Valuation Effect of Geographic 
Diversification: Evidence from U.S. Banks”, Working paper. 
135
 
Greenwood J. and Jovanovic B. (1990) “Financial Development, Growth, and the 
Distribution of Income”, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1076–1107. 
Griliches Z. (1990) “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey," Journal of 
Economic Literature 28, 1661-1707. 
Guiso L., Sapienza P. and Zingales L. (2004) “Does Local Financial Development 
Matter?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929-969. 
Hadlock C.J. and James C.M. (2002) “Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?”, Journal of 
Finance 57, 1383-1419. 
Hall B.H. (2004) “Exploring the Patent Explosion”, Journal of Technology Transfer 
30, 35-48. 
Hall B.H., Jaffe A. B. and Trajtenberg M. (2001) “The NBER Patent Citation Data 
File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools”, Working paper 8498, 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hall B.H., Jaffe A. and Trajtenberg M. (2005) “Market Value and Patent Citations”, 
RAND Journal of Economics 36, 16-38. 
Hall B.H. and Ziedonis R.H. (2001) “The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical 
Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995”, Rand 
Journal of Economics 32, 101-128. 
Harhoff D., Narin F., Scherer F.M. and Vopel K. (1999) “Citation Frequency and the 
Value of Patented Inventions”, Review of Economics and Statistics 81, 511-515. 
Hausman J., Hall B. and Griliches Z. (1984) “Econometric Models for Count Data and 
an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship”, Econometrica 52, 909-938. 
Himmelberg C.P. and Petersen B.C. (1994) “R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel 
Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 76, 38-51. 
Jaffe A., Fogarty M.S. and Trajtenberg M. (2000) “Knowledge Spillovers and Patent 
Citations: Evidence from a Survey of Inventors”, American Economic Review 
90, 215-218. 
Jayaratne J. and Strahan, P. (1996) “The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank 
Branch Deregulation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 639–670. 
Jayaratne J. and Strahan, P. (1998) “Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and 
Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking”, Journal of Law and 
Economics 41, 239-274. 
Johnson S. (1997) “An Empirical Investigation of Corporate Debt Ownership 
Structure”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 47-69. 
Kashyap A.K., Lamont O.A. and Stein J.C. (1994) “Credit Conditions and the Cyclical 
Behavior of Inventories” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 565-592. 
Kerr W.R. and Nanda R. (2009) “Democratizing Entry: Banking Deregulation, 
Financing Constraints, and Entrepreneurship”, Journal of Financial Economics 
94, 124-149. 
Kerr W.R. and Nanda R. (2010) “Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and 
Firm Entry Size”, Journal of the European Economic Association 8, 582-593. 
136
 
King R. and Levine R. (1993a). “Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory and 
Evidence”, Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 513–542.  
King R. and Levine R. (1993b). “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717–737. 
Kortum S. and Lerner J. (2000) “Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to 
Innovation”, RAND Journal of Economics 31, 674-692. 
Leary M T. (2009) “Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital 
Structure”, Journal of Finance 64, 1143-1185. 
Leary M.T. and Roberts M.R. (2005) “Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?”, 
Journal of Finance 60, 2575-2619. 
Lemmon M. and Roberts M.R. (2010) “The Response of Corporate Financing and 
Investment to Changes in the Supply of Credit”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 45, 555-587. 
Levine R. (2005) “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence”, in Handbook of 
Economic Growth, edited by Aghion P. and Durlauf S.N., Elsevier. 
Maksimovic V. and Pichler P. (2001) “Technological Innovation and Initial Public 
Offerings”. Review of Financial Studies 14, 459-494. 
Pirinski C. and Wang Q. (2006) “Does Corporate Headquarters Location Matters for 
Stock Returns?”, Journal of Finance 61, 1991-2005. 
Rajan R. and Zingales L. (1998) “Financial Dependence and Growth”, American 
Economic Review 88, 559-586. 
Sapra H., Subramanian A. and Subramanian K. (2011) “Corporate Governance and 
Innovation: Theory and Evidence”, Working paper. 
Scherer F.M. (1983) “The Propensity to Patent”, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 1, 226-237. 
Stiglitz J.E. (1985) “Credit Markets and Capital Control”, Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking 17, 133-152. 
Trajtenberg M. (1990) “A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of 
Innovations”, RAND Journal of Economics 21, 172-187. 
Trajtenberg M., Jaffe A. and Henderson R. (1997) “University versus Corporate 
Patents: A Window on the Basicness of Invention”, Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology, 5 19-50. 
Wall H.J. (2004) “Entrepreneurship and the Deregulation of Banking”, Economics 
Letters 82, 333-339.  
Winston Smith S. (2011) “Beg, Borrow and Deal? Entrepreneurs’ Choice of Financing 
and New Firm Innovation”, Working paper. 
Wooldridge J. (1999) “Distribution-Free Estimation of Some Nonlinear Panel Data 
Models”, Journal of Econometrics 90, 77-97. 
 137 
 
Appendix. List of variables 
Name Description Source 
 
Innovation variables 
Patent counts Count of a firm’s number of patents for the period 1976-1995 NBER  
Ln (Patent counts) Logarithm of a firm’s number of patents for the period 1976-1995 NBER  
Cite-weighted 
patent counts 
Count a firm’s number of patents for the period 1976-1995 weighed by future citations 
received and adjusted for truncation (as described in Hall et al. 2001; Hall et al. 2005) 
NBER  
Ln (Cite-weighted 
patent counts) 
Count a firm’s number of patents for the period 1976-1995 weighed by future citations 
received and adjusted for truncation (as described in Hall et al. 2001; Hall et al. 2005) 
NBER  
σ (Cite-weighted 
patent counts) 
 
Standard deviation of the logarithm of a firm’s count of number of patents for the period 1976-
1995 weighed by future citations received and adjusted for truncation. Standard deviations are 
computed in the pre-and post-deregulation period, keeping in the computation firms that 
remain in each period at least two years 
NBER  
Originality index Equal to � � ∑ �������  , where ����  denotes the percentage of citations made by a patent i that 
belong to the patent technology class j out of ni patent classes. Technology classes are defined 
by the USPTO and consist of about 400 main patent classes (3-digit level). The index will take 
high values (high originality) if a patent cites other patents that belong to many different 
technological fields 
NBER  
Generality index Equal to � � ∑ s������  , where s��� denotes the percentage of citations received by a patent i that 
belong to the patent technology class j out of ni patent classes. The index will take high values 
(high generality) if a patent receives citations from subsequent patents that belong to many 
different technological fields 
NBER  
Ln (R&D Stock) Logarithm of (cumulative R&D expenditures), computed assuming a 15% annual depreciation 
rate 
Compustat 
R&D to total 
investment 
Ratio of R&D expenses to total investment, computed as the sum of CAPEX and R&D 
expenses 
Compustat 
 
Firm and industry characteristics 
Ln (Sales) Logarithm of a firm’s sales Compustat 
Ln (K/L) Logarithm of capital to labor ratio, where capital is represented by property, plants and 
equipment (PPE), and labor is the number of employees 
Compustat 
Ln (Age) Logarithm of (1+age), where age is the number of years that the firm has been in Compustat Compustat 
ROA EBITDA to total assets, dropping 1% of observations at each tail of the distribution to mitigate 
the effect of outliers 
Compustat 
Cash holdings Cash and marketable securities to total assets Compustat 
Tangibility 1- (intangible assets to total assets) Compustat 
Industry HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, computed as the sum of squared market shares of all firms, based 
on sales, in a given three-digit SIC industry in each year. We drop 2.5% of observation at the 
right tail of the distribution to mitigate potential misclassifications (Giroud and Mueller 2010) 
Compustat 
Young firms Dummy variable equal to one if a firm was present for less than 10 years in Compustat at the 
time of the interstate deregulation, and zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Credit constrained 
firms 
Dummy variable equal to one if a firm report a S&P bond rating in 1985, and zero otherwise 
 
Compustat 
 
Industry and geographic linear trends 
Industry trends Average of the dependent variable across all firms in the same three-digit SIC industry of a 
given firm, where averages are computed excluding the firm in question 
Compustat 
Geographic trends Average of the dependent variable across all firms in the same state of location of the firm, 
where averages are computed excluding the firm in question 
Compustat 
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Banking deregulations variables 
Interstate/Intrastate 
deregulations 
Dummy variables equal to one from the deregulation year onwards, and zero for the period 
prior to deregulations 
 
 
Diversification variables 
Diversification 1 State economy’s comovement with the rest of the U.S., measured as the correlation of state's 
coincident index to the U.S. coincident index. We estimate it from the monthly values of the 
indices over 1979-1984. The coincident index combines data on nonfarm payroll employment, 
average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary 
disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city average) 
Federal 
Reserve 
Bank of 
Philadelphia
Diversification 2 Weighted average of the comovement between the state and the states where the bank holding 
companies of its out-of-state banks are located. We estimate the pairwise correlations between 
all states from the monthly values of the coincident indices over 1979-1984. We then calculate 
the weighted average of these comovement measures across all out-of-state banking  
institutions operating in the state, based on the location of bank holding company. As a weight 
for each institution, we use the assets it has in the state as a fraction of the total assets in the 
state held by out-of-state banking institutions. Due to data limitations, this measure is 
constructed for the period 1986-1995 
Federal 
Reserve 
Banks of 
Philadelphia 
and Chicago
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Figure 1. 
Relationship between innovation and credit supply 
This graph shows the non-parametric (lowess smoothing) relationship 
between total net loan supply and patenting activity in the U.S. using state-
year observations from the mid 1980s to mid 1990s. The line reports the 
local linear regression fit computed using a bandwidth of 0.8. 
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Table 2. 
Summary statistics 
 
This table illustrates summary statistics. Patent counts represent a firm’s number of 
patents. Cite-weighted patent counts represent a firm’s patents weighted by the number 
of future citations and adjusted for truncation. Ln (R&D) is the logarithm of R&D 
expenditures. R&D/Investment is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total investment, 
computed as the sum of R&D and capital expenditures. Ln (Sales) is the logarithm of a 
firm’s sales. Ln (K/L) is the logarithm of capital to labor ratio. Ln (Age) is the logarithm 
of 1 plus the number of years a firm has been in Compustat. ROA is return on assets, 
measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and depreciation (EBITDA) divided by 
the book value of assets. See Appendix for a full description of each variable. 
 
Number of  
observations 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation
Median 
 
 
Innovation measures 
Patent counts 22,400 10.418 40.681 1 
Cite-weighted patent counts 22,400 159.008 775.394 0 
Ln (R&D) 21,894 1.590 1.485 1.135 
R&D to total investment 21,688 0.427 0.266 0.400 
     
Other firm characteristics 
Ln (Sales) 22,367 4.304 2.418 4.230 
Ln (K/L) 22,180 2.840 0.986 2.811 
Ln (Age) 22,400 2.525 0.785 2.565 
ROA 22,178 0.089 0.202 0.134 
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Panel B. Poisson estimates 
 
Dependent variable: Patent counts 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interstate deregulations 0.1611** 0.1414*** 0.1413*** 0.1421*** 
 (0.0696) (0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0408) 
Intrastate deregulations -0.1524 -0.1315** -0.1145* -0.1076** 
 (0.1262) (0.0590) (0.0588) (0.0528) 
Ln (Sales)  0.7093*** 0.4423*** 0.4896*** 
  (0.0618) (0.0775) (0.0861) 
Ln (K/L)  0.2566*** 0.2392*** 0.1872** 
  (0.0646) (0.0792) (0.0796) 
Ln (R&D stock)   0.4185*** 0.3783*** 
   (0.1226) (0.1233) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls No No No Yes 
Number of obs. 18,011 18,011 18,011 18,011 
144
Table 4. 
Innovation quality 
This table reports Poisson regression results using cite-weighted and truncation-adjusted 
patent counts as the dependent variable. Column (4) includes an additional set of firm 
and industry lagged controls. Specifically, it includes: Ln (Age), HHI, ROA, tangibility, 
cash holdings. Coefficients, unreported to save space, are available upon request. The 
construction of control variables is described in Appendix. Standard errors clustered by 
state of operation are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent variable: Cite-weighted patent counts 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    
Interstate deregulations 0.1412** 0.1014** 0.0949** 0.0974** 
 (0.0710) (0.0477) (0.0448) (0.0439) 
Intrastate deregulations -0.0416 -0.0028 0.0229 0.0184 
 (0.1475) (0.0678) (0.0669) (0.0610) 
Ln (Sales)  0.6895*** 0.3180*** 0.3724*** 
  (0.0577) (0.0686) (0.0897) 
Ln (K/L)  0.2437*** 0.2083*** 0.1794** 
  (0.0621) (0.0763) (0.0741) 
Ln (R&D stock)   0.6019*** 0.5817*** 
   (0.1053) (0.1139) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls No No No Yes 
Number of obs. 17,892 17,892 17,892 17,892 
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Table 6. 
Patenting and technological fields 
 
This table reports Poisson results using as dependent variable the originality index 
(Columns 1-2) and generality index (Columns 3-4). The construction of these indexes 
and control variables is described in Appendix. Standard errors clustered by state of 
operation are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Originality index 
 
 Generality index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interstate deregulations 0.1547* 0.1283***  0.1366** 0.1420*** 
 (0.0798) (0.0460)  (0.0636) (0.0496)    
Intrastate deregulations -0.1678 -0.1221**  -0.0938 -0.0321    
 (0.1270) (0.0532)  (0.1385) (0.0590)    
Ln (Sales)  0.4936***   0.5142*** 
  (0.0754)   (0.0830)    
Ln (K/L)  0.2101**   0.1578**  
  (0.0882)   (0.0763)    
Ln (R&D stock)  0.3545***   0.4209*** 
  (0.1177)   (0.1350)    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry trends Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Additional controls No Yes  No Yes 
Number of obs. 17,305 17,305  16,654    17,305 
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Table 8. 
Diversification benefits 
 
This table reports Poisson regression results using as dependent variable cite-weighted and truncation-
adjusted patent counts. Diversification 1 refers to state economy’s comovement with the rest of the U.S., 
measured as the correlation of state's coincident index to the U.S. coincident index. We estimate it from the 
monthly values of the indices over 1979-1984. The coincident index combines data on nonfarm payroll 
employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary 
disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city average). Diversification 2 refers to weighted 
average of the comovement between the state and the states where the bank holding companies of its out-of-
state banks are located. We estimate the pairwise correlations between all states from the monthly values of 
the coincident indices over 1979-1984. We then calculate the weighted average of these comovement 
measures across all out-of-state banking institutions operating in the state, based on the location of bank 
holding company. As a weight for each institution, we use the assets it has in the state as a fraction of the total 
assets in the state held by out-of-state banking institutions. Due to data limitations, Diversification 2 is only 
available for a subsample in the period 1986-1995. The construction of the control variables is described in 
Appendix. Standard errors clustered by state of operation are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent variable: Cite-weighted patent counts 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interstate deregulations 0.5490*** 0.4152*** 0.1074 0.1257 
 (0.1873) (0.1005) (0.1107) (0.0927) 
Interstate deregulations × Diversification 1 -0.5936** -0.4471***   
 (0.2714) (0.1357)   
Interstate deregulations × Diversification 2   -0.2044* -0.2281**
   (0.1134) (0.0954) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Industry trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 18,665 18,665 7,664 7,664 
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Conclusion
My dissertation empirically investigates the effect of a set of managerial and financial 
characteristics on corporate outcomes. Methodologically, my dissertation builds on 
”quasi-natural experiments” derived from legislative changes, which enable the 
estimation of causal relationships. From a conceptual standpoint, my dissertation 
contributes to the econometric research exploring the vast heterogeneity in corporate 
policies and the determinants of firm performance. 
The first chapter provides evidence that firms family-connected with the political 
sector improved substantially their profitability following an increase in the political 
power of the politicians they were connected to. The chapter also suggests that the 
increase in profitability arises from a better ability of connected firms to do business 
with the public sector. My analysis goes beyond the prevailing focus on corrupt 
environments and/or national politicians, and instead analyzes connections with local 
politicians in a country such as Denmark, which is typically considered as one of the 
least corrupt in the world. Analyzing the full welfare effects of political connections is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, some results suggest that political 
connections are welfare reducing. First, politically connected firms tend to be less 
productive before the connection is established. Second, the value of political 
connections is higher among less profitable firms. Both arguments indicate that political 
connections may transfer rent from more productive to less productive firms. The 
welfare reduction is mitigated, however, since connected firms use the rent to increase 
their operating efficiency. 
The second chapter links corporate governance to the competitive ability of firms. 
Using both accounting and stock market measures of corporate performance, my 
econometric analysis indicates that U.S. firms endowed with worse corporate 
governance become significantly less able to face a sudden increase in foreign 
competition. The mechanism behind this inability is closely related to changes in 
financial constraints: firms subject to worse governance are less able to raise external 
funds when competition strengthens.  
151

The third chapter explores how changes in the supply of credit and quality of 
financial intermediation influence firms’ innovative ability. By employing the passage 
of banking deregulations in the U.S. during the mid 1970s and 1980s, I provide 
evidence of a significant increase in the quality and quantity of corporate innovations, 
as measured by patent metrics, following the deregulation of banking activities across 
U.S. states. This effect can be traced to a better ability of banks to geographically 
diversify credit risks thereby increasing lending to risky customers, such as constrained 
firms with high innovation potential. Finally, in line with the notion that innovation is 
one of investments most sensitive to changes in financial constraints, I show that easier 
access to credit leads firms to increase their R&D expenditures relative to total 
investment. 
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